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Abstract
The issue of energy security rose in prominence in British political discourse between the 
years of 1997 and 2010, partly due to diminishing North Sea oil and gas reserves, and partly 
due to the increasing recognition that significant measures would have to be taken in order to 
mitigate the effects of man-induced climate change. Indeed, the UK became increasingly 
reliant on imported fossil fuel supplies for a substantial proportion of its energy needs. Given 
these facts, and the British armed forces historical requirement for large amounts of fuel in 
order to conduct effective operations, this thesis asks what impact energy security 
considerations had on British defence policy during the tenure of the previous Labour 
government and whether a more sustainable conception of energy security became evident as 
Labour’s time in power progressed. Using a framework for analysis adopted from Ian 
Bellany’s book Reviewing Britain’s Defence, in addition to explanatory tools adopted from 
the Oxford Research Group, Graham Allison and Andrew Dorman, this thesis demonstrates 
that energy security considerations did indeed have a noticeable impact, but this impact 
varied at each level of defence policy. Where the impact of energy security considerations 
was evident in British defence policy, it tended to manifest itself as a control paradigm 
approach, with an emphasis on the securing of energy resources through military action. 
However, the increased political saliency of environmental issues in the run-up to the 2010 
General Election saw the espousal of more sustainable energy security ideas within British 
defence policy, as the government became eager to demonstrate its ‘green’ credentials. In 
addition, there were some positive developments in the field of alternative energy technology 
for use by the armed forces as Labour’s time in power came to an end.
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Introduction
Why study energy security’s effect on British defence policy from 1997 to 2010? The first 
and most pertinent answer to this question is the historical evidence of the importance of 
energy issues to the British defence establishment since the latter half of the 19 century. For 
example, the advent of steam-powered warships in the 1860s necessitated the creation of 
well-stocked and well-protected coaling stations at strategic points around the globe to refuel 
the Royal Navy. As a War Office report commented at the time ‘not until the important 
coaling stations shall have been made secure can the strength of the British Navy be 
adequately exerted at sea’.1 In 1911, the then First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, 
had to decide whether to switch from the use of secure Welsh coal to relatively insecure 
Persian oil as the main fuel for the ships of the Royal Navy. He chose oil due to its perceived
performance benefits but in doing so raised the question of security of supply that has
•  * 2  •persisted ever since. The creation of the RAF in 1918 and the motorisation of the British
Army in the 1930s extended the importance of oil supplies to all three services of the British 
armed forces. Oil became the lifeblood of effective military operations.3 Indeed, the British 
Chiefs of Staff were keen to maintain a military presence in Palestine following the end of the 
Second World War, as they believed, in part, that it would ensure continued British access to 
Middle Eastern oil reserves.4 Since 1979, the British armed forces have operated in the 
Persian Gulf region on a regular basis, protecting oil tankers in the ‘oil tanker’ war of the 
1980s, removing Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991 and invading Iraq in 2003. Continued 
access to Middle Eastern oil reserves has been mooted by some commentators as one of the 
major determinants of military intervention, particularly in relation to the latter two events.5
1 Quote from the Carnarvon Commission report o f 1882 in The Cambridge History o f  the British Empire,
Volume III: The Empire-Commonwealth (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1959) p.234
2 Winston Churchill, The World Crisis Vol. 1 (New York: Scribner’s, 1923) pp. 134-136.
3 This reality was highlighted memorably by the American General George S. Patton in 1944, when he 
commented ‘My men can eat their belts, but my tanks have gotta have gas’.
4 Ritchie Ovendale, British Defence Policy Since 1945 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994) p.5.
5 See Paul Rogers, ‘Oil and US Security’ in Paul Rogers ‘Global Security and the War on Terror: Elite Power 
and the Illusion o f  Control’ (Abingdon: Routledge, 2008) The Green Party o f the United States explicitly stated 
that they believed that oil was a major factor in the UK and US decision to invade Iraq even before it took place. 
See Green Party o f  the United States Website, ‘US Oil Interests are Driving the Invasion o f Iraq, say Greens’, 
(23 February 2003) accessed at http://www.gp.org/press/pr 02 24 03.html on 30 April 2012; Alan Greenspan, 
former Chairman o f the US Federal Reserve, commented in his autobiography "The Age o f  Turbulence: 
Adventures in a New World’ that he believed the invasion o f Iraq in 2003 was primarily due to the need to 
safeguard the large reserves o f oil in Iraq for the world economy. In an interview with The Guardian newspaper 
in 2007 he commented, when quizzed on this statement ‘From a rational point o f view, I cannot understand why 
we don't name what is evident and indeed a wholly defensible pre-emptive position ’. See Richard Adams, 
‘Invasion o f Iraq was driven by oil, says Greenspan’, The Guardian (17 September 2007).
Therefore, we can see that energy security was a major concern for the armed forces for 
much of the 20th Century. As such, this thesis will ascertain whether this concern continued 
into the first decade of the 21st century or whether the British military no longer viewed it as 
an issue of great significance.
The historical importance of this issue for the operational effectiveness of the British 
armed forces has recently been mirrored by the rising prominence of energy security 
considerations within British political discourse. This fact (along with the need to study a 
specific political time frame in which key decisions in this area were made) is why this thesis 
concentrates specifically on the period from the inception of the Labour government in 1997 
until its demise in 2010. Indeed, during the Labour government’s time in office, three key 
White Papers on energy security were published, the proposed construction of a new series of 
nuclear power stations was outlined and a new government department for energy matters, 
the Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC) was created.6 Similarly, British 
defence policy also received greater attention within the media and the minds of the general 
public than in the immediate post-Cold War period. This enhanced prominence could be 
ascribed to what the journalist John Kampfher termed ‘Blair’s Wars’ -  Tony Blair’s decisions 
as Prime Minister to deploy significant British forces in Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan
n
and Iraq from 1999 onwards. Given that the Strategic Defence Review of 1998 was meant to 
‘fundamentally reshape and modernise Britain's armed forces, sorting out the weaknesses, 
[and] building on [their] strengths’ it would therefore seem appropriate to consider whether 
! defence policy kept pace with developments in energy policy during the Labour
i ftj administration or took a different course due to other considerations. This indeed is the main
| question this thesis seeks to address.
The creation of the DECC and the melding of policies towards energy and climate
j  change into a single government department illustrated the increased importance of the latter
j  issue in political debate. Indeed, the potential ramifications of climate change mitigation
[ measures for civilian and military energy use, as well as the threat posed by climate change to
! ____________________________
6 DTI, Our Energy Future: Creating a Low Carbon Economy, Cm 5761 (London: TSO, 2003); DTI, Meeting
' the Energy Challenge: a White Paper on Energy, Cm 7124 (London: TSO, 2007); BERR, Meeting the Energy
i Challenge: A White Paper on Nuclear Power, Cm 7296 (London: TSO, 2008); Martha Linden and Craig
Woodhouse, ‘Government needs nuclear power, Government insists’, The Independent (9 November 2009). The 
| DECC was created in October 2008 and brought together energy policy (previously under the remit o f the now
defunct Department o f Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform) and climate mitigation policy (previously 
the responsibility o f the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs). See DECC Website, ‘About U s’ 
(2012) accessed at http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/about/about.aspx on 30 April 2012.
7 John Kampfher, B lair’s Wars (London: Free Press, 2004).
8 Quote taken from the then Secretary State for Defence, George Robertson's statement on the ‘Strategic 
Defence Review’, Hansard, HC Deb Volume 315, Column 1073 (July 8 1998).
future international security, are the reasons for the adoption of the international relations 
think-tank the Oxford Research Group’s (ORG) notion of a sustainable security paradigm as 
a prism of analysis in this thesis. In brief, this paradigm views climate change and continued 
competition for key resources as significant global conflict drivers, both presently and in the 
future. The ORG’s ideal response to these drivers entails adopting sustainable energy 
solutions that reduce the UK’s reliance on imported fossil fuels, whilst at the same time 
mitigating climate change. The response it actually believes the UK has taken historically to 
energy security is that of a control paradigm approach, effectively using British military 
power, in alliance with the United States, to preserve access to key fossil fuel reserves and 
uphold the power of friendly but unpopular regimes.9 This thesis will use these notions to 
determine the effect of energy security considerations on British defence policy from 1997 
until 2010.
However, before we move onto the main body of the thesis, we must first summarise 
the purpose and general content of each chapter, so as to make the basis and structure of the 
argument clear in the reader’s mind.
Chapter one defines what we mean when we refer to British defence policy, so that 
we have a solid understanding of the specific area of policy this thesis seeks to address. This 
chapter will also outline the framework for analysis that will be used to analyse defence 
policy, which is adopted from Ian Bellany’s book ‘Reviewing Britain’s Defence’.10 Here the 
thesis will explain the decision to analyse British defence policy at the three separate levels 
that will be scrutinized in succeeding chapters: declaratory policy; operational policy; and 
defence-industrial policy. This approach will also include an explanation of subsequent 
modifications of this model and how these will be integrated into the framework for analysis. 
Graham Allison’s well-known methods of analysing government policy (outlined in the book 
‘Essence of Decision’) will also be scrutinized and elements of his ideas similarly 
incorporated into the analytical framework.11 Finally, the ORG’s conception of a control 
paradigm and a sustainable security paradigm approach to wider security will then be 
delineated, and their utility to the analysis of the importance of energy security considerations 
in defence policy will be established.
9 James Kemp, ‘Sustainable Peace and Security Today’, Compass Thinkpiece 18 (November 2006) p.2.
10 Ian Bellany, Reviewing Britain’s Defence (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994).
11 Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence o f  Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: 
Longman, 1999) p.3. This book was first published in 1971 under Allison’s sole authorship. Due to the 
emergence o f tape recordings o f  government proceedings during the Cuban Missile Crisis, the book was 
rewritten with Philip Zelikow in 1999.
Chapter two will demonstrate the increasing importance of energy security 
considerations to the United Kingdom as a whole since 1997 and how these considerations 
could likely have affected defence policy in the period under examination.
Chapters three, four and five (the main body of the thesis) will then analyse the 
separate levels of defence policy within the framework for analysis provided by Ian Bellany, 
moving in succession through the declaratory, operational and defence-industrial levels of 
policy. These chapters will examine key documents, important actions and the statements 
made by senior actors at each level (or circle) of policy so as to explain the reasons for energy 
security’s relative importance (or unimportance) in each individual sphere. Connections and 
divergences between each circle of policy will also be outlined so as to assess whether there 
has been a synergy in outlook between all parts of the British defence establishment in the 
attitude towards the importance of energy security as a key consideration.
The conclusion will then provide a summation of what has been discovered vis-a-vis 
defence policy in the analysis of preceding chapters and consider how these findings could be 
further utilised in future studies of British defence policy. Thus, with the structure of the 
thesis now clear in the reader’s mind we can move on to the next chapter and the question of 
‘what is defence policy?’.
Chapter One
The Framework for Analysis 
What is Defence Policy?
Before embarking on an analysis of energy security’s effect on British defence policy it is 
first necessary to define what in fact we mean by ‘defence policy’ in this particular instance. 
The word ‘policy ’ itself can have a number of different nuances. According to John Baylis, 
these can include: a flow of decisions; a set of orientations or principles; an overall plan or 
framework; or a series of actions designed to achieve the objectives of a programme as a 
whole.1 All seem to have a degree of validity.
Then there is the question of what we actually mean by ‘defence ’ in this particular 
context. Defence has a number of dictionary definitions. Two of the most applicable for this 
analysis are: ‘resistance against danger or attack’ and ‘a country’s military measures or 
resources’. For the purposes of this thesis we can therefore apply these definitions to the 
defence of the state; the state being in Gianfranco Poggi’s words ‘a complex set of 
institutional arrangements for rule operating through the continuous and regulated activities 
of individuals acting as occupants of offices’. In Poggi’s analysis, the state monopolizes, as 
far as it can, ‘all faculties and facilities pertaining to this business’.3 If we then use this 
definition to scrutinize the United Kingdom, we can see that the British state is comprised of 
all the institutions (such as the UK Parliament, the Police force, County Councils, prisons) 
that are employed to ensure effective rule of individuals within the territorial boundaries of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
Thus, we can define defence as being concerned with protecting the state and the 
people it rules within a defined territorial unit from attack, through the use of military 
measures and resources. Of course, the attack on the state and its people could originate 
internally (from individuals or political bodies) or externally (from other states or terrorist 
organisations). In the UK, internal security has been mainly provided by the various county
1 John Baylis ed., British Defence Policy in a Changing World (London: Croom Helm, 1977) p. 12.
2 Collins Dictionary and Thesaurus (Glasgow: HarperCollins, 2000) p.300.
3 Gianfranco Pozzi, The Development o f  the Modern State: A Sociological Introduction (Stanford University 
Press, 1978) p. 1.
and borough police forces compulsorily instituted from the mid 19th century onwards.4 
Indeed, the UK has not had to face any major conventional military threat to internal security 
since the last Jacobite Rebellion was defeated in 1746.5 Externally, the armed forces are the 
institutions that have been used to provide international security for the United Kingdom 
since the 18th Century.6
Due to the lack of major internal threats to the security of the state for a significant 
period of time and the creation of various internal security bodies such as the police, criminal 
justice and prison services, the term ‘defence’ in British political discourse has become a 
euphemism for the British armed forces. For example, the Ministry of Defence (MOD) is the 
government body that manages the armed forces, not the police, intelligence or prison 
services. Similarly, annual government statements on defence, as well as defence White 
Papers, are concerned with the administration of the armed forces and their general efficacy.
In truth, this denomination of ‘defence’ has often been concerned with far more than 
purely defensive actions. States can use their armed forces in an aggressive manner as part of 
what they term their defence policy, in this way seemingly belying the claims of defensive 
action. Indeed, the United Kingdom had a War Office until as late as 1963, when its 
responsibilities (along with the Admiralty and Air Ministry) were transferred to a new 
Ministry of Defence (MOD). Nowadays, if offensive military action is taken by the state
4 The Police (Counties and Boroughs) Bill o f 1856 legislated for the compulsory establishment o f police forces 
in those counties and boroughs in England and Wales that did not already have them. A similar act was passed 
for Scotland in 1857. This led to the vast majority o f internal security duties within the United Kingdom being 
transferred to the Police forces over time, leading to the present situation, where the armed forces are primarily 
postured for overseas action.
5This discounts military operations conducted in Ireland when it was incorporated into the United Kingdom. 
Northern Ireland’s stability has been affected significantly by ‘The Troubles’ o f the past 40 years, but this issue 
has arguably never posed the danger o f undermining UK internal stability to any significant degree. There was 
certainly never a major conventional military threat.
6 The creation o f the Royal Navy can be traced back to Henry VIII’s reign. The British Army was formed 
following the Act o f Union in 1707 and the subsequent amalgamation o f the English and Scottish Armies. One 
of its responsibilities has always been to maintain a policing role in the event o f serious civil disturbance, but 
this has become less and less prominent as the Police Service has adopted much o f the Army’s previous duties. 
More recently, the Army has been used to aid the civilian sector with what CDS General Sir Michael Walker 
termed the ‘four f  s ’ -  the fuel crisis, floods, the fire strike and the response to the foot and mouth disease 
outbreak. See General Sir Michael Walker, ‘Delivering Security in a Changing World: Annual Chief o f the 
Defence Staff Lecture’, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 149, No. 1 (2004) p. 36.
7 A Ministry o f Defence had initially been established in 1946 to co-ordinate the policies o f the War Office (the 
Army), the Admiralty (the Royal Navy) and the Air Ministry (the Royal Air Force) under the terms o f the 
Ministry o f  Defence Bill. The Defence (Transfer o f  Functions) Bill o f 1963 created a new unified Ministry of  
Defence that combined the functions o f the previous Minister o f Defence, the First Lord o f the Admiralty and 
the separate Secretaries o f State for War and Air. In addition, the new Cabinet post o f Secretary o f State for 
Defence was created. See MOD, Central Organization fo r  Defence, Cmd. 6923 (London: HMSO, 1946) and 
MOD, Central Organization fo r Defence, Cmnd. 2097 (London: HMSO, 1963). In relation to the word 
‘defence’ often being used as a euphemism for actions that are far from defensive, there is a famous comment 
attributed to Napoleon Bonaparte that stated that he was never the aggressor when his armies invaded another 
country, as the opposing soldiers always fired first.
against other states it can have a myriad of justifications including humanitarian intervention, 
peacekeeping, the enforcement of international law, state-building or self-defence (this 
offensive-defensive response to a future perceived threat being termed pre-emption). This 
increased prominence of these justifications can partly be ascribed to the legacy of the UN 
Charter of 1945 and the Nuremberg Trials of 1946, both of which effectively denoted flagrant
•  52wars of aggression as war crimes. However, there has always been a history of these types of 
justifications from the governments of states, no matter the political system, as no population 
would be likely to fight a war in which they considered their own cause to be wrong.9 As 
John Mearsheimer has commented ‘Most people prefer to think of fights between their own 
state and rival states as clashes between good and evil, where they are on the side of the 
angels and their opponents are aligned with the devil. Thus, leaders tend to portray war as a 
moral crusade or an ideological contest, rather than as a struggle for power’.10 In line with 
this fact, all the United Kingdom’s major military interventions since 1997 have been 
grounded upon the aforementioned reasons (with the exception of self-defence).11 
Accordingly, we can see that the word ‘defence’ in British government policy is associated 
with the armed forces and can pertain to military action that is conducted outside the United
8 See UN Website, ‘Charter o f the United Nations’ (2012) accessed at http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/ 
on 30 April 2012 and Yale Law School: The Avalon Project, ‘Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol 1: Charter o f  
the International Military Tribunal’ (1945) accessed at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp on 30 April 
2012. The latter link provides the text o f  the document that set out the principles for prosecution at the 
Nuremberg Trials o f 1946.
9 The Nazi regime justified its invasion o f  Poland in 1939 by staging a mock attack on the Gleiwitz radio station, 
and then claiming it had been instigated by the Polish government. In 1931, it is believed that the Japanese 
government had staged a similar attack on a section o f Japanese-owned railway in Southern Manchuria as a 
pretext for the invasion o f  Manchuria by the Imperial Japanese Army.
0 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy o f  Great Power Politics (New York; London: Norton, 2001) p.23.
11 Kosovo was a war ostensibly conducted for humanitarian reasons, as evidenced by Tony Blair’s famous 
speech on ‘The Doctrine o f International Community’ in Chicago in 1999 where he stated: ‘This is a just war, 
based not on any territorial ambitions but on values. We cannot let the evil o f ethnic cleansing stand. We must 
not rest until it is reversed’. See Tony Blair, ‘The Doctrine o f International Community’, Speech made to the 
Economic Club (24 April 1999) accessed at http://keeptonyblairforpm.wordpress.com/blair-speech-transcripts- 
from-1997-2007/#chicago on 30 April 2012. As regards the intervention in Sierra Leone, the recent Defence 
Green Paper states this was conducted to support the government of Sierra Leone, assist the UN force stationed 
there and train the Sierra Leonean army. See MOD, Adaptability and Partnership: Issues fo r  the Strategic 
Defence Review, Cm. 7794 (London: TSO, 2010). Gordon Brown stated at the Iraq Inquiry that the war with 
Iraq was conducted primarily to uphold international law ‘I believe we made the right decision for the right 
reasons, because the international community had for years asked Saddam Hussein to abide by international law 
... and, at the end o f the day, it was impossible to persuade him that he should abide by international law’. See 
Gordon Brown, Testimony to the Iraq Inquiry (5 March 2010) accessed at
http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/media/45411/100503-brown.pdf on 30 April 2012. The then British Foreign 
Secretary, David Miliband, commented that the continued British presence in Afghanistan since 2001 was for 
reasons o f state-building and to deny a base for terrorism: ‘... we’re not trying to create a colony [in 
Afghanistan]. We’re trying to support a democratically-elected Afghan government with all the difficulties that 
that country faces to make itself safe for its own people from the return o f the Taliban’. See Prospect Magazine, 
‘Interview: David Miliband’ (25 October 2008).
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Kingdom’s own borders, whether this be in international waters or another state’s defined 
territorial boundaries.
In view of this analysis, what then can we define defence policy as being? We have 
seen that ‘policy’ can be viewed as an overall plan or framework aimed at achieving a 
particular end. At the governmental level, the term ‘defence’ means anything related to the 
state’s own armed forces, which in Great Britain are considered to be primarily geared 
towards tackling external threats. In combining these two concepts, we can argue that 
‘defence policy’ is therefore a government framework for action in relation to the armed 
forces, ultimately aimed at ensuring national security from outside threats. Perhaps the most 
cogent definition is provided by John Baylis when he comments: ‘ [Defence policy] involves 
the political direction of a nation’s defence resources as a whole with a view to ensuring
10national security, protecting vital interests and furthering the international aims of the state.’ 
Indeed, this is an effective rationalization and, for the purposes of this thesis, will provide the 
necessary basis for the resultant analysis of the UK government’s decisions on defence from 
1997 onwards. Following on from this, the next section will outline in greater depth what 
factors influence defence policy formulation in the UK and which framework for analysis we 
can use to best evaluate energy security’s effect on British defence policy since 1997.
Effective Analysis of Defence Policy
In a representative democracy such as Britain, the elected government is the key executive 
decision-maker and should therefore be expected to formulate the overall direction of defence 
policy. As we saw in the previous section, British defence policy is fundamentally postured 
towards dealing with external threats to the British state. As such, defence policy for the 
United Kingdom should be heavily related to foreign policy. Hence, the international aims of 
the British state and political establishment, usually fostered through diplomacy via the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) are backed by the potential utilization of force 
from the British military. This apparent symbiosis between defence policy and foreign policy 
was clearly outlined in the Strategic Defence Review of 1998 with the statements ‘The 
publication of this White Paper fulfils the Government's manifesto commitment to conduct a 
foreign policy-led strategic defence review’ and ‘Defence serves the aims of foreign and
12 Baylis ed. (1977) p. 14.
security policy’. From this understanding, it would seem justified if we examined defence 
policy decisions purely through the lens of the foreign policy considerations of the elected 
government. In this manner, if energy security was a significant issue for British foreign 
policy we would expect this approach to be reflected in defence policy.
However, this analytical base is not sufficient on its own to explain British defence 
policy in its entirety. There are still complex processes that operate within defence policy, 
which can complicate the follow-through of any governmental decision that is taken. For 
example, as regards procurement of equipment for the armed forces, it is not a simple 
procedure of a governmental decision being taken to buy a particular weapons system and 
that particular item being bought for the use of the armed forces. There will be the views of 
the armed forces to be taken into account, as well as the UK arms industry, both of which 
have significant lobbying power in the media and amongst certain MPs (who may represent 
constituencies in which the defence industry is a major employer, as well as perhaps having 
served with the military). Both these areas can be a significant determinant in what the 
government decides can be effectively implemented as regards the defence budget.14
To continue, it would appear from governmental analysis conducted since 1945 that 
the traditional top-down explanations of decision-making by governments have proven to be 
too simplistic to explain the course o f complex policies and events. The much lauded book 
‘Essence of Decision’ was a seminal work in understanding the processes of governmental 
policy and the difficulty of reaching desired outcomes in modem governmental structures. 
Through an analysis of the Cuban Missile Crisis the book’s author, Graham T. Allison, 
showed that the decision maker in any government is not one calculating individual but ‘a 
conglomerate of large organisations and political actors’.15 Therefore, in order for the reader 
to better understand the influence and effects that separate organizations can have on the 
formulation of government policy, as well as the reasons for the adoption of Ian Bellany’s 
related framework for analysis, we will firstly analyse the models put forward by Graham 
Allison, before proceeding onto an outline of Bellany’s paradigm.
13 MOD, The Strategic Defence Review, Cm. 3999 (London: TSO, 1998) Chapter One, paragraphs 1 and 13.
14 Michael D. Hobkirk, The Politics o f  Defence Budgeting: a Study o f  Organisation and Resource Allocation in 
the United Kingdom and the United States (London: Macmillan, 1984) p. 10.
15 Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence o f  Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (New York: 
Longman, 1999) p.3.
Graham Allison’s Models of Government
Three models were put forward for analysis in ‘Essence of Decision’: The Rational Actor 
Model; The Organisational Behaviour Paradigm and The Governmental Politics Model. 
Together, all were considered to be important in explaining the eventual outcomes of 
governmental policies. They all explained different aspects of the decision-making process. 
The Rational Actor Model was useful for understanding the objectives and goals set by an 
administration in a rational manner. To put it simply, based upon a series of factors 
politicians would determine what was the most propitious course of action in a particular 
policy area. In essence, decisions were taken based upon cost/benefit calculations of likely 
outcomes based on the available evidence. The factors for consideration would include: the 
regime’s particular goals and objectives; the alternative decisions that could be made; and the 
potential consequences of each decision.16 In relation to British defence policy, we could 
interpret the decision to invade Iraq in 2003 as following this model. Thus, Tony Blair and 
the majority of the British Cabinet stated that they saw the failure of the Iraq regime to 
comply with UN weapons inspections as deliberate flouting of international law and that they 
believed he had developed a WMD capability that posed a significant threat to international
1 7stability. They therefore took a deliberate, rational decision to employ force, along with the 
United States, to remove Saddam Hussein’s regime and destroy any WMDs that were found, 
thereby preventing the possibility of a further costly inter-state war in the region and the 
potential for WMDs to fall into the hands of terrorist groups that were intent on attacking the
1 ftUnited Kingdom. Thus, the government were the prime decision makers in this particular
16 Ibid. p. 18.
17 See Hansard, HC Deb Volume 390, Columns 3-5 (24 September 2002) Prime Minister Tony Blair: ‘[The 
intelligence picture] concludes that Iraq has chemical and biological weapons, that Saddam has continued to 
produce them, that he has existing and active military plans for the use o f chemical and biological weapons, 
which could be activated within 45 minutes, including against his own Shia population, and that he is actively 
trying to acquire nuclear weapons capability’ and ‘Read the chapter on Saddam and human rights in this dossier. 
Read not just about the 1 million dead in the war with Iran, not just about the 100,000 Kurds brutally murdered 
in northern Iraq, not just about the 200,000 Shia Muslims driven from the marshlands in southern Iraq, and not 
just about the attempt to subjugate and brutalise the Kuwaitis in 1990 that led to the Gulf war. I say, "Read also 
about the routine butchering o f political opponents, the prison 'cleansing1 regimes in which thousands die, the 
torture chambers and the hideous penalties supervised by him and his family and detailed by Amnesty 
International." Read it all and, again, I defy anyone to say that this cruel and sadistic dictator should be allowed 
any possibility o f getting his hands on chemical, biological and nuclear weapons o f  mass destruction.’ See also 
BBC News Online, ‘Blair outlines Iraq evidence’ (24 September 2002) accessed at 
http://new s.bbc.co.U k/l/hi/uk_politics/2277352.stm  on 30 April 2012.
18 See Hansard, HC Deb Volume 401, Column 768 (18 March 2003) Prime Minister Tony Blair: ‘The 
possibility o f the two coming together—o f terrorist groups in possession o f weapons o f mass destruction or even 
o f a so-called dirty radiological bomb— -is now, in my judgment, a real and present danger to Britain and its
instance. This model had been so dominant and fundamental to most academic thinking that 
it was rarely explicitly recognised up until Allison’s analysis.19 Still, it remains an important 
analytical tool for anyone analysing any form of governmental decision-making.
The Organisational Behaviour Paradigm identifies the fact that a government is, in
7Hessence, a vast conglomerate of loosely allied organisations. Each organisation is assigned a 
particular set of problems to work on and resolve. Due to their large size they have to develop 
a set of standard operating procedures to ensure efficiency. Consequently, a particular 
organizational culture develops in each organisation -  what could be described as ‘a way of 
doing things’. This affects the way they are likely to respond to certain challenges. For 
example, one could hypothesise that the Royal Navy’s whole ethos has for hundreds of years 
been based upon the provision of surface ships. Many navy personnel may have joined due to 
the attraction of these particular weapons systems and the whole of the navy’s doctrine may 
be based upon these particular platforms. Therefore, if a government attempts to restructure 
an organisation or assign it a task that it collectively believes is not within its remit there is 
likely to be a degree of resistance. As Michael D. Hobkirk comments ‘Any large organisation 
of a hierarchical nature is likely to be hostile to new ideas, particularly those affecting 
established procedures.’ As regards this, a prime example is the negative response given to 
the 1981 Defence Review calling for a change in emphasis in the Royal Navy from a surface-
77based to a more submarine-based naval force. Indeed, despite the experiences of the 
Falklands Conflict in 1982 and the proven vulnerabilities of surface ships such as destroyers 
and frigates to enemy air attack (which Nott had recognised), the Royal Navy has persisted in 
developing the new Type 45 Destroyer and Type 26 Frigate.23 As the defence commentator 
and former Royal Navy Officer Lewis Page has postulated, this continued organisational
national security.’ Rational in this context ‘refers to consistent value-maximizing choice within specified 
constraints’. Definition taken from Graham Allison and Philip Zellikow, (1999) p.18.
,9Allison and Zelikow (1999) pp. 15-16.
20 Ibid. p. 143.
21 Michael D. Hobkirk, The Politics o f Defence Budgeting: a Study o f Organisation and Resource Allocation in 
the United Kingdom and the United States (London: Macmillan, 1984) p. 107.
22 See Andrew Dorman, ‘John Nott and the Royal Navy: the 1981 Defence Review Revisited’, Contemporary 
British History, Vol. 15, No. 2 (2001). Andrew Dorman states in the introduction that due to the 1981 Defence 
Review, the then Minister o f Defence, John Nott, still ‘remains a figure o f scorn within parts o f the Royal 
Navy’. Indeed, the article outlines the fact that, to avoid the proposed cuts in the surface fleet, the Royal Navy 
put forward proposals to disband the Royal Marines and scrap the navy’s amphibious ships.
23 See The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons, Cmnd. 8758 (London:TSO, 1982). The lack o f an effective 
Airborne Early Warning (AE W) capability to defend against Argentine aircraft armed with the Exocet anti-ship 
missile was emphasised as a significant deficiency in capability. This capability gap has since been filled by Sea 
King helicopters equipped with long-range radar. However, the point remains that without air cover, surface 
ships remain vulnerable to air attack, even if  they are designed for an air defence role like the Type 45 
Destroyers. Indeed, discounting the Exocet, a significant proportion o f Argentine bombs hit their targets but 
failed to explode. If they had, the losses to the British fleet may have been unsustainable.
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focus on these kinds of ships reflects the fact that the Royal Navy career structure is geared 
towards promotion of those who have commanded these types of vessels. In his opinion, this 
has been the reason for their persistent development rather than their perceived utility in 
military operations.24
Finally, there is the Governmental Politics Model. Using this model, governmental 
behaviour can be understood as a result of bargaining between different political players. This 
includes political heads of governmental departments, top civil servants and lower level 
officials in the press, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and the public arena. Each 
player represents their particular organisation and will generally feel obliged to fight their 
comer as well as aiming to further their own personal ambitions, if possible. An illustration 
of its importance can be provided by the meeting of the First Sea Lord, Sir Henry Leach and 
Margaret Thatcher when it became clear that Argentine forces were about to invade the 
Falklands in 1982. Leach was adamant that the UK should send an expeditionary force to 
retake the islands and it is believed by many that this was a decisive factor in persuading the
• 7£then Prime Minister to embark on war with Argentina. Both personalities had their own 
personal reasons for agreeing on this course of action. Leach may have seen it as an 
opportunity to prove that the navy’s surface capability was an essential force and should not 
face the projected cuts outlined in the 1981 defence review. Thatcher, on her part, saw an 
opportunity to boost her government’s flagging popularity.
Of course, despite the originality of Allison’s models there are still valid criticisms 
that can be made regarding its assumptions. Lawrence Freedman has argued that that the 
formulation of the Governmental Politics Model focused too heavily on ‘those moments 
when bureaucracy is in greatest control of policy and action ... the most visible stage is taken
77to be the most important stage’. He also commented that the model failed to take into 
account the fact that policy formulation would still result in less-than perfect performance 
even if all actors were pursuing the same goals: ‘Even if all key actors are essentially of the 
same mind coherence is difficult to achieve because of problems endemic to the management
24 Lewis Page, Lions, Donkeys and Dinosaurs: Waste and Blundering in the Military (London: Arrow, 2007) 
p.216: ‘The command o f a frigate or destroyer is ... like a battalion/regiment CO in the army. No frigates or 
destroyers would mean no credible command slots at this rank, which would, in turn, decrease the supply o f  
admiral material in the future’.
25 Allison and Zelikow (1999) pp.255-256.
26 See The Daily Telegraph, ‘Obituary: Admiral o f  the Fleet Sir Henry Leach’ (26 April 2011) accessed at 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/obituaries/militarv-obituaries/naval-obituaries/8474861/Admiral-of-the-Fleet- 
Sir-Henrv-Leach.html on 30 April 2012. Also, see Lawrence Freedman, The Official History o f  the Falklands 
Campaign -  Volume II: War and Diplomacy, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2005) p.3.
27 Lawrence Freedman, ’Logic, Politics and Foreign Policy Processes: A Critique o f the Bureaucratic Politics 
Model’, International Affairs, Vol. 52, No. 3 (1976)p.440.
of the governmental apparatus and the design of value-maximising policies’."6 Jonathan 
Bendor and Thomas Hammond have also argued that Allison’s original models were 
arnhignons in their assumptions and that their areas of concern often overlapped: ‘we find 
that Tthe O rganizational Behaviour Model! and [the Governmental Politics Model!, which 
have different intellectual pedigrees and which Allison presumably intended to be distinct.
9Qapparently share much of the same analytical turf. They also made the point that the 
Rational Actor Model was far too simplistic and discounted the uncertainties inherent at this 
level of policy. As such they argued that the very lack of foundation of the analysis provided 
by this paradigm undermined the Organizational Behaviour and Governmental Politics 
Models. These shortfalls in Allison’s examination demonstrate the problems with the 
development of any overarching theory. Nonetheless, his ideas have stimulated much 
discussion and development in defence policy-making theory as we shall see from the next 
section.
The Model to be Used: Ian Bellany’s Framework for Analysis
Despite the criticisms levelled at Allison’s initial hypothesis, as a basis for the examination of
governmental decisions it provides a solid grounding and, as such, there was further
elaboration on its concepts by academics interested specifically in defence. This elaboration
was also due to the fact that Allison’s model, although applicable to all areas of government,
had mainly been focussed on the formulation of foreign policy. Desmond Ball and Donald M.
Snow (writing about nuclear strategy) adapted the Governmental Politics Model to defence
policy and, in this manner, separately identified 3 levels of defence policy: declaratory policy,
^  1
operational policy and development-industrial policy, which relate to Allison’s models.
Their ideas were then successfully adapted by Ian Bellany as the framework for analysis in 
his excellent book on the United Kingdom’s conventional defence policy Reviewing Britain’s 
Defence. Indeed, this framework for analysis will be adopted in this thesis to answer the 
question of how energy security concepts have affected the formulation of defence policy
28Ibid. p.438.
29 Jonathan Bendor and Thomas H. Hammond,‘Rethinking Allison’s Models’, The American Political Science 
Review, Vol. 86, No. 2 (1992) p.304.
30 Ibid. p.319.
31 Ian Bellany ‘Reviewing Britain’s Defence ’ (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994) pp.5-8.
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since 1997. In the first instance, this is because the model neatly divides defence policy into 
three ‘spheres’ that are relatively distinct in their institutional makeup.33 It therefore makes 
the task of analysing defence policy easier by delineating it into recognisable ‘chunks’.
Perhaps the most apt justification for this methodical approach was provided by the 
then Defence Secretary, Dr Liam Fox, when he stated that, under the new Conservative 
government, the MOD would see structural reform in which the department would be 
‘reorganised into three pillars of Policy and Strategy, the Armed Forces, and Procurement 
and Estates’.34 In light of this, the subsequent independent review document Defence Reform 
-  an independent report into the structure and management o f  the Ministry o f  Defence, called 
for changes in the structure of the MOD whereby the Secretary of State for Defence and his 
Ministers would have the responsibility of setting ‘strategic direction on the military 
capabilities the country needs and on the types of operations the Armed Forces should 
undertake’. Their essential task was to direct defence policy. The individual service chiefs 
would ‘be responsible for generating and developing their Service in line with that strategic 
direction and within the budget set’. The Chief of Joint Operations (CJO) would then 
ideally be given the required forces by the individual service chiefs and would then conduct 
operations in liaison with the Chief of the Defence Staff. According to the report, this would 
fulfil the operational function of defence policy.37 Finally, the Chief of Defence Material and 
Defence Equipment and Support (DE&S) would be responsible for acquisition of new 
defence equipment, with the 2nd Permanent Under Secretary (PUS) responsible for oversight
• 3 0
of science and technology development within the MOD.
From this approach (that is analogous to Ian Bellany’s three spheres of defence 
policy) we can see that there has been a recognition at the executive level of government that 
the effective creation of a clear differentiation of policy areas within the MOD is likely to 
offer an effective method of managing defence policy as a whole within the United Kingdom. 
As such, the adoption of a similar delineation in the analysis of defence policy in this thesis
32 The term ‘development-industrial policy’ has been changed to ‘defence-industrial policy’ so as to provide a 
clearer connection in the reader’s mind between this and the other levels o f policy within the overall framework, 
as well as following the Labour government’s definition o f this level o f defence policy.
33 The differences between the separate circles o f policy will be outlined in greater depth below.
34Liam Fox, Speech made at the Royal Institute o f  Chartered Surveyors (13 August 2010) accessed at 
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/People/Speeches/SofS/201008l3TheNeedForDefenceRefor 
m.htm on 30 April 2012.
35 Defence Reform -  an independent report into the structure and management o f  the Ministry o f  Defence 
(London: TSO, 2011) p. 17.
36 Ibid. p. 18.
37 Ibid. This was given the moniker ‘the operate function’ in the report.
38 Ibid. p. 18, p.75.
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would appear justified. Indeed, the essential components of Bellany’s framework were 
adopted by Andrew Dorman, albeit with certain updates and modifications, which will be 
outlined later in this chapter. Firstly, before we move on to the main body of analysis, it will 
be necessary to outline each strand of policy and the methods that will be used to effectively 
scrutinize each level so as to establish the overall aims and purpose of particular actions in 
the period in question.
Declaratory Policy
Declaratory policy, in this instance, can be defined as the officially stated description of what 
British defence policy is. This includes Defence White Papers, the language of government 
ministers in their public speeches, statements to the press on defence matters and any debates 
on defence that take place in the House of Commons.40 It is the official line of the 
government and indicates the direction that it aims to take in all defence matters. For 
example, in the 20th Century the British government had a history of publishing an annual 
statement on defence outlining the roles and responsibilities of the armed forces for the 
coming year, as well as potential threats and the finances of the armed forces. Under the 
previous Labour government, this policy was discontinued in 1999. Instead, from 1998 
onwards there were a number of Defence White Papers outlining all of the issues mentioned 
in the annual statements on defence but on a more infrequent and irregular basis. As such, the 
sources outlined above will provide the main body of analysis for the declaratory section of 
this thesis.
Operational Policy
Operational policy refers to the British armed forces and what they view their role as being, 
optimally as a servant of aims decided at the declaratory level.41 There is also the desire 
amongst the armed forces to maintain a relatively pre-eminent position amongst UK 
departments and secure future funding and equipment. As mentioned already, all three 
services (being large organisations) would like to maintain (and strengthen, if possible) their 
own culture and traditions. This often leads to inter-service rivalry, as the Army, RAF and
39 Andrew Dorman, Defence Under Thatcher (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002).
40 Ibid. p. 15.
41 Ibid. p.2.
Royal Navy lobby the government for vital funding and against potential budgetary cutbacks. 
This was seen in 2010 with speeches made by the Head of the Royal Navy, First Sea Lord 
(FSL) Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope and Chief of the General Staff (CGS) General Sir David 
Richards.42 These statements were cited in the media as demonstrating a difference in opinion 
on the future direction of defence policy, as well as illustrating a battle between the services 
for dwindling resources. This was because budgetary cuts for defence were widely believed 
to be on the agenda following the 2010 general election 43 Hence, in order to analyse this 
level of defence policy and whether its conception of energy security is effectively in line 
with declaratory policy, we will therefore need to examine any discrepancies between 
statements made by senior officers at the operational level and the declaratory level, as well 
as within the operational level itself. We will also need to scrutinize the doctrinal works 
published by the armed forces, as again, this will give us a clearer view of how the armed 
services viewed themselves and their purpose in the period in question, as well as whether 
energy security considerations had any impact on their general outlook.
In addition to the armed forces’ view of their designated role, Ian Bellany’s 
framework in relation to operational policy also concerns the actual tasks that the armed 
forces are called upon to perform by the government, whether these tasks are peacekeeping, 
humanitarian assistance or the invasion of another country.44 In this way, we can determine 
whether declaratory policy’s relative emphasis on energy security was reflected in the 
operations conducted by the British military between 1997 and 2010.
Defence-Industrial Policy
Defence-Industrial policy relates to the defence-contracting industries based within the 
United Kingdom and what they interpret their role as being for and what they regard 
themselves as ready to do 45 For the purposes of this analysis, this does not necessarily mean
42 See Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, ‘Defence in a Changing World: Flexible Thinking, Flexible Forces’, Speech 
made at the Benvin, Leighton and Paisner Defence Breakfast (19 January 2010) accessed at 
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/People/Speeches/ChiefStaff/20100119DefenceInAChanged 
WorldFlexibleThinkingFlexibleForces.htm on 30 April 2012 and General Sir David Richards, ‘Future Conflict 
and Its Prevention: People and the Information A ge’, Speech made to the International Institute fo r Strategic 
Studies (IISS) (18 January 2010) accessed at http://www.iiss.org/recent-key-addresses/general-sir-david- 
richards-address/ on 30 April 2012.
43 ‘UK military chiefs clash over future defence strategy’, The Guardian (19 January 2010) and Malcolm 
Chalmers, ‘Capability Cost Trends: Implications for the Defence Review’, RUSI Working Paper Number 5 
(January 2010).
44 Bellany (1994) p.45.
45 Ibid. p.2.
that they have to be British-owned companies. This is because due to a process of 
consolidation within the global defence market following the end of the Cold War, there are 
now fewer large companies vying for trade within the UK (the same is true worldwide). BAE 
Systems has become the largest British defence company (following a series of acquisitions) 
and there remain smaller British defence companies such as Qinetiq, Cobham and 
Chemring.46 However, foreign defence companies such as Thales and General Dynamics 
have also created a significant industrial presence within the UK. In fact, Thales has been 
contracted to build the new Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers for the Royal Navy and 
General Dynamics has recently been contracted to build the new light tank for the British 
Army.47 This reflected the Labour government’s view that the internationalisation of the 
defence industry now meant that ‘The UK defence industry should ... be defined in terms of 
where the technology is created, where the skills and the intellectual property reside, where 
jobs are created and sustained, and where the investment is made’ 48 Thus, when we examine 
this level of policy we are examining the military research, development and manufacture of 
equipment within the UK conducted by British workers.
In order to determine the effect of energy security considerations on this level of 
policy we will need to analyse the statements made by senior executives of defence 
companies that operate within the UK, as well as any policy documents published by defence 
industry bodies such as the Defence Industries Council (DIC) from 1997 until 2010. We can 
then ascertain whether developing technology to enhance energy efficiency and combat 
energy issues such as climate change was an important determinant of action from 1997 
onwards. Finally, we will also examine what systems were actually developed (or were in 
development in the studied period) with energy security considerations in mind.
Possible Criticisms of Bellanv’s Framework
Like any model, Ian Bellany’s is open to criticism. In this manner, the adoption of his 
framework for analysis for this thesis can also be criticised. Thus, we need to defend its
46 For a list o f British defence companies within the world’s top 100 see Defense News Website, ‘Defense News 
Top 100’ (2010) accessed at http://special.defensenews.com/top-100/ on 7 May 2012.
47 See BBC News Online, ‘General Dynamics beats BAE to win UK tank-making deal’ (22 March 2010) 
accessed at http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/business/8580266.stm on 7 May 2012 and read information on Thales’ 
role in the construction o f the new aircraft carriers at Thales Group Website, ‘Aircraft Carriers -  Queen 
Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers’ (2012) accessed at
http://www.thalesgroup.com/Portfolio/Defence/naval_productpage_CVF/?pid=6906 on 7 May 2012.
48 MOD, Ministry o f Defence Policy Paper -  Paper No. 5: Defence Industrial Policy (MOD, 2002) p.9.
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adoption if the reader is to feel comfortable with its use. Indeed, Ian Bellany addressed these 
potential criticisms within the book in question. He accepted the fact that disputes within 
each circle of defence policy (as there undoubtedly are) could possibly undermine his model. 
As we have seen above, there is inter-service rivalry within the armed forces, and even the 
possibility of quarrels within the same service -  ‘for instance between the sub-surface and 
surface arms of the navy’ 49 The same fact applied to possible labour disputes and inter­
company competition at the defence-industrial level of policy, as well as governmental 
disagreements at the declaratory level. In response to these potential observations, Bellany 
stated ‘it cannot be denied that there is something arbitrary in settling for three levels of 
policy; if each level (or circle of actors) is capable of further subdivision, why stop at three, it 
might be asked’.50 His response is to argue for a ‘suspension of judgement’ until the reader 
has finished reading the book, as well as to argue that due to the complexity of the subject 
(and the world in general) one could always call for more and more sub-divisions so as to 
better reflect reality.51 One’s analysis has to stop at some point so as not to be get bogged 
down in too much detail, hence Bellany’s statement that ‘The possibility of sub-atomic 
physics does not preclude the possibility of chemistry’.
In light of these arguments, it is therefore important to note that this framework still 
remains a simplification of reality and by no means aims to create a comprehensive overview 
of all the individual factors that have affected government policy in this area. Simplifications 
are needed so that we can effectively make sense of systems that involve millions of actions 
and decisions being taken every day, with many competing aims and interests amongst the 
individuals making these choices.
Thus, Bellany’s model effectively delineates defence policy into three constituent 
parts that are often perceived to have different and competing goals. It provides sound 
methodological scaffolding for the empirical examination of separate levels of defence policy 
and allows us to determine whether there were differing conceptions of the importance of 
energy security within the overall defence establishment during Labour’s time in power. In 
this manner, we can ascertain whether the importance (or lack thereof) of energy security
49 Bellany (1994) p.29.
50 Ibid.
51 The two philosophical problems o f  Achilles and the tortoise (in which the pursuer can never catch the front- 
runner in a race as he must always travel half the distance that the pursued has travelled, thus never catching 
him) and the paradox o f the heap (in which the question is asked: at what point does a heap o f sand cease to be a 
heap o f sand as individual grains o f  sand are removed) perhaps best illustrate this issue.
52 Ibid. pp.29-30.
53 See Allison and Zelikow (1999) and Andrew Dorman (2002).
within defence policy has been due to the effective efforts of one, two or all the separate 
circles of policy. Indeed, we may find that there is a synergy of effort or a misalignment of 
the separate strands. Still, despite the sound analytical basis that Bellany’s model provides 
through the demarcation of British defence policy into separate ‘circles’ of policy, there are 
still modifications that can be made in order to improve its application to the understanding 
of defence policy. These additions to the framework for analysis are outlined in the next 
section.
Additions to Bellanv’s Framework for Analysis: Andrew Dorman’s Model
As alluded to earlier in this chapter, Andrew Dorman adopted a similar approach to Ian 
Bellany in his book Defence Under Thatcher. For example, he commented in the introduction 
to this work that ‘The defence policy-making process remains a direct reflection of the 
interrelationship of declaratory, strategic and procurement policy overseen by the MOD’.54 
However, he updated the Bellany approach by introducing the idea of ‘time cycles’ in 
defence policy. In this approach, each level of policy is understood to be working under 
different time constraints, with the actors at each level of defence policy heavily influenced 
by these. For the purposes of this thesis, aspects of this model will be integrated into the 
analysis in each chapter of the successive levels of defence policy. This will then illuminate 
the reader as to how the separate time cycles at each level of policy (and any attendant 
interaction between these) may have created any perceived differences between policy 
formulation and subsequent policy implementation. Dorman’s model can then be utilised at 
the appropriate juncture of each chapter where it is deemed to provide an effective 
explanation as to why energy security considerations may have increased in importance or 
been sidelined at the three separate levels of defence policy at certain key points.
The declaratory sphere of policy is considered to be primarily focussed upon short­
term considerations, looking ahead up to two years. This is due to the general vicissitudes of 
parliamentary politics and the fact that defence secretaries and ministers generally only have 
a short time period in which to make an impression on their department, so as to further their 
political careers. As Dorman commented about their situation: ‘Long-term planning does not
54 Andrew Dorman (2002) p.9; On the same page, Dorman states ‘In summary British defence policy is a 
combination o f several factors. First, the formal declaratory policy line espoused by the government... Second, 
the strategic policy indicated by the various military doctrines adopted by Britain’s armed services ... Third, the 
procurement policy reflected in the purchasing policies emanating from the MOD.’ From this explanation, we 
can see that the strategic level o f policy is directly analogous to operational policy summarized earlier in this 
chapter.
produce the results that are likely to be recognized in the short term, and the system of rapid 
ministerial turnover therefore encourages ministers to take a more short-term approach to the 
decisions before them’.55 Thus, any long-term policies on procurement that may have been 
decided by previous ministers may be subject to change due to operational and political 
considerations.56 In relation to this thesis’ question, this could potentially mean equipment 
programmes long in development being adapted by defence ministers so as to provide greater 
energy-efficiency or alternative energy options, in response to energy concerns raised in 
British political debate.
In contrast, the operational and defence-industrial policy levels (known as the 
strategic and procurement policy levels in Dorman’s analysis) operate under more extended 
timelines. The operational sphere is thought to be concerned chiefly with medium-term 
considerations (from four to ten years) as the individual Service Chiefs aim to preserve their 
service’s share of the defence budget ahead of the immediate three year time period in which 
the budget has already been allotted. There is also the aim of increasing their individual 
services’ autonomy over policy and procurement decisions and increasing the input they have 
in any future strategic defence reviews.57 Similarly, successive Chiefs of the Defence Staff 
(CDSs) aim to increase their authority over the individual Service Chiefs, as well as aspiring 
to raise the influence of the Defence Staff in planning defence policy.58 Thus, we could 
possibly see individual Service Chiefs alluding to the energy saving benefits provided by 
certain items of equipment or certain operational procedures, so as to promote or preserve the 
money and status assigned to their particular branch of the armed forces in the longer term.
Due to the fact that the contemporary procurement process of new weapons platforms 
and systems can now take as long as thirty years, the defence-industrial sphere operates under 
the most extended timeframe. Therefore, the British defence industry has to look ahead at the 
potential weapons projects that are likely to be commissioned by the British government and 
plan accordingly by preserving core capabilities such as key manufacturing skills. There is 
also the need to recognise the potential for technological improvements and the need to 
acquire any core competencies in which the industry is lacking so as to secure British
55 Andrew Dorman (2002) p .l 1.
56 A recent example o f this can be seen with the current Conservative government’s decision in the Strategic 
Defence and Security Review  o f 2010 to build two Queen Elizabeth Class Aircraft Carriers (as outlined in the 
SDR o f 1998) but mothball the second o f these. There had never been any indication o f this eventuality from the 
previous Labour government. See MOD, Securing Britain in an Age o f  Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and 
Security Review, Cm. 7948 (London: TSO, 2010) p.21.
57 Dorman (2002) p. 12.
58 Ibid. p. 13.
governmental orders for equipment manufactured in the United Kingdom.59 Consequently, 
the defence-industrial level may be keen to outline the perceived environmental or logistical 
benefits of a particular piece of equipment so as to ensure the long development process 
continues or could alternatively seek to downplay these factors and accentuate others, for the 
same reason.
In conclusion, Andrew Dorman’s model will be used as an explanatory tool to help us 
understand why energy security considerations may or may not have been deemed important 
at each of the three policy levels under consideration. It must also be noted here that, based 
on circumstances, the time cycles can extend or contract and the actors can sometimes also 
change their cyclical outlook due to difference circumstances.60 Any situation in which this 
occurs will be outlined in the appropriate section. The next section of this chapter will now 
examine how we can integrate Graham Allison’s models of government into our analysis of 
British defence policy.
Additions to Bellanv’s Framework for Analysis: Graham Allison’s Models of 
Government
As discussed earlier in this chapter, Graham Allison’s three models of government can be 
used as templates to understand the reasons for governmental decisions. Certainly, Andrew 
Dorman explicitly states in his book that he adopts a ‘bureaucratic-elite’ model of analysis, 
akin to Allison’s Bureaucratic Politics Model.61 Therefore, Allison’s models will be used in 
this thesis to help us understand more broadly how British defence policy functions in its 
approach to energy security considerations. For instance, if energy security is identified as 
being important at a particular level of defence policy is this because of a rational, top-down 
decision made by the Labour administration to focus on this issue, an organizational 
behaviour bias towards energy considerations, or the result of political negotiation and the 
attempts of different actors within the defence establishment to achieve their goals via an 
emphasis on energy security considerations? Indeed, could an importance placed on energy 
security by certain sections of the armed services be merely a manifestation of the desire to 
procure certain weapons platforms, rather than any interest in energy security per se? The
59 Ibid. p. 14.
60 Ibid. For example, Dorman notes that as a general election draws nearer, the short-term cyclical outlook o f  
Defence ministers may contract.
6] Ibid. p. 10.
effective scrutiny of the empirical data collected will indicate which model best suits the 
understanding of how British defence policy was formulated in the period under examination.
Having now discussed the basic framework for analysis and hopefully made it clear in 
the reader’s mind, it would now be pertinent to outline how this thesis will proceed in 
measuring the importance of energy security within British defence policy. The ensuing 
section will address this question.
Measuring the Effect of Energy Security Considerations in British Defence 
Policy
In order to understand energy security’s effect on British defence policy from 1997 to 2010, 
we need to find an effective means of measuring its impact on each circle of policy in the 
studied period. In order to do this effectively, this thesis continues in a similar vein to the 
preceding sections in this chapter by adopting and melding an already espoused approach, in 
this instance in the form of two analytical prisms provided by the ORG. These can be termed 
the ‘control paradigm’ and the ‘sustainable security’ approaches to energy security. These 
paradigms will be used as twin axioms in the analysis; that is, the assumption is made that the 
‘control paradigm’ and its attendant approach to energy security had a significant effect on 
British defence policy from 1945 until 1997 and that there is therefore the possibility that this 
way of thinking continued to exert influence on the British defence establishment from 1997 
until 2010. In opposition to the ‘control paradigm’ archetype is the ORG’s ‘sustainable 
security’ notion that provides a normative idea of the approach that could be taken to energy 
security by the British government, with a potential concomitant effect on the way defence 
policy is formulated. By outlining these two models of possible energy security approaches, 
we can then use their key features to measure energy security’s effect on British defence 
policy formulation and implementation, at each of the three levels already outlined.
For example, if it is observable that UK defence policy in the examined period placed 
much emphasis on the ability to intervene militarily in a region that was essential in 
producing vital energy resources, with no significant parallel movement towards the adoption 
of sustainable energy sources, then the effect of energy security considerations on defence 
policy would have changed little from preceding governments and there would be no 
discontinuity with past approaches. Thus, we can deduce that a ‘control paradigm’ approach 
remained the default position and energy security remained an important factor in the
formulation of British defence policy. If alternatively, it is discernible that defence policy 
became more focussed on developing sustainable energy sources for military use, as well as 
greater cooperation with other government departments in security matters, we can infer that 
a ‘sustainable security’ paradigm was in vogue, creating a novel effect on defence policy. 
Ultimately, we may even find evidence of each approach at different points in the time period 
under examination or none at all. Energy security may prove to be an issue of little 
importance to the defence establishment. With these things in mind, the main tenets of the 
two paradigms will now be outlined.
The Control Paradigm
The ORG believes that since the end of the Cold War, the dominant idea that has been 
utilised to maintain global security has been what is termed the ‘control paradigm’. This is an 
attempt to control security issues merely through the use of military force, whilst taking no 
real steps to address the deeper-seated causes of global instability. The main instigator of this 
paradigm is considered to be the United States, currently by far the most powerful global 
economic and military power. It is thought that it has aimed to maintain the status quo and its 
current hegemonic position through ‘the control of access to fossil fuels, [by maintaining] its 
global military supremacy, [by protecting] US dominance of global financial institutions and
ff) •[by maintaining] the military advantages enjoyed by key regional allies.’ This approach can 
alternatively be expressed as Tiddism’ -  the desire to keep the ‘lid on insecurity’ without 
addressing the root causes. As regards energy resources, Paul Rogers, Global Security 
Consultant to the ORG and Professor of Peace Studies at Bradford University, has identified 
secure access to Persian Gulf oil as one of the prime US motivations for the invasion of 
Iraq.64 The invasion of Iraq is cited as a prime example of this idea, with the UK also playing 
a major role in its execution.65 Indeed, it is argued that these conflicts may have stimulated 
higher levels of recruitment into the ranks of Al-Qaeda and could have led to the increased 
radicalisation of Muslims in the United Kingdom.66 Some have argued that these conflicts
62 James Kemp, ‘Sustainable Peace and Security’, Compass Thinkpiece 18, p.2.
63 Paul Rogers, Losing Control: Global Security in the Twenty-First Century (London: Pluto Press, 2002) p. 10.
64 Paul Rogers, ‘Iraq: the Path o f War’, openDemocracy Website (December 2009) accessed at 
http://sustainablesecurity.org/article/iraq-path-war on 6 May 2012.
65 Ibid.
66 Chris Abbot, Paul Rogers and John Sloboda, ‘Global Responses to Global Threats: Sustainable Security for 
the 21st Century’, Oxford Research Group Briefing Paper (ORG, 2006) p. 19.
and the perceived attack on the Muslim Umma (global community) led directly to the July 
2005 bombings in London.67
In essence, a control paradigm approach to security can be defined as ‘an approach 
based on the false premise that insecurity can be controlled through military force or balance
• • •  6ft3f power politics and containment, thus maintaining the status quo’. In terms of energy 
security the ORG has outlined two related global conflict drivers: competition for resources 
and climate change. At the present time and in the recent past, the ORG contends that the 
control paradigm response to these has been to ‘[secure] control of, or access to, key 
resources such as Persian Gulf oil’.69
In reference to the United Kingdom, it is this thesis’ contention that this ‘control 
paradigm’ approach was a significant determinant in the formulation of and implementation 
[)f defence policy from 1945 to 1997 (and even before this period). There is much evidence to 
support this point of view and the British government’s desire to maintain access to the oil 
ind gas resources of the region. As mentioned in the introduction, in 1946 the British Chiefs
;)f Staff believed that the need to safeguard access to oil reserves from the Middle East was
1(\an important raison d ’etre for a continued British military presence in Palestine. In 1955, 
the British government signed the Baghdad pact with Iran, Iraq and Pakistan and Turkey in 
prder to contribute to ‘the defence of the Middle East against aggression’ and ‘maintain and 
develop continuity in defence planning and to promote political and economic co-operation 
|vithin the area’.71 The 1962 ‘Statement on the Defence Estimates’ stated ‘Peace and stability 
jn the oil producing States of Arabia and the Persian Gulf are vital for the Western world’, 
igain stressing the importance of the energy resources of the area. The supposed withdrawal 
East of Suez’ of British forces mooted in the 1967 ‘Statement on the Defence Estimates’ was 
loon reneged upon, with the 1972 ‘Statement on the Defence Estimates’ outlining ‘new 
reaties of friendship signed with Bahrain, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates’ with ‘ships of 
he Royal Navy and ... Royal Air Force aircraft [visiting] the Gulf regularly’ as well as ‘the
Mark Townsend, ‘Official: Iraq war led to London bombings’, The Observer (April 2 2006).
Chris Abbot and Thomas Phipps, ‘Beyond Dependence and Legacy: Sustainable Security in Sub-Saharan 
frica’, Oxford Research Group Briefing Paper (May 2009) p. 1, accessed at
ttp://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/pub1ications/briefing papers/bevond dependence and legacy sustaina 
le security sub saharanafrica on 30 April 2012.
Chris Abbot, Paul Rogers and John Sloboda, ‘Global Responses to Global Threats: Sustainable Security for 
ie 21st Century’, p.28.
Ritchie4 Ovendale, British Defence Policy Since 1945 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994) p.5.
’ MOD, Statement on Defence 1956, Cmd. 9691 (London: HMSO, 1956) p.22.
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oan of British military personnel to local defence forces...’.72 In 1975, the significance of 
Arabian oil supplies was again emphasised, and the importance of maintaining secure oil 
upplies and transport routes continued to be mentioned in the 1980s and 1990s by the 
Conservative governments in power at the time.73
Indeed, the perceived strategic importance of the region (primarily due to its energy 
mportance) saw British troops deployed to protect Kuwait from possible Iraqi invasion in 
1961, British soldiers involved in conflict in Aden from 1963 until 1967 and in the Gulf war 
[)f 1990-1991. There has also been a constant British naval presence in the Persian Gulf since 
1980 (the so-called Armilla patrol).74 The planned withdrawal of British forces from ‘East of 
Suez’ in the 1967 ‘Statement on the Defence Estimates’ demonstrated the importance of 
aircraft carriers in terms of their power projection capabilities in the Middle East and further 
afield, as both the planned replacements for the extant Royal Navy fleet carriers were 
cancelled as a result of this policy decision.75 Arms exports to the region were also not 
insignificant with Oman purchasing all its military equipment from the UK until the end of 
the 1950s and continuing to be a major customer for the UK arms industry with the purchase
•  76 *of 38 Challenger 2 tanks in the 1990s. Saudi Arabia was also a major importer of British 
military equipment with some of the biggest arms deals in history concluded between the two
• 7 7  •countries. With this information in mind, we must now examine how we can use the control 
paradigm’s manifest effects to interpret whether this was the general approach taken to 
energy security in defence policy from 1997 to 2010.
72 See MOD, Statement on the Defence Estimates 1967, Cmnd. 3203 (London: HMSO, 1967) pp.6-9 and MOD, 
Statement on the Defence Estimates 1972, Cmnd. 4891 (London: HMSO, 1972) p.4. In addition, the United 
Kingdom established a Five Power defence arrangement with Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore 
in April 1971, which was designed to guarantee the security o f the latter two states. See MOD, Statement on the 
Defence Estimates 1971, Cmnd. 4592 (London: HMSO, 1971) p.5 and MOD, Statement on the Defence 
Estimates 1972, Cmnd. 4891 (London: HMSO, 1972) p.4. Also, see Carlyle A. Thayer, ‘The Five Power 
Defence Arrangements: The Quiet Achiever’, Security Challenges, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2007).
73 MOD, Statement on the Defence Estimates 1975, Cmnd. 5976 (London: HMSO, 1975) pp. 14-15; MOD, 
Statement on the Defence Estimates 1985, Cmnd. 9430-1 (London: TSO, 1985) p.l 1 and MOD, Statement on the 
Defence Estimates 1996, Cm. 3223 (London: TSO, 1996) p.3.
74 MOD, Statement on the Defence Estimates 1989 - Volume I, Cm. 675 (London: TSO, 1989) p. 19.
75 See Paul Rogers, ‘Big Boats and Bigger Skimmers: Determining Britain’s Role in the Long War’, 
International Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 4 (2006) pp. 656-657.
76 See Mark Phythian, The Politics o f  British Arms Sales Since 1964 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2000) p.240.
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Jsing the Control Paradigm’s Tenets to Measure Energy Security’s Effect on Defence 
^licv
the - control paradigm’ has represented the default defence position on energy security 
»ince 1945, the effect of this approach on British defence policy in the studied period would 
^resent a continuity of action with the examples given above. As such, if energy security was 
a key issue for British defence policy from 1997 onwards, and elements of a control paradigm 
approach were adopted, the first thing we would expect to see at the declaratory level of 
policy are statements that outlined the importance of maintaining the security of global 
supply routes, as well as the security significance of key fossil-fuel producing regions. We 
should also see the recognition that military action may have needed to be taken in order to 
ensure continued supplies of essential energy resources. Given the focus on fossil-fuels there 
should have .been little discussion of the development of alternative energy technologies. All 
of the above will be examined in greater depth in Chapter Three of this thesis.
I In Chapter Four, we will examine the operational sphere of British defence policy. If a 
control paradigm approach was taken, British armed forces doctrine should have stated 
energy security as a relevant issue for overall planning. The significance of fossil-fuels to the 
operational effectiveness of the armed forces should also have been outlined, as well as the 
importance of maintaining an expeditionary capability that could intervene in key areas such 
as the Middle East, as well as areas of emerging importance to British energy security 
considerations. For example, we may find that the two mooted Queen Elizabeth class aircraft- 
carriers were put forward in Royal Navy doctrine as key enablers of the ability to protect 
important lines of communication and project power in important fossil-fuel producing 
regions.
As in the declaratory sphere of policy, the operational sphere should also have 
displayed little Tnention of the potential need to develop alternative energy technologies. 
Where this was mooted we would expect to see protests that it could undermine essential 
combat capability. In the same manner, the statements of serving officers in each of the 
services should have echoed these sentiments. Similarly, in Chapter Four we will see 
whether the actual operations they were engaged upon and their conduct during these 
operations reflected the above considerations. As such we would expect to have seen the use 
of military force to maintain security in areas of importance to UK energy supplies.
In terms of the defence-industrial base, Chapter Five will analyse whether senior 
figures within the defence industry outlined the role the British Defence Industrial Base
[DIB) played in producing military equipment and weapons platforms that could be used to 
Drotect British interests in regions important to British energy security considerations.
Chapter Five will also ascertain whether there was continued development of conventional 
energy technologies that utilised fossil fuels for power between 1997 and 2010. Also, in line 
with the aforementioned ORG’s notion that a control paradigm seeks to maintain ‘the 
military advantages of key regional allies’ we will observe whether there were significant 
weapons sales to regimes that had significant energy reserves, as mentioned earlier in this 
chapter with the instances of weapons sales to Oman and Saudi Arabia in the 1980s and 
1990s.
Sustainable Security
In opposition to the control paradigm approach to energy security is the ORG’s stated 
alternative; this is the sustainable security approach. The term ‘sustainable security’ was 
coined relatively recently by Paul Rogers and the Oxford Research Group (ORG), seemingly 
to create a security paradigm that mirrored the well-known idea of ‘sustainable development’. 
Indeed, the articulation of this notion has become a focal point for much of their work. Paul 
Rogers has been developing many of the ideas that are propounded by the think-tank in his
7 5 1work over the past twenty years. Still, the idea of sustainable security has also been 
suggested by other academics and policy-makers who generally tend to have an interest in the
7 0related idea of sustainable development. But, before we outline its applicability to the 
analysis of energy security within British defence policy, it is important to scrutinize the 
concept of sustainability itself so the reader can gather a greater understanding of its 
theoretical roots.
The Concept of Sustainability and the Sustainable Security Paradigm
Sustainability is a term that is much used in the modem media and much discussed in relation 
to environmental issues. The Collins Dictionary and Thesaurus defines the word sustainable 
as meaning: ‘capable of being sustained’ and ‘(of economic development, energy sources
78 See Paul Rogers, Global Security and the War On Terror: Elite Power and the Illusion o f  Control (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2008). This provides a definitive survey o f his thoughts on international security, 
with published journal articles from the past twenty years.
79 See Sanjeev Khagram, William C. Clark and Dana Firas Raad, ‘From the Environment and Human Security 
to Sustainable Security and Development’, Journal o f  Human Development, Vol. 4, No. 2 (2003).
etc.) capable of being maintained at a steady level without exhausting natural resources or 
causing severe ecological damage’.80 This was further elaborated on by the previous Labour 
government when it defined the goal of sustainable development as: ‘to enable all people 
throughout the world to satisfy their basic needs and enjoy a good quality of life without 
compromising the quality of life of future generations.’81
Thus, sustainability indicates progression in all human activities without this 
progression or improvement jeopardising future generations’ basic living standards. But how 
can this idea be applied to security? Of course it could be applied to all aspects of human 
security, whether this be at international, national, local or individual levels. But this runs the 
risk of providing too broad a definition, which then serves no use to academics, military 
chiefs or government policy-makers. As Stephen E. Sachs comments in his article ‘The 
Changing Definition of Security’, ‘there is the danger of defining security as everything that’s 
good or ‘necessary’ in life.’82 But how do we then decide what is ‘necessary’ or even good?
To make things more cogent we need to focus on those issues that are conflict drivers, 
whether within or between recognised states. Within this remit would fall international 
terrorism and, in certain cases, crime in circumstances where it threatens to lead to the 
breakdown of law and order within a given society.83 Seismic events, such as volcanoes and 
earthquakes, which have the potential to cause massive destruction and disruption to modem 
societies, will not be included within this analysis. The reason being that they are ‘acts of 
god’ and there is nothing that can be done, as yet, to prevent their precise occurrence. 
However, the broad international consensus that climate change is increasing the incidence of 
such meteorological phenomena as hurricanes, as well as causing rapid changes in regional 
climates, is something that has entered the security agenda in the past few years and is now 
considered to have the potential to be a major conflict driver by the ORG, Paul Rogers and
* 0 4
the British armed forces. Therefore, man’s understood contribution to climate change would
80 Collins Dictionary & Thesaurus, (GlasgowrHarperCollins, 2000) p. 1203.
81FCO, UK International Priorities: The FCO Sustainable Development Plan (FCO, 2007) p.4.
82 Stephen E. Sachs, ‘The Changing Definition o f Security’, stevesachs.com (2003) accessed at 
http://www.stevesachs.com/papers/paper security.html on 30 April 2012.
83 The situation in Panama before US involvement in 1989 is a good example o f the latter point.
84 Mark Henderson, ‘Global warming linked to increase o f hurricanes’, The Times (16 September 2005). The 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) reports outlining the effects of human-induced climate 
change can be accessed at IPCC Website, ‘Publication and Data’ (2012) accessed at
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications and data/publications and data reports.htm on 30 April 2012. ORG reports 
on sustainable security and the importance o f climate change mitigation within this concept can be accessed at 
the ORG Website, ‘Briefing Papers and Reports’ (2012)
http://www.oxfordresearchgroup.org.uk/publications/briefing papers?term=51 &field pub date value%5Bvalu 
e%5D%5Byear%5D=&field pub date value%5Bvalue%5D%5Bmonth%5D= on 30 April 2012. Also, see 
DCDC, The DC DC 'Global Strategic Trends Programme 2007-2036 (Shrivenham: DCDC, 2007).
need to be an important consideration in the formulation of any acceptable sustainable 
security strategy.
According to the ORG, there are currently 4 major global conflict drivers that need to 
be addressed if global security is to be ensured in the near future. These are: climate change; 
competition over resources; marginalisation of the majority world; and global militarisation.85 
The issue of the economic marginalisation of the majority of the world’s population ties in 
with the problems created by rapid man-induced climate change, as well as the potential for 
increased human competition over finite natural resources. For example, whilst overall global 
wealth has increased in the past century, the benefits of this growth have not been equally 
shared. In the year 2000, the richest 10 percent of the world owned 85 percent of household 
wealth whereas the poorest 50 percent owned barely 1 percent of the total amount.86 
According to UN statistics published in 2005, one billion people were forced to survive on 
less than $1 a day and it was estimated that 815 million people in developing countries were 
suffering from acute hunger despite the fact there is enough food produced every year to feed 
the world’s entire population.87 In addition, half of the world’s population of 2.2 billion 
children were then considered to be living in poverty.88 Unfortunately, these problems are 
likely to be exacerbated as the effects of climate change are increasingly felt.89 Thus, a 
substantial proportion of the world has reason (and will have reason) to feel marginalised.
This situation is not aided by calls for free trade by Western countries when free trade 
policies are often inimical to the economies of those poor states where subsistence agriculture 
remains a key employer. For example, the state of Haiti has been heavily indebted to various 
creditors since it declared independence in 1804.90 In return for IMF and World Bank loans in 
the 1980s (following the US-enforced exile of the notorious dictator Baby Doc) the Haitian 
economy had to remove tariffs on agricultural produce, thus allowing the influx of subsidised 
American food. The effect was devastating for a country in which two-thirds of the populace
85 Chris Abbot, Paul Rogers and John Sloboda, ‘Global Responses to Global Threats: Sustainable Security for 
the 21st Century’, Oxford Research Group Briefing Paper (ORG, 2006) p.4.
86 James Davies, Susanna Sandstrom, Anthony Shorrocks and Edward N. Wolff, ‘The World Distribution o f  
Household Wealth’, World Institute fo r  Development Economics Research, Helsinki, (2006) p.26, accessed at 
http://www.iariw.org/papers/2006/davies.pdf on 30 April 2012.
87 United Nations Development Programme, United Nations Human Development Report 2005 (UN, 2005) 
accessed at http://hdr.undp.org/repports/global/2005 on 30 April 2012.
88 UNICEF, ‘Childhood Under Threat: The State o f the World’s Children 2005’, UNICEF Annual Report (UN,
2006) p. 15, accessed at http://www.unicef.org/publications/index 24433.html on 30 April 2012.
89 See Stephan Harrison, ‘Climate change and Regional Security: Assessing the Scientific Uncertainties’, The 
RUSI Journal, Vol. 153, No. 3 (2008) pp. 88-91.
90 Alex Von Tunzelmann, ‘Haiti: the land where children eat mud’, The Sunday Times (May 17 2009). The 
French demanded 150 million Francs in reparations following Haitian independence. These reparations were 
finally paid off (including interest) in 1947. Since then Haiti has continued to rely on loans from international 
organizations.
relied on subsistence agriculture to make a living. In 2002, more than half of all children were 
malnourished and 80% of the rural population lived below the poverty line.91 In turn, this 
contributed to widespread corruption and a low-level of security in the country with drug- 
trafficking providing one of the few real business opportunities and criminal gangs holding 
sway in many areas of the country.92 This then deterred further investment and potential 
income that may have been generated from industries such as tourism.93
Additionally, despite the hardship prevalent in developing countries, their populations 
are able to see the lives of those lived in developed countries due to the rapid spread of 
communications technology such as televisions and radios. More than 30 years ago, Alberto 
Quiros Corradi, in an article on the importance of secure energy resources, was stating that 
‘The have-nots now know there is a show to be enjoyed’.94 Indeed, the increased threat of 
terrorism worldwide can be ascribed, to a significant degree, to the concept of ‘a revolt from 
the margins’ -  a phrase coined by Paul Rogers. This idea recognizes that terrorism does not 
necessarily consist of involvement from the poorest of the poor. Rather those that have 
received a relatively good education in countries that have significant disparities in wealth 
between rich and poor often feel compelled to resort to political and religious violence when 
they ‘do not share in the fruits of economic growth’.95 Thus, the phenomenon of Al-Qaeda 
(whilst there are undoubtedly varied reasons in its formulation), as well as many more 
localised terrorist groups, can be seen as part of a wider global movement fighting against 
perceived inequalities that are believed to be perpetuated by those countries that wish to 
maintain the global status quo.96 In this way, parallels can be drawn with the anti-colonial
Q7movements that surfaced throughout the world following the end of the Second World War.
In addition to global marginalisation, the ORG believes that global militarisation 
threatens to destabilise the international system, mainly through the increased proliferation of 
WMDs. The Cold War saw a massive stockpiling of nuclear weapons by the two major
91Charlotte Denny, ‘Haiti: proof o f hypocrisy’, guardian.co.uk (11 April 2002) accessed at 
http://www.giiardian.co.ukAvorld/2002/apr/l1/global isation.charlottedenny on 7 May 2012. The import tariff on 
rice in Haiti was cut from 50% to 3%. There were similar tariff cuts on other essential foodstuffs.
92 The Economist, ‘Weighed down by disasters’ (12 February 2009).
93 Britain does not currently have an embassy in Haiti, in part due to security concerns. See FCO Website,
‘Haiti’ (23 April 2012) accessed at http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/trave1-and-living-abroad/travel-advice-by- 
countrv/north-central-america/haiti/ on 30 April 2012.
94 Alberto Quiros Corradi, ‘Energy and the Exercise o f Power’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 57, Iss. 5 (1979) p. 1154.
95 Paul Rogers, Why We ’re Losing the War on Terror, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008) p. 152.
96See Alan B. Krueger and Jitka Maleckova, ‘Education, Poverty and Terrorism: Is There a Causal Connection’, 
Journal o f  Economic Perspectives, Vol. 17, No. 4 (2003) pp. 119-144. This posits the explanation that terrorists
are more likely to be well-educated people who inhabit countries where there are significant restrictions on civil 
liberties by the State.
powers -  the US and USSR -  as well as the United Kingdom, France, Israel and China. The 
years since the end of this period have seen some positive steps towards nuclear 
disarmament. The global numbers of active nuclear weapons have fallen (from US and 
Russian combined figures of 70,000 to around 20,000) and a Chemical Weapons Convention 
reduced the global stockpiles of chemical weapons significantly.98
However, these encouraging signs have been counteracted by renewed proliferation in 
other regions of the world. India and Pakistan have both developed nuclear weapons 
capabilities in the past 15 years and given the poor relations between these countries 
(exacerbated by the continuing dispute over partitioned Kashmir and sporadic terrorist attacks 
on India by Pakistani extremists) there exists a potent threat of nuclear war.99 There is also 
the fear that Pakistani nuclear weapons could fall into the hands of terrorists given the recent 
insurgency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that border Afghanistan, as 
well as similar problems in the western provinces of Baluchistan.100 North Korea is also 
believed to have tested nuclear weapons and has managed to develop a ballistic missile 
capability that could ultimately have a range of up to 10,000 kilometres.101 Moreover, 
although the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) became the first multilateral 
weapons treaty to ban an entire category of weapons, the lack of any formal verification 
regime to ensure compliance is a serious handicap preventing the effective enforcement of 
the accord.102 Subsequently, it is widely believed that North Korea has breached the terms of 
the convention by conducting biological weapons research and perhaps weaponising one or
98 See Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Website, ‘World Nuclear Forces’ (2011) accessed at 
http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2011 /07 on 30 April 2012.The Convention on the Prohibition o f the 
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chemical weapons stockpiles by 2012. For more information, see the Organization fo r  the Prohibition o f  
Chemical Weapons Website, ‘Convention on the Prohibition o f the Development, Production, Stockpiling and 
Use o f Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention)’ (2012) accessed at 
http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/ on 30 April 2012.
99 Rahul Bedi, ‘ 12 die in raid on India parliament’, The Daily Telegraph (14 December 2001) and Peter Walker, 
‘Mumbai terror attacks: Rice Arrives in Delhi to try and salve India-Pakistan relations’, guardian.co.uk (3 
December 2008).
100 Nathan Busch, ‘Risks o f Nuclear Terror: Vulnerabilities to Theft and Sabotage at Nuclear Weapons 
Facilities’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 23, No.3 (2002) pp. 39-42.
101 BBC News Online, ‘North Korea’s missile programme’ (27 May 2009) accessed at 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/2564241 .stm on 30 April 2012.
102 For the full text o f the agreement see United Nations Office at Geneva Website, ‘Disarmament: The 
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)’ (2012) accessed at
http://www.unog.ch/80256EE600585943/(httpPagesV04FBBDD6315AC720C1257180004B1 B2F?OpenDocum 
ent on 30 April 2012.
wo biological agents.103 Iran is also believed to have a burgeoning nuclear weapons
104)rogramme.
These are all trans-national security threats that have the potential to affect every state 
vithin the global system and are likely to be the major underlying causes of conflict 
hroughout the globe in the forthcoming years. However, the twin drivers of climate change 
md resource competition are particularly applicable to energy security considerations and, as 
such, will be the two that are focussed on within this thesis. Accordingly, in broad terms, a 
1 sustainable security’ paradigm as outlined by the work of the ORG and Paul Rogers, would 
be based upon addressing these conflict drivers. This paradigm should ultimately be 
considered a synergy of what the ORG term Common Security and Human Security 
approaches to international relations.105 In this way it combines a Common Security agenda, 
which would consist of greater levels of inter-state co-operation in addressing global issues, 
jand the human security agenda, which calls for a prioritization of the rights of the individual 
and communities worldwide as an end in itself, as well as an effective means for the creation 
of greater stability within the international system. This paradigm also builds in ‘a capacity 
for long-term resilience’ by addressing the aforementioned environmental and socio­
economic issues.106 Consequently, there is both a ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ conception of 
the causes of global instability, providing a coherent model for the understanding and 
alleviation of conflict worldwide. A neat summation of this is provided by Chris Abbot and 
Sophie Marsden when they say a ‘[sustainable security framework] must be based on an
107integrative analysis of security threats and a preventative approach to responses’.
In adopting a sustainable security objectives, defence policy would need to embrace a 
more holistic approach to security rather than focussing purely on military means, although of 
course the ability to project ‘hard power’ (in common military parlance) would remain an 
important basis for the British armed forces. Hard power (the ‘ability to coerce’ using 
military force) must be integrated with ‘soft power’ (the ability to persuade through attraction
103 See IISS Website, ‘North Korea’s Chemical and Biological (CBW) Programmes’ (2004) accessed at 
http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-dossiers/north-korean-dossier/north-koreas-weapons-programmes-a- 
net-asses/north-koreas-chemical-and-weapons-cbw-prog/ on 30 April 2012.
104 See IAEA, ‘Implementation o f the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions o f  Security Council 
Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008) and 1835 (2008) in the Islamic Republic o f Iran’, IAEA 
Report (5 June 2009) accessed at http://isis-online.org/publications/iran/IAEA Iran Report 5June2009.pdf on 
30 April 2012.
105 Paul Rogers (2008) pp. 157-158.
106 Ibid. p. 158.
107 Chris Abbot and Sophie Marsden, ‘From Within and Without: Sustainable Security in the Middle East and 
North Africa’, Oxford Research Group Briefing Paper (ORG, 2009) p. 2.
using political, economic and cultural policies).108 This necessitates greater cooperation with 
3ther government departments as well other governments. As the ORG states ‘this approach 
does not attempt to unilaterally control threats through the use of force (‘attack the 
symptoms’), but rather it aims to cooperatively resolve the root causes of those threats using 
the most effective means available (‘cure the disease’).’109 We would therefore expect to see 
a recognition of the long-term threats to security posed by climate change and competition for 
resources. There should also be an appreciation that prevention of conflict is important but 
that the military may need to make judicious interventions globally in cases where regional 
security is threatened. This prevention of conflict would require greater inter-departmental 
cooperation between governmental departments that have significant foreign interests. Thus, 
the FCO, DFID, DECC and MOD would need to implement similar measures to combat 
climate change and enhance stability in states key to UK energy security. Similarly, as 
security should be dependent upon international institutions and the rule of law, all efforts 
should be made to achieve as wide a consensus as possible through the United Nations before 
any intervention is embarked upon.110 Arms sales to ‘regional allies’ would also be 
significantly reduced or stopped as these enhance global militarisation and are recognised as 
a key conflict driver through their creation of mistrust between neighbouring countries.111 In 
terms of a sustainable security response to climate change, the ORG outlines the greater 
adoption and development of renewable energy sources worldwide.
Similarly, to alleviate and prevent potential conflict over competition for energy 
resources, the ORG emphasises the imposition of greater energy efficiency measures and
119energy conservation measures within overall government policy. In addition, there should
also be a focus on the development of an integrated security strategy that recognises the need
♦ • 11^to enhance cooperation between government departments to address these particular issues.
In this way, these measures would aid in the prevention of conflict rather than trying to cure 
conflict through the application of military force, as in a control paradigm approach.
108 These definitions are taken from Joseph S. Nye, Jr., ‘Soft Power and European-American Affairs’ p.26 in 
Thomas Ilgen ed., Hard Power, Soft Power and the Future o f  Transatlantic Relations (Aldershot: Ashgate 
Publishing, 2006).
109 Chris Abbot, Paul Rogers and John Sloboda, ‘Global Responses to Global Threats: Sustainable Security For 
The 21st Century’, Oxford Research Group Briefing Paper (ORG, 2006) p.29.
110 Interview with Paul Rogers conducted via telephone. 19 March 2009. See Chris Abbot and Sophie Marsden, 
‘From Within and Without: Sustainable Security in the Middle East and North Africa’, Oxford Research Group 
Briefing Paper (ORG, 2009) p. 2.
111 James Kemp, ‘Sustainable Peace and Security’, Compass Thinkpiece 18, p.2.
112 Chris Abbot, Paul Rogers and John Sloboda, ‘Global Responses to Global Threats: Sustainable Security For 
The 21st Century’, Oxford Research Group Briefing Paper (ORG, 2006) p.28.
113 James Kemp, ''Sustainable Peace and Security’, Compass Thinkpiece 18, p.2.
Ising the Sustainable Security Tenets to Measure Energy Security’s Effect on Defence 
olicv
If a fully sustainable security approach to energy security within defence policy was adopted 
then what essential steps would have been taken? As outlined already, a sustainable security 
approach would attempt to settle these issues in the long-term through measures that 
addressed the foundational aspects of energy insecurity. In essence, there would need to be a 
preventative approach to these energy security issues, with an emphasis on the need for the 
armed forces to address energy insecurity through a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, 
greater energy efficiency, the adoption of alternative energy technologies and more inter­
governmental and inter-departmental cooperation on energy issues.
Consequently, at the declaratory level (outlined in Chapter Three) we should expect to 
have seen an articulation of the importance of competition over energy resources and climate 
change as potential international conflict drivers, allied with the subsequent need for the 
armed forces to move towards greater development of alternative energy sources, as well as 
increased energy efficiency so as to combat these issues. Most importantly, there would be a 
movement away from emphasising the importance of being able to deploy British armed 
forces to key fossil-fuel producing regions as wider governmental measures should have 
made the UK’s energy requirements more diverse and secure. There should also have been 
the acknowledgement that developments in energy technology had the potential to enhance 
military capability through increased operational range and durability and front-line units 
reduced need for fuel resupply and was therefore in the long-term interests of the military.114 
Similarly, the requirement for greater cooperation with other government departments in 
terms of energy issues should have been acknowledged and the appropriate changes in policy 
and governmental structure implemented so as to facilitate this.
At the operational level of defence policy, the twin drivers of climate change and 
competition for resources should have been regarded as issues that needed to be addressed by 
the British armed forces. This could be done most propitiously through liaison with other 
government departments and states and through the recognition of the advantages of 
alternative and energy efficient technologies for alleviation of these drivers. Indeed, the effect
114 For example, Qinetiq’s Zephyr programme has developed an Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) that can 
remain airborne for up to two weeks through the combined use o f solar panels and lithium-sulphur batteries 
installed on its wings. This presents the possibility o f an aircraft that can provide surveillance for ground forces 
around the clock. See Qinetiq Website, ‘High altitude long endurance UAV -  Zephyr’ (2012) accessed at
http://www2.qinetiq.com /hom e/defence/defence so lu tions/aerospace/unm annedairsystem s/uav .h tm l on 30 
A pril 2012.
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3f sustainable security notions on operational policy should be seen through the use of these
win drivers as justification for the adoption of any sustainable security measures. With the 
*
focus moving away from securing access to fossil-fuel producing regions, there should also 
have been the acknowledgement that past procurement had been too heavily focussed on hard 
power capabilities, when a more multi-role capability for the armed forces could be 
developed. Paul Rogers’ conception of a British military establishment geared towards 
sustainable security principles would see a more doctrinal emphasis on peace support 
operations (with soldiers geared towards restoring civilian rule in areas of conflict) as well as 
the avoidance of the manufacture of large capital ships and weapons platforms whose sole 
aim is to project military force. More multi-role vessels providing greater versatility would be 
preferable.115 All these aspects of the paradigm should have been demonstrated both at the 
doctrinal level and within the statements of senior officers from each of the three services.
Similarly, the level of defence-industrial policy should also have demonstrated the 
desire to address the twin drivers of climate change and energy resource competition by using 
| these as a justification for research and development into alternative energy technologies. 
Added to this, this level of policy would not have engaged in selling arms in energy-rich 
regions where their sale may potentially increase inter and intra-state tensions. The political 
importance of using weapons exports to forge close links with energy-rich states would also 
have diminished, making these actions less prevalent.
Caveats in Measuring Energy Security’s Effect on British Defence Policy
Before we can proceed to the next chapter, this section will call to attention a number of 
considerations that need to be taken into account before we begin to use the two models that 
have been outlined previously. The first point to note is that the use of the control and 
sustainable security paradigms as analytical prisms does not suggest that energy security’s 
effect on defence policy can only be viewed in binary terms or as an either/or in relation to 
these two approaches to ensuring energy security for the UK. In reality, the two paradigms 
should be understood as constituting the two opposing sides of an energy security continuum. 
As such, it is likely that we will see aspects of both paradigms evident in the military’s 
approach to energy security in this period, rather than a fundamentally pure control paradigm 
or sustainable security approach. However, given the fact that the control paradigm was the
115 Interview with Paul Rogers conducted via telephone, 19 March 2009.
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lefault approach to energy security until 1997, any noticeable adoption of sustainable 
;ecurity tenets will be denoted as a movement towards a sustainable energy ideal.
Secondly, we may find that in the examined period that there was the development 
md adoption of technologies that were amenable to sustainable security principles, but 
without the attendant espousal of sustainable security tenets as justification for the 
technologies’ promotion. For instance, we may observe the promotion of solar panels for use 
by the British armed forces in this period. However, the benefits of their use may be couched 
purely in terms of their operational advantages (less need for fuel resupply, less vulnerability 
to attack etc) rather than in the attendant desire for the military to cut greenhouse gas 
emissions or contribute to Britain’s energy security through improved energy efficiency. 
Ultimately, if this approach is observed in the succeeding analysis it is important for the 
jreader to bear in mind that this does represent a movement towards a sustainable security 
approach (due to the mitigating effects of such technologies on the drivers of climate change 
j and energy resource competition) but does not demonstrate the impact of sustainable energy 
security considerations on British defence policy in this period.
The final point to take into account is that the British government would almost 
certainly never publicly highlight the need to ensure continued access to oil reserves as the 
prime reasoning for any military action. This is because the British public would be unlikely 
to back military action on the cynical grounds of Realpolitik. As John Mearsheimer has noted 
in reference to the United States, ‘Realism is a hard se ll... Because Americans dislike 
realpolitik, public discourse in the United States is couched in the language of liberalism.’116 
This same view can be applied to the British public with polls showing that the invasion of 
Iraq would not have been supported if fought for oil (indeed without the second UN 
resolution in 2003 most people opposed the invasion of Iraq) and the massive London 
protests before the Iraq war with many banners decrying the potential conflict as a war for 
oil.117 Indeed, the Labour government saw fit to describe the conflicts that involved British 
forces during their time in government as examples of ‘Liberal Interventionism’, as well as 
denying in Parliament that the Iraq War was in any way motivated by the desire for access to
116 John Mearsheimer, The Tragedy o f  Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001) p.23, p.24.
117 See Ipsos MORI Website, ‘War with Iraq’ (5 March 2003) accessed at http://www.ipsos- 
mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/po11.aspx?oltemld=830 on 30 April 2012. This poll indicated 
that only 25% o f the British public would support British involvement in the invasion o f  Iraq if  inspectors failed 
to find WMDs and there was a failure to gain a second UN resolution in favour o f the war. If both conditions 
were met the figure would have been 75% in favour o f the war. The UK’s biggest ever demonstration took place 
against the war in London on 16 February 2003. Numbers were estimated to have been between 750,000 and 2 
million. See BBC News Online, “ Million’ march against Iraq war’ (16 February 2003) accessed at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1 /hi/2765041 .stm on 30 April 2012.
he country’s significant oil reserves.118 Similarly, the operational and defence-industrial 
evels would be unlikely to espouse opinions on energy security that would be likely to draw 
legative media and public opinion.119
Of course, the fact that there is likely to be little mention given to the term ‘energy 
security’ in the government defence literature or Ministerial statements on defence does not 
mean that this issue will not be prominent, nor at the same time important at the declaratory 
ievel of policy. Instead, due to the public relations reasons outlined above, rather than 
explicitly stating the importance of ‘energy security’ and the military means to ensure the 
maintenance of this, each circle of defence policy is more likely to use implicit language that 
indicates a British interest in the resources and economic benefits that a particular country or 
region provides to the United Kingdom and the world as a whole.120 For example, the 1985 
Statement on the Defence Estimates commented: ‘We ... have a strong interest in seeing 
peace and stability maintained in the countries constituting our trading partners; in securing 
the supplies of oil and strategic minerals that are vital to our and other Western economies; 
and in keeping open key trade routes.’121 Thus, we are likely to see this kind of language used 
in reference to any regions or countries that are deemed important in ensuring energy security 
for the United Kingdom.
Essentially, what the preceding paragraphs have outlined is the fact that military 
action or posturing that is predicated upon the acquisition or safeguarding of key energy 
resources is likely to be highly unpalatable to the general public and media at large. Thus, if 
a control paradigm approach to energy security proves to be important in defence policy we 
will observe language that emphasises the importance of peace and stability in key regions
118 See David Miliband, ‘Foundations o f Freedom: the Promise o f the New  
Multilateralism’, William Wilberforce Lecture (2008), accessed at
http://wwvv.wilberforcelecturetrust.co.uk/index.php/lectures/lecture-detail/2008-lecture-from-rt-hon-david- 
miliband-mp/ on 30 April 2012. This speech effectively outlined the Labour government’s idea o f a paradigm o f  
liberal interventionism. Also, see Hansard, HC Deb Volume 397, Column 675 (15 January 2003). Tony Blair 
commented: ‘Let me first deal with the conspiracy theory that this is somehow to do with oil. There is no way 
whatever, if  oil were the issue, that it would not be infinitely simpler to cut a deal with Saddam, who, I am sure, 
would be delighted to give us access to as much oil as we wanted if  he could carry on building weapons of mass 
destruction. The very reason why we are taking the action that we are taking is nothing to do with oil or any o f  
the other conspiracy theories put forward’.
119 In an interview with Lord Walker o f Aldringham (CDS from 2003 to 2006) he advised that it was his belief 
that the UK identified the Persian Gulf region as a core area due to political and historical links that had been 
forged throughout the twentieth century. Interview with Lord Walker o f Aldringham, March 17, 2011. The
interview was conducted via telephone.120This is not to say that there will never be explicit mention o f the need to secure energy resources through 
military coercion, but rather its incidence will almost certainly be less likely than that o f  implicit terminology, 
due to the public relations reasons mentioned already and the attendant desire, outlined by Mearsheimer, to 
portray one’s actions as being motivated by noble ideals rather than purely ‘realist’ considerations.
121 MOD, Statement on the Defence Estimates 1985, Cmnd. 9430-1 (London: TSO, 1985) p .l 1.
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that provide important energy resources, rather than a focus on Britain’s need to acquire these 
resources at all costs. In contrast, more sustainable sources of energy in military use are likely 
to be highlighted by the defence establishment as they are unlikely to have the same negative 
connotations in the public mind. The potential discrepancy between stated policy and the 
measures that are actually implemented will aid in highlighting which policy focus has been 
considered more important.
Conclusion
In sum, this chapter has set out the framework of analysis to be used in succeeding chapters 
to determine the effect of energy security considerations on British defence policy from 1997 
to 2010. It began by outlining what the term ‘defence policy’ actually means in the context of 
this thesis and demonstrated that the effective analysis of defence policy requires effective 
analytical tools due to the complex processes that can affect policy decisions within any 
nation’s defence establishment. In view of this, after briefly scrutinizing Graham Allison’s 
renowned three models of government, Ian Bellany’s notion of analysing the three separate 
strands of British defence policy was examined and adopted as a model for analysis for 
succeeding chapters. In addition, ideas from Andrew Dorman (time cycles) and Graham 
Allison (three models of government) were also adopted for use in later chapters. The latter 
two models will prove particularly useful as explanatory tools to account for the reasons why 
a particular course of action was taken at each level of defence policy. Finally, the ORG’s 
two paradigms of security were scrutinized and appropriated to be used as prisms (one 
historical, one normative) through which we can measure the effect of energy security 
considerations on British defence policy. This will be done through the comparison of what 
actually happened in the period under scrutiny and what should have happened if key points 
of the two paradigms were to be adhered to by the British government. Certainly, we may 
find evidence of both paradigms at work at different points in the studied period, or even (to 
greater and lesser degrees) at the same time.
However, before we can begin to use the framework to analyse defence policy it 
would first be pertinent to assess how the UK supplied its energy needs in the examined 
period. In this way, we can then fathom the wider governmental policy towards energy 
issues, which global regions would have been important to UK energy security (if any) and 
apply the resultant information so as to understand whether a control paradigm or sustainable 
security paradigm was at work. As such, Chapter Two will outline the UK’s energy needs, as
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veil as UK government energy policy, from 1997 to 2010. The thesis will then proceed to the 
nain body of analysis regarding energy security considerations’ effect on British defence 
)olicy during the Labour administration.
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Chapter Two
Ensuring Energy Security For The United Kingdom
During the tenure of the previous Labour administration, ‘energy security’ became a 
subject of increasing importance within British political discourse. Large energy price 
rises led to governmental claims that ‘the age of cheap energy is over’.1 The steep rise in 
oil and domestic energy prices in the United Kingdom pushed the issue of ‘energy 
security’ increasingly to the forefront of the British political agenda. Indeed, in 2008, 
Prime Minister Gordon Brown was moved to write an article in The Guardian newspaper 
recognising the effect energy price rises were having on the citizens of Britain and how 
the Government was aiming to deal with the problem.2 In addition, the British 
government called for the creation of a new series of nuclear and ‘clean-coal’ power 
stations to address the future energy needs of the United Kingdom.3 A report by Ofgem, 
the UK’s independent energy regulator (published in 2010), raised concerns over the 
future energy security of the United Kingdom and called for greater state intervention to 
ensure adequate levels of power generation.4 Indeed, the importance of energy resources 
to the UK was cited by some as the main reason for the invasion of Iraq in 2003, although
1 The then UK Energy Minister, Malcolm Wicks, said ‘I agree with the person who said that the age of  
cheap energy is over’ when interviewed by Channel 4 News on 17 July 2008. He was responding to a 
comment made by Duncan Sedgwick, the Chief Executive of the Energy Retail Association (ERA), who 
had made the original claim to BBC News. See BBC News Online, ‘Gas bills ‘to top £1000 a year” (18 
July 2008) accessed at http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/business/7512971 .stm on 30 April 2012. According to 
energy price statistics published by the DECC, UK domestic energy prices rose in real terms by 29.5 % 
between 1999 and 2010. Similarly, premium unleaded petrol increased from a price of 61 pence per litre 
(ppl) in January 1997 to 111 ppl by January 2010. In addition, diesel increased from a price of 62 ppl to 
113 ppl in the same period. See Tables QEP 2.1.1 and QEP 4.1.3 at DECC Website, ‘Energy Price 
Statistics’ (2012) accessed at
http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/statistics/energy stats/prices/prices.aspx on 30 April 2012.
2 Gordon Brown, ‘Gordon Brown: We Must All Act Together’, The Guardian (28 May 2008).
3 See Meeting the Energy Challenge: a White Paper on Energy, Cm. 7124 (London: TSO, 2007) and BBC 
News Online, ‘Clean Coal Plants Get Go Ahead’, (23 April 2009) accessed at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1 /h i/8 0 14295 .stm on 30 April 2012.
4 Ofgem, ‘Project Discovery: Options for delivering secure and sustainable energy supplies’, Ofgem 
Consultation Paper (3 February 2010) accessed at
http://www.ofgem.gov.uk/Pages/MoreInformation.aspx?docid=73&refer=Markets/WhlMkts/monitoring-
energy-securitv/Discovery on 30 April 2012.
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the official rationale provided by the American and British governments was the belief 
that Saddam Hussein’s regime was developing a significant WMD capability.5 
The purpose of this chapter is to create a frame of reference for the analysis of energy 
security’s effect on the formulation of British defence policy from 1997 until 2010. By 
outlining and understanding the energy requirements of the United Kingdom in this 
period we can surmise what issues defence policy makers would have had to take into 
account if they were to view energy security as a legitimate factor in the formulation of 
British defence policy. In later chapters we can then determine how important these 
issues were at the separate levels of defence policy by scrutinizing the relevant 
documents, speeches and actions of the actors involved. Ultimately, this will allow us to 
establish the significance of energy security as a factor in British defence policy during 
the time that Labour were in office.
For example, the potential for future British exploitation of large fossil fuel 
reserves in and around the Falkland Islands may have affected defence policy planners 
notions of the military equipment that would need to be maintained or procured to protect 
British interests in this region, as well as the deployments required to protect the Falkland 
Islands from any potential Argentine aggression. Similarly, the continued importance of 
the Middle East region to global oil and gas supplies and the possible need for armed 
intervention in this area may have necessitated the procurement of equipment that could 
operate adequately in hot, desert conditions, as well as the organization of preparatory 
desert exercises so UK forces could adapt to this hostile environment.
In addition, the information garnered in this chapter can also be used for 
comparative purposes. For example, by inspecting the evolution of motive fuels and 
power generation technology in the civilian sector and from 1997 onwards we can
5 See Greg Muttit, ‘Crude Designs: The rip-off o f Iraq’s oil wealth’, PLATFORM paper (2005) accessed at 
http://www.carbonweb.org/showitem.asp?article=57&parent=4&link=Y&gp=3 on 30 April 2012. 
PLATFORM is, in its own words, ‘an interdisciplinary organisation working on issues of environmental 
and social justice. Founded in 1984, it specialises in addressing the impacts o f British oil corporations on 
development, environment and human rights.’ See the PLATFORM Website, ‘Unravelling the Carbon Web’ 
(2012) accessed at http://www.carbonweb.org/ on 30 April 2012. Also, see Mark Curtis, Web of Deceit: 
Britain’s Real Role in the World1 (London: Vintage, 2003) Hansard, HC Deb Volume 400, Column 265 
(26 February 2003) Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Jack Straw: ‘First, why 
Iraq? The best answer to that question is to be found in the 42 pages of text of the 13 Security Council 
resolutions that form the first section o f the Command Paper. There we see, paragraph by paragraph, the 
exceptional danger posed by Iraq, and its continued defiance o f the United Nations’.
P a g e  | 51
ascertain in later chapters whether the British armed forces were moving ahead or behind 
civilian energy technology developments of the time. This correlation (or lack thereof) 
can then be used to determine whether the military was arguably more or less aware of its 
environmental footprint than other sections of British civilian society and whether this 
demonstrated a movement towards or away from notions of sustainable security within 
the defence establishment.
To aid clarity, the main body of this chapter will proceed by initially summarizing 
what we mean when we use the term ‘energy’, along with a description of its various uses 
within modem societies. Following on from this, it will then outline the UK’s energy 
needs within the examined period, the potential threats to the security of supply of 
important energy resources (and what this could mean for the British military) and finally 
the Labour government’s notion of what constituted energy security for the United 
Kingdom. The conclusions garnered from this analysis will then be used in succeeding 
chapters to evaluate whether concepts of energy security were deemed important factors 
in defence policy formulation from 1997 onwards.6
What Do We Mean By Energy?
Energy can, in physical terms, be defined as ‘the capacity of a body or system to do 
work’ and ‘a measure of this capacity, measured in joules.’7 Put more simply by Dave 
Watson ‘Energy is a property or characteristic . . .o f  matter that makes things happen, or, 
in the case o f stored or potential energy, has the potential to make things happen. ’8 Thus, 
it can come in many forms including kinetic, chemical, electrical, electromagnetic, 
nuclear and thermal types. Energy can be converted from one form to another but is never 
created or destroyed. As shall be seen, the conversion from chemical energy (fossil fuels) 
to kinetic and electrical energy (transportation and electrical power generation) remains 
the most important use in contemporary human activity.
6 Many o f the energy issues outlined in this chapter currently remain extant. For reasons o f clarity, they are 
discussed in the past tense so the reader is left in no doubt that we are examining the period that the Labour 
government were in power and not any current progressions in government policy.
7 Collins Dictionary & Thesaurus, (Glasgow: HarperCollins, 2000) p.387.
8 Dave Watson quoted in FT Exploring Website, ‘What is the Definition of Energy’ (2012) accessed at 
http://www.ftexploring.com/energy/definition.html on 30 April 2012.
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How Is Energy Used?
In modem society, different forms of energy are essential in the residential, transportation 
and industrial sectors. Energy supplies are used to produce electricity which then powers 
various residential appliances such as computers, televisions and refrigerators as well as 
myriad industrial machines. Power stations conventionally use turbines driven by a fluid 
to generate electricity. This fluid can simply be water, as in the case of hydroelectric 
power, or steam that is created by heat from the burning of fossil fuels (oil, coal, gas), 
from uranium fuel (nuclear power stations) or from geothermal energy.9 Wind-powered 
turbines are also increasingly popular, as they do not need to be supplied with any 
particular fuel and do not emit greenhouse gases, merely relying on wind strength. 
However, as the electricity generation in this case is dependent on meteorological factors 
it can often be intermittent. Large numbers of turbines are also needed to produce the 
same amount of electricity as conventional fossil-fuel or nuclear powered stations.10 
Other ‘Clean Energy’ (or renewable energy) alternatives include solar panels (utilising 
photovoltaic cells), tidal and wave power. Although constituting a small percentage of 
world electrical generation, their role in the future is expected to increase due to 
government subsidies, fears over greenhouse gas-induced climate change, higher oil 
prices and increased investment in research and development.11 Once generated, 
electricity is routed along a grid system (in the UK termed ‘The National Grid’) and 
supplied directly to residential, business or industrial properties through power lines.
As regards transportation from a global perspective, by the late twentieth 
century crude oil became by far the most important resource in powering vehicles on 
land, on sea and by air. Refined into petroleum and diesel these fuels are used in intemal- 
combustion engines to power various vehicles, whether civilian or military. Bio-fuels 
have also been developed, especially in the United States and Brazil, as an alternative to 
oil-based fuels. Agricultural products such as com or sugar-cane are distilled to create 
ethanol, which can then be used in automobiles specially converted to utilize this type of
9 H2G2 Website, ‘How Power Stations Work’ (19 June 2002) accessed at
http://www.h2g2.com/approved entry/A715637 on 7 May 2012.
10 Michael McCarthy, ‘Britain will need 12,500 wind farms to satisfy EU targets’, The Independent (24 
January 2008).
11 The Economist, ‘Green Dreams’ (18 November 2006).
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fuel.12 Indeed, Henry Ford’s first car and Rudolf Diesel’s first engine both ran on bio­
fuels.13 Despite this, it is important to bear in mind that bio-fuels are not generally seen as 
a replacement for crude oil-derived fuels. Indeed, even the much-lauded Brazilian 
ethanol-based fuel is mixed with standard gasoline, with the ethanol component often 
consisting of no more than 15% of the total fuel mix.14 Indeed, according to IEA figures, 
the 3% of bio-fuels used for road transport fuel worldwide in 2008 would have increased 
to only 8% globally by 2035.15 We can see from this that continued supplies of 
petroleum will remain important even when these alternatives are available.
Finally, there were hopes in the first decade of the twenty-first century that 
hydrogen could be developed as a clean and reliable fuel for the future, with three major 
car companies investing $2 billion in hydrogen fuel-cell technology by the end of 2003.16 
However, as yet there has only been one hydrogen-powered vehicle produced for the 
commercial market, the Honda FCX Clarity. Only 200 units have been produced and 
there remains the problem of a lack of hydrogen refuelling infrastructure that will allow 
these vehicles to refuel throughout any country where they are to be used. Only 
California has the necessary infrastructure to allow their effective use.17 Again, this 
demonstrates that, internationally, a large degree of further development is required for 
any alternative to oil-derived fuels to become viable as a fuel for mass transportation
12 Robert Clark, ‘Green Dreams’, National Geographic Magazine (October 2007).
13 Ibid.
14 For more information see BioFuel.org.uk, ‘Types o f Biofuel’ (2012) accessed at 
http://www.biofuel.org.uk/tvpes-of-biofuel.html on 30 April 2012.
15 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2010: Executive Summary (OECD/IEA publication, 2010) p.9.
16 Maggie Shiels, ‘Is hydrogen the fuel o f the future?’, BBC News Online (27 March 2003) accessed at 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/business/2880975.stm  on 7 May 2012.
17 See Andrew English, ‘Honda FCX Clarity: Car of the century?’, The Daily Telegraph ’ (17  November
2007). These cars cannot be bought and so far have only been available for hire on a monthly basis. For 
more information see: Honda Website, ‘FCX Clarity: Fuel Cell Electric Vehicle (FCEV) Zero-Emission 
Hydrogen Powered’, accessed at http://automobiles.honda.com/fcx-claritv/ on 6 May 2012.
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The UK’s Energy Needs 1997-2010
Before addressing the issue of potential threats to UK energy security and the British 
defence establishment’s response to this, it will first be necessary to comprehend the 
overall structure of the UK energy sector in the examined period. It then becomes easier 
to define where the UK was vulnerable to an interruption of energy supplies and to 
elucidate the reasons for the particular responses taken by the British government.
Historically, the UK was largely self-sufficient in energy in the first half of the 
20th Century (mainly using wood and coal), before becoming ever more reliant on 
imported energy, mainly oil, for the immediate 25 years following the end of the Second 
World War. The discovery of North Sea oil and gas in the late 1960s led to Britain 
becorrfing a net exporter of energy for most of the 1980s and 1990s. More recently, the 
UK has become a net importer of energy as North Sea oil and gas production peaked in 
1999. Britain became a net importer of gas in 2004 and by 2008, net imports of energy 
(mainly coal and gas) accounted for 26.5% of the UK’s primary energy consumption.18 It 
is also important to note here that even in the periods when the UK produced more 
energy than it consumed, it was still reliant on imports of energy types of which demand 
could not be met indigenously and remained exposed to changes in international energy
19prices.
As regards energy consumption in the UK, this increased by 15% between 1970
90and 2001. Thus, we can observe that energy supplies became increasingly important to 
the UK population as a whole. Secondly, as of 2009, total electricity generation 
percentages were: Coal 28%; Oil 1%; Natural Gas 45%; Nuclear 17%; Other sources 
(including renewables) 8%; Imports 1%.21 This compared to 1990 figures of: Coal 67%; 
Oil 7%; Natural Gas 0.5%; Nuclear 19%; Other sources (including renewables) 2.5%;
18 See Malcolm Wicks, ‘'Energy Security: A national challenge in a changing world’ (DECC, 2009) pp.l 1- 
18. Malcolm Wicks was the government’s Special Representative on International Energy from October 
2008 until May 2010.
19 Ibid. p. 18.
20 DTI, Energy Consumption in the United Kingdom (DTI, 2002) p.8. According to The Guardian 
newspaper, energy use in 2009 had increased by 32% since 1970. See Vidal, John, ‘Budget 2009: Energy 
efficiency spend will barely reduce emissions, say green groups’, guardian.co.uk (22 April 2009) accessed 
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2009/apr/22/budget-energy-efficiencv on 6 May 2012.
21 This shows that oil has not proven to be as important as other fuels in electricity generation. See DECC, 
UK Energy in Brief 2010 (London: TSO, 2010) p.26.
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99Imports 4%. From these statistics we can see the massive growth in the UK’s reliance 
on natural gas as a power generator as well as an associated decline in the importance of 
coal.
In terms of motive fuels, as in all developed countries, oil-derived fuels remained 
essential to the transportation sector in the UK. An indication of their increased 
importance is provided by the statistic that consumption of diesel fuel for Diesel Engined 
Road Vehicles (DERVs) increased from 10.7 million tonnes per annum in 1990 to 21 
million tonnes per annum in 2007.23
We can see from this that fossil fuels such as coal, gas and oil were (and remain) 
essential to the effective functioning of the UK economy, with the former two currently 
providing three-quarters of all electricity generation and the latter energy resource being 
the most important factor in fuelling the transport sector. However, it was recognised by 
the Labour government that Britain would become more and more reliant on imports of 
oil and gas in the future as North Sea reserves diminished.24 For example, in June 2004, 
the United Kingdom became an overall net importer of crude oil for the first time since 
1985.25 Indeed, the UK (which was a net exporter of fuels throughout the 1980s and 
1990s) became a net importer of all fuels (Coal, Oil and Natural Gas) from 2004 
onwards.26
The importance of fossil fuels to the British economy was further illustrated by the 
detrimental impact of high oil and gas prices on the UK economy and public opinion 
since the turn of the century. For example, average prices for all forms of primary energy 
rose in 2008 and, according to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2009, annual 
oil prices rose for the seventh consecutive year, the first instance of this in the history of
22 DECC, UK Energy in Brief2008 (London: TSO, 2008) p.24.
23 Ibid. p.l8.This is in contrast to the decline in petroleum consumption by motor vehicles using roads,
which dropped from 24.3 million tonnes in 1990 to 17.6 million tonnes in 2007. This noticeable drop in
petroleum use was ascribed to the growing popularity o f diesel cars in general due to the perceived cost 
benefits. Also, smaller vans such as the Ford Transit had generally switched from petrol-power to diesel-
power in the preceding years. For more information on this see Kyle MacDonald-Wallis and Martin 
Young, ‘The UK oil industry over the past 100 years’, BERR Paper (2007) accessed at 
http ://w ebarchive.nationalarch ives.gov.U k/-i-/h ttp://w w w .berr.gov.uk/files/file43853.pdf on 7 May 2012.
24 Ibid.
25 See Kevin Morrison and Steve Johnson, ‘UK net oil importer for first time in decade’, Energy Bulletin 
Website (11 August 2004) accessed at http://www.energybiilletin.net/node/1604 on 4 May 2012. It must be 
stated here that this consisted of net imports for only that particular month.
26 See DECC, Digest o f UK Energy Statistics 2008 (London: TSO, 2008) p.12.
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the 150-year old oil industry. However, prices maintained their tendency towards 
volatility, with oil prices reaching $140 a barrel in July 2008 but then collapsing by more 
than 70% by the end of the year.27 This caused much consternation in the press and 
amongst politicians with Prime Minister Gordon Brown calling for improved regulation 
of oil markets to prevent damage to the world economy.28 There was also a call for a ban 
on oil speculation from certain commentators and politicians around the globe, with the 
German government being amongst the most notable critics of this particular practice.29
The oil protests of 2000 further illustrated how the UK economy could be brought 
to a standstill by disruption of petrol and diesel supplies. In this instance, farmers and 
hauliers unhappy with the price, of petrol and diesel fuel blockaded oil refineries 
throughout Britain and managed to cause significant disruption to the economy for a 
week. The price of the blockade to the economy was estimated at around £1 billion.30 
Thus, violent fluctuations in oil prices certainly had the potential to cause social and 
economic unrest and therefore influence governmental attitudes towards energy prices.
As regards transportation, there remained much to do in the creation of a transport 
infrastructure that did not rely almost exclusively on oil-derived fuels. For example, bio­
fuels accounted for merely2.9% of road fuel consumption in 2009.31 The British 
government attempted to increase this figure through the imposition of a Renewable 
Transport Fuels Obligation (RTFO). From April 2008 this placed an obligation on fuel 
suppliers to ensure that a certain percentage of their fuel sales were made up of bio-fuels. 
The original target was for 5% of all forecourt sales in the UK to be of bio-fuels by 2010.
27 BP, BP Statistical Review o f World Energy 2009 (BP, 2009) p.3.
28 BBC News Online, Brown warns on volatile oil price’ (December 19 2008) accessed at 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/uk politics/7791269.stm on 7 May 2012.
29 Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, ‘Germany in call for ban on oil speculation’, The Daily Telegraph (26 May
2008).
30 Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC), ‘Impact of September 2000 Fuel Price 
Protests on UK Critical Infrastructure’, Incident Analysis: IA05-001 (January 2005) accessed at 
http://www.iwar.org.uk/cip/resources/PSEPC/fuel-price-protests.htm on 4 May 2012. There were further 
attempts to initiate blockades but none achieved the results o f 2000, at least in the UK. See BBC News 
Online, ‘Q&A: Europe fuel protests’, (May 30 2008) accessed at 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/europe/7427543.stm on 7 May 2012.
31 DECC, Digest o f UK Energy Statistics 2010 (London: TSO, 2010) p.72. Admittedly, this figure was a 
large increase from the 0% of British road fuel consumption consisting of bio-fuels in 2003. Still, these 
fuels still had to be blended with conventional diesel and petrol as outlined earlier in this chapter.
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This was then amended in 2009 to 3.4% by 2010 and 5% by 2013/2014. Failure to reach 
these targets by fuel companies would lead to substantial fines.32
Of course, this meant that even if the target was met 95% of fuel sold in the UK 
would continue to be derived from refined oil. The enormity of the task facing any British 
administration wishing to convert from the monopoly of fossil-fuel powered 
transportation to alternative sources was perhaps best illustrated by the following figures: 
in 2010, the amount of newly registered road vehicles in the UK defined by the Society 
of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT) as ‘alternatively-fuelled’ was just over 22, 
865. This compared to the figure of 2,030,846 new cars registered in the same year which 
were conventionally-powered by petroleum or diesel fuel, as well as the figure of 34, 
100,000 conventionally-powered vehicles registered in the UK as a whole.3334
- This importance of fossil fuels for transportation purposes was mirrored in the 
British armed forces. All manned vehicles in all of the three services relied (and continue 
to rely) on oil-derived fuels for power, the only exceptions being the nuclear-powered 
Trident submarines, the Trafalgar-class Ship Submersible Nuclear (SSN) attack 
submarines and the new Astute-class fleet submarines of the Royal Navy. MOD figures 
for 2009 show that nearly one billion litres of fuel and lubricants were supplied to front­
line units alone. The last few years of the Labour administration saw an average of £700 
million spent annually by the military on fuelling these front line units.35 In fact, the 
RUSI Alternative Energy and Sustainability conference report of 2009 noted that it took 
the equivalent of 7 litres of fuel to supply one litre of fuel to British front line units. 
Indeed, fuel convoys were a persistent target of attack for enemy forces in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. In 2006 attacks on fuel tankers resulted in the loss of 139 personnel and 89
32 Ibid. Also, see more detailed information on this at the Department fo r Transport Website, ‘Renewable 
Transport Fuels Obligation’ (2012) accessed at http://dft.gov.uk/topics/sustainab 1 e/biofuel s/rtfo/ on 4 May 
2012. The Renewable Fuels Agency (RFA) that administered the RTFO was disbanded in March 2011.
33 See Society o f Motor Manufacturers and Traders Website, ‘Motor Industry Facts 2011’ (2011) accessed 
at http://www.smmt.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/Motor-Industrv-Facts-2011 .pdf on 6 May 2012. 
‘Alternatively-fuelled vehicles’ referred to vehicles that were powered by a combination o f petrol and 
alcohol, petrol and electric, by petrol and gas or by electric means alone. For more information on new 
types of vehicles that do not require petrol or diesel to function see http://www.whatgreencar.com/
34 DFT, Vehicle Licensing Statistics 2010 (National Statistics Publication, 2011).
35 Figures taken from Lieutenant Commander Susie Thompson, ‘Fuelling the Front Line’, MOD Defence 
News Website (11 April 2009) accessed at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/mod.uk/defenceinternet/defencenews/equipmentandlogistics/f
uellingthefrontline.htm on 6 May 2012.
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tankers. Given this information, one would expect the military to have had as much of 
an interest in this particular aspect of energy security as those in the civilian sector.
Hence, we would expect there to be recognition of this issue amongst the British defence 
establishment when we peruse the defence literature and statements in later chapters.
In response to this reliance on fossil fuels (as well as climate change concerns) in 
the sphere of power generation, renewable energy supplies such as wind, solar and tidal 
power were being increasingly emphasised by the Labour government as the future of 
electricity generation in the UK. Nevertheless, these remained highly unlikely to make up 
any shortfall in the short to medium-term as they only consisted of 5% of total electricity 
generation in 2007. As a result, the British government continued to emphasise that 
whilst renewable energy sources would come to play an increasingly important part in the 
UK’s energy infrastructure they would remain insufficient in regards to ensuring secure 
energy supplies for the United Kingdom: ‘The need to reduce carbon emissions whilst 
ensuring secure energy supplies means that we cannot rely on renewables alone. This is 
because we need a diverse electricity generation mix. Moreover, some of the most cost- 
effective renewable technologies, such as wind, are intermittent and cannot produce 
electricity on demand.’38
36 Elizabeth Quintana and Amanda Sinden, ‘Alternative Energy and Sustainability in the Military 2009’, 
RUSI Conference Report (27 February 2009) accessed at
http://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/Altemative Energy and Sustainability Conference Report -
FINAL.pdf on 4 May 2012.
37 See DECC, UK Energy in Brief2008 (London: TSO, 2008) p.29. The stated European Union aim is to 
cut carbon emissions by 20% by 2020. This is to be done by aiming for 20% of electricity generation to be 
made up of renewable sources by this target period. The UK is aiming to reach the target o f 15% of energy 
generation to be from renewable sources by 2020 as it is starting from a much lower base than the current 
EU mean average of 8.5%. See BBC News Online, ‘EU Climate Change Package Explained’ (9 April 2010) 
accessed at http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/europe/7765094.stm on 7 May 2012.
38 See Meeting the Energy Challenge: a White Paper on Energy, Cm. 7124 (London: TSO, 2007) p. 16. In 
reality, Labour government spending was very low on research, development and demonstration (RD&D) 
budgets for renewable energy resources. As a report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) and the Atlantic Council o f the United States mentioned, the United States and Europe had reduced 
their renewable RD&D budgets over the previous 15 years and, according to the International Energy 
Agency (IEA), the total spending in 2005 remained below 0.06 percent o f GDP. This compared to total 
private sector spending in these areas being estimated at around 4 to 6 times more than total government 
expenditure annually. See Franklin Kramer and John Lyman, ‘Transatlantic Cooperation for Sustainable 
Energy Security: A Report of the Global Dialogue Between the European Union and the United States’, 
Center for Strategic and International Studies and The Atlantic Council o f the United States (February
2009) accessed at http://www.acus.org/files/publication pdfs/523/EnergySecurityReport.pdf on 4 May 
2012 .
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The UK would need around 30-35 gigawatts of new electricity generation capacity 
by 2027 and two-thirds of this requirement by 2020. This is mainly due to the closure of 
many coal-fired power stations over the next two decades.39 In order to supplant this loss 
of capacity, the government announced in 2008 that measures would be taken to facilitate 
the construction of a new generation of nuclear power stations. It was envisaged that 
these would be built solely by private investment and allow the UK to achieve its targets 
on cutting C02 emissions, whilst helping to maintain energy security.40 In addition, the 
Labour government also announced plans to allow the creation of 4 new coal-fired power 
plants using carbon-capture and storage technology. These ‘demonstration’ plants would 
test the viability of this technology in cutting carbon emissions 41 It was hoped that, 
following effective trialling of this technology, it would allow the UK to continue to use a 
natural resource that remains in abundance throughout the globe.42
Therefore, as the Labour administration demonstrated its future intention to utilise 
Britain’s large reserves of coal these through the development of carbon capture and 
storage technology, and the UK also has the technical expertise to construct new nuclear 
power stations along with reliable overseas suppliers of uranium ore, it appeared that the 
potential shortfall in power generation from these areas was not one that would 
necessitate any real consideration in the formulation of defence policy. However, as gas 
had become a proportionally more significant fuel in terms of power generation and oil 
remained, to all intents and purposes, the only viable fuel for the vast majority of vehicles 
in the United Kingdom, it is important to now consider what threats to the supply of these 
resources .emerged between 1997 and 2010. In view of this, the next section will outline 
these potential threats in more detail.
39 Meeting the Energy Challenge: A White Paper on Energy, p.7.
40 Meeting the Energy Challenge: A White Paper on Nuclear Power, Cm. 7296 (London: TSO, 2008).
41 See Ed Crooks, ‘Britain bets on clean coal’, ft.com  (23 April 2009) accessed at 
http://blogs.ft.com/energy-source/2009/04/23/britain-commits-to-clean-coal/ on 30 April 2012.
42 Proven reserves of UK coal have been estimated at 3196 million tonnes. See UK Coal Website, ‘World 
Coal Statistics’ f2012) accessed at http://www.ukcoal.com/whv-coal/need-for-coal/the-need-for- 
coal#world-coal-statistics on 7 May 2012. Despite these reserves the UK imported the vast majority o f its 
coal with 44 million tonnes being imported in 2007. Russia provided the majority o f this with 48% of total 
imports. South Africa was second with 18%. The UK exported a total o f 0.8 million tonnes in the same 
year with the majority o f exports going to the Republic o f Ireland. See Digest o f UK Energy Statistics 
2008, pp.293-294.
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Potential International Threats to the Security of Supply of Fossil Fuels
to the United Kingdom
Gas Supplies
The need to ensure reliable supplies of gas to the United Kingdom had the potential to 
affect defence policy makers from 1997 onwards given (as outlined earlier in this 
chapter) its massively increased importance in terms of UK electrical generation. 
Although there were no immediate threats to UK energy security in terms of the supply 
of essential fossil fuels (due to large reserves still present in the North Sea) the UK 
became more and more dependent on imported oil and gas, and this dependency was only 
likely to increase in the future.43 It was estimated by virtually all sources that the United 
Kingdom would become more dependent on imported oil and gas in the future. For 
example, according to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2009, in 2008 Britain 
produced 2.3% of the world’s gas but was responsible for 3.1% of consumption 44 This 
disparity was almost certain to increase as time progressed, given known reserves.
This consideration was already beginning to become a factor in UK energy policy 
as shown by the decision to construct three new Liquid Natural Gas (LNG) facilities at 
the Isle of Grain on the Thames Estuary and two at Milford Haven, South Wales.45 LNG 
terminals were increasingly important from an energy security perspective as they 
allowed large quantities of gas to be transported over long distances without the need for 
pipelines and the requisite security that was often required in the regions that these 
pipelines traversed. LNG transported from countries such as Qatar and Indonesia, was 
likely to be crucial to Britain in the coming years as the UK’s consumption of natural gas
43 See Oil and Gas UK, 2010 Oil and Gas UK Activity Survey (2010) accessed at
http://www.oilandgasuk.co.uk/cmsfiles/inodules/publications/pdfs/EC020.pdfon 6 May 2012. There were 
still believed to be the equivalent o f 25 billion barrels o f oil left in the North Sea for future exploitation in 
2008. In any emergency these would be able to sustain UK oil for a short time. Around 36 billion barrels 
had been exploited already at this time. As regards gas reserves, there were a proven 2, 857 billion cubic 
metres (bcm) of natural gas available in for exploitation at the end o f 2010, with 55 bcm extracted that year. 
See DECC, UK Gas Reserves and Estimated Ultimate Recovery 2011 (2011) accessed at 
http://og.decc.gov.Uk/assets/og/data-maps/docs/3184-uk-gas-res-and-eur-2011 .pdf on 6 May 2012 
44BP Statistical Review o f World Energy 2009, p.24, p.27.
45 Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology, ‘The Future of UK Gas Supplies’, Parliamentary 
Office o f Science and Technology Postnote (October 2004).
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was projected to increase by 16% by 2011/2012.46 Indeed, LNG’s share of total British 
gas imports rose from 2% in 2005 to 25% in 2009.47 Certainly, many countries without 
the requisite technology to import and/or export their gas via LNG were endeavouring to 
construct the capability in this period, indicating its perceived importance.48 Therefore, 
from a defence perspective, potential protection of the transit routes of LNG tankers 
would be expected to be a policy consideration if energy security was to be taken into 
account in the examined period from 1997 to 2010.
Russia also seemingly began to use its large reserves of oil and gas to flex its 
muscles in seeming attempts to regain its lost ‘great power’ status. Between 2005 and 
2010, there were a number of examples of Russia using what one could label ‘energy 
blackmail’ in order to put pressure on neighbouring governments. For example, in 2006 
the Russian government purposefully diminished the flow of gas to the Ukraine in a row 
over prices. This was seen by many as an attempt by the then President of Russia 
Vladimir Putin to show his disapproval of the Ukrainian regime of Viktor Yushchenko.49 
This incident and further confrontations with Belarus and Lithuania (not to mention the 
war with Georgia in August 2008) were of particular concern to European Union 
countries as the vast majority of gas consumed in the EU was supplied by Russia and its 
major gas company (in which the Russian government owns a controlling stake) 
Gazprom. Certainly, the Russian government proved itself to have a strong predisposition 
to use oil and gas supplies as a political weapon to ensure compliance with neighbouring 
countries in recent years, the most recent example being an embargo on oil exports to 
Belarus in January 2010.50 This was a concern as Russia had the largest proven gas 
reserves in the world and all its exports went to Europe.51 Indeed, taken together, Russia, 
Qatar and Iran had 60% of the world’s proven gas reserves. Given that two of these
46 See Dragon LNG: Energy fo r Wales Website, ‘HomePage’ (2012) at 
http://www.dragonlng.co.Uk/whyis1ngneededin.cfTn#l accessed on 4 May 2012.
47 Digest o f UK Energy Statistics 2010, p. 100.
48 See Energy Information Administration Website, The Global Liquefied Natural Gas Market: Status and 
Outlook’ (December 2003) at http://www.eia.gov/oiaf/analvsispaper/global/worldlng.html accessed on 6 
May 2012.
49 See Jonathan Stem, ‘The Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis o f January 2006’, Oxford Institute fo r Energy 
Studies (2006) pp. 10-11 for evidence of the general world response to this incident.
50 Tim Webb, ‘Dispute looms as Russia disputes Belarus energy supplies’, The Guardian (4 January 2010).
51 BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2009, p.22. Russia had 23.4% of proven global natural gas 
reserves at this time.
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regimes would not have been considered ‘friendly’ to the West, there was the fear that 
there could be an interruption in gas flows from these areas. There were even mooted 
claims that Russia was looking to create an international gas cartel with other gas 
exporting countries, with OPEC as the model. This followed a meeting of the Gas 
Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) in Qatar on April 9th 2007 where Russia joined other 
gas producers to discuss the above possibility, and offered to lead a study into gas
• • 52 •pricing. Indeed, fears of a resurgent Russia prepared to use energy as a political and 
economic weapon led to a Defence Select Committee report analysing the potential 
dangers posed to UK security (published in July 2009) and the former NATO Secretary 
General, Jaap De Hoop Scheffer, highlighting the importance of good relations with 
Russia in an article published in 2008.
Rising Chinese and Indian Demand for Energy
Potential conflicts over scarcer energy resources seemed to loom large when one 
considered the increasing energy demands of the emerging economies of China and India 
in the first decade of the twenty-first century. According to figures published in 2005, 
these two countries combined had around one-third of the global human population, yet 
the Asia-Pacific region had the world’s smallest oil reserves and the third-smallest gas 
reserves.54 Certainly, some observers saw the makings of a new struggle for energy
52 The Economist, ‘A Bear at the Throat’ (14 April 2007). There was much discussion amongst experts in 
this field on whether the GECF, founded in 2001 and meeting once a year, was likely to become a cartel in 
the manner of OPEC. The majority opinion seemed to be that it was improbable but not impossible . For a 
range o f opinions on this topic see the following articles: Hadi Hallouche, ‘The Gas Exporting Countries 
Forum: Is it really a Gas OPEC in the making?’, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, (2006); Ronald Soligo 
and Amy Myers Jaffe, ‘Market Structure in the New Gas Economy: Is Cartelization Possible?’ Geopolitics 
of Gas Working Paper Series (May 2004) accessed at http://iis-
;hydb.stanford.edu/pubs/20705/Gas OPEC final.pdf on 4 May 2012. Matthew Hulbert and Tariq Akbar, 
‘Why a Gas Troika and cartel will prove to be hot air...’, Datamonitor Website (November 2008) accessed 
at http://www.europeanenergyreyiew.eu/index.php?id=368 on 4 May 2012.
53 See House of Commons Defence Committee, Tenth Report - Russia -  a new confrontation?, HC 276, 
session 2008- 2009 (London: TSO, 2009) Also, see Jaap De Hoop Scheffer, ‘NATO and the Challenge of 
Energy Security’, The RUS1 Journal, Vol. 153, Iss. 6 (2008). The Sunday Times reported on 28 March 2010 
that GAZPROM, Russia’s state-owned gas company, was expected to put in a bid for 800 petrol stations 
and an oil refinery in the UK. See Danny Fortson, ‘Russians prepare £lbn grab for UK fuel supplies’, The 
Sunday Times (27 March 2010).
54 Gawdat Bahgat, ‘Energy Partnership: Pacific Asia and the Middle East’, Middle East Economic Survey, 
Volume XLVIII, No. 33 (2005).
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resources between the US and these two countries, perhaps leading to open conflict, or at 
least a new ‘Great Game’ in Asia.55 A good indicator of the increased affluence of China 
and the corresponding potential for expansion of energy consumption were the figures 
given in The Economist in 2009 regarding agricultural consumption. According to the 
Australian investment-advisory firm Caiani & Company, in the previous decade China 
had seen sales of milk increase seven-fold and that of olive oil six-fold. The Chinese were 
eating 60% more poultry, 30% more beef and 25% more wheat.56 With increased 
standards of living in China and India (the world’s two most populous countries) and the 
concomitant demands for power to fuel electrical appliances and fuel to power newly 
purchased cars, it would not have been imprudent to surmise that the world’s two most 
populous countries could feasibly have entered into direct competition with the West for 
fossil fuel resources. For example, IEA figures indicated that between 2005 and 2030, 
China and India would account for nearly half of the increase in the world’s energy 
demand with India becoming the world’s largest oil importer by 2030.57 China actually 
overtook the USA as the world’s largest consumer of energy in 2010.58 From this 
perspective, British defence policy may have had to take into account the potential for 
military confrontations with China or India, an ‘east of Suez’ out-of-area intervention 
capability that was meant to have been abandoned following the 1967 Labour Defence 
White Paper.
The Importance of the Middle East to Energy Security
During the tenure of the Labour government, the Middle East Region, and Saudi Arabia 
in particular, remained extremely important in considerations of the security of oil 
supply, as these areas had the world’s largest proven oil reserves.59 In many ways Saudi
55 Mathew Burrows and Gregory F. Treverton, ‘A Strategic View of Energy Futures’, Survival, Vol. 49, Iss. 
3 (2007) p.87.
56 The Economist, ‘Green Shoots’ (19 March 2009).
57 IEA, World Energy Outlook 2007 (OECD/IEA Publication, 2007) p.3.
58 IEA Website, ‘China overtakes the United States to become world’s largest energy consumer’ (20 July
2010) accessed at http://www.iea.org/index info.asp?id=1479 on 7 May 2012.
59 BP Statistical Review o f World Energy 2009, Saudi Arabia had 21% of global proven oil reserves. OPEC 
as a whole had 76% of proven oil reserves. P.6 The Middle East had 59.9 % o f proven oil reserves and 41 
% o f gas reserves. P.6, p.22.
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Arabia acted as a microcosm of many of the world’s oil supply problems. Firstly, despite 
having the largest oil reserves Saudi Arabia was not the world’s largest producer. This 
was of course partly down to the production limits that OPEC set to keep oil at the 
desired price, but this fact may have obscured other problems within the oil-producing 
infra-structure of Saudi Arabia and other countries with large oil reserves. Indeed, all of 
Saudi Arabia’s oil reserves remain state-controlled via the oil company Saudi Aramco. 
This followed a trend of nationalisation of oil resources in resource rich countries.60 In 
essence, this meant that the Saudi Arabian government maintained total policy control of 
how its oil fields were developed, and what further exploration was likely to be 
conducted. This fact, combined with the world’s largest oil reserves, made Saudi Arabia 
an important swing producer, able to affect global oil prices in the long-term by 
increasing drilling capacity and exploration activities, or in the short-term by reducing 
daily production quotas.61 Thus, the importance of Saudi Arabia to a country as heavily- 
reliant on oil as Great Britain was in the effect its domestic oil production could have on 
global prices. From a security perspective, Saudi Arabia’s domestic stability was 
therefore significant to the British economy, as disruption to production was likely to 
result in higher oil prices worldwide, leading to more money spent on transportation fuel
60 Nationalisation was often driven by the feeling that a country’s resources are being exploited by multi­
national companies that provide little benefit to the majority of people. It could often appear that the 
national patrimony was being flogged on the cheap. See The Economist, ‘Barking louder, biting less’ (10 
March 2007). The nationalisation o f oil resources in many Persian Gulf countries actually led to a loss o f  
expertise in the exploitation o f proven reserves as the technical know-how o f international oil companies 
such as BP and ExxonMobil, developed through their vast experience o f oil exploration and development, 
was lost. In fact, it was estimated that national oil companies now have control o f three-quarters of proven 
world oil reserves. See Carola Hoyas, ‘The new Seven Sisters: oil and gas giants dwarf western rivals’,
The Financial Times (11 March 2007). Consequently, there was a lack of spare production capacity in the 
first decade of the 21st Century which meant any disruptions in supply were keenly felt around the world. A 
perfect example o f this was that o f Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the damage it caused to many oil 
installations in the Gulf o f Mexico. This caused global oil prices to rise dramatically in the aftermath o f the 
natural disaster. However, it must also be noted that this lack o f spare production capacity was also due to 
the under-investment in exploration due to the low oil prices o f the 1990s. See Leonardo Maugeni, ‘Two 
Cheers for Expensive Oil’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, Iss. 2 (2006) pp.152-153; Mathew Burrows and 
Gregory F. Treverton, ‘A Strategic View o f Energy Futures’, Survival, Vol. 49, Iss. 3 (2007) p.80. It is 
estimated that OPEC, in 2006, was operating at 99% of oil production capacity. Joe Barnes and Amy 
Myers Jaffe, ‘The Persian Gulf and the Geopolitics of Oil’, Survival, Vol. 48, Iss. 1 (2006) p. 145; Carl 
Mortished, ‘Hurricane Katrina Whips Oil Price To A New High’, The Times (30 August 2005) and Gawdat 
Bahgat, ‘Energy Partnership: Pacific Asia and the Middle East’ Middle East Economic Survey, Volume 
XLVIII, No. 33 (2005)
61 See Michael Klare, ‘Saudi Arabia: the sands run out’, Le Monde diplomatique (English edition) (March 
2006).
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that could be utilised in other areas, and increased potential (given recent history) for oil 
protests that could adversely affect the economy.
Saudi Arabia also provided a good example of the threats that internal instability 
and terrorism could pose to energy infrastructure. Following increased terrorist attacks on 
foreign nationals within Saudi Arabia, by 2006 there were 25,000-30,000 security 
personnel defending oil installations within the country and the annual security budget for 
this was estimated at around $8 billion. Joe Barnes and Amy Myers Jaffe argued that a 
large reason for the political instability within the country could be ascribed to reduced 
oil revenues per capita since 1982. For example, in 1982 oil revenues represented 
$30,000 per capita. This had declined to $9,300 per capita by 2003, the main reason for 
this being the massive increase of population from seven million to twenty-two million 
within the same period of time.62 Whether this level of security spending and wealth 
distribution was sustainable was a moot point. What was clear was that the internal 
security of energy-rich states remained important to the effective supply of energy 
resources and global market confidence in the period under examination.
Terrorist and insurgent attacks on oil installations also had the potential to disrupt 
global supply in key oil producers. The most consistent and sustained attacks took place 
in Iraq and Nigeria, the former due to the continued insurgency following the Anglo- 
American invasion of 2003 and the latter due to tensions between foreign oil corporations 
and a number of ethnic minority groups in the Niger Delta, where the majority of the oil 
is situated. For instance, oil prices rose 2.6% in February 2006 following attacks by 
militants in Nigeria that led to a shutdown of nearly a fifth of the country’s oil
fs\production. Furthermore, it was believed that due to sustained insurgent attack oil 
production in Iraq had fallen around 40% below pre-war levels in 2006.64
Indeed, there were initially large question marks over the involvement of Western 
oil companies in Iraq due to the persistent lack of security and the perceived hard 
bargains the Iraqi government was willing to drive in its auctions for the right to drill for
iL
oil and gas in the country. Auctions on 30 June 2009 (the same day US soldiers began
62 Joe Barnes and Amy Myers Jaffe, ‘The Persian Gulf and the Geopolitics of Oil’, Survival, Vol. 48, Iss. 1 
(2006) p. 149.
63 Mouawad, Jad, ‘Oil Prices Leap After Attacks In Nigeria’, The New York Times (20 February 2006).
64 Daniel Yergin, ‘Ensuring Energy Security’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, Iss. 2 (2006) p.72.
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withdrawing from Iraqi cities) yielded only one contract for the eight biggest oilfields. 
This was in the country with the third largest proven oil reserves in the world. Still, BP 
and the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), who came to an agreement to 
develop the Rumaila oilfield, would be paid only $2 per barrel, half of what BP initially 
asked for and a fraction of what other oil companies wanted. It seems Asian oil 
companies were much more prepared to accept these harsh terms in the search for new 
energy supplies, with Sinopec (another Chinese state-controlled company) buying an oil 
company operating in Iraqi Kurdistan for $7 billion in June 2009. As Derek Brower 
commented in 2009 ‘... if the Iraq war was a quest to secure reserves for western 
consumers, the plan is failing. In fact it might turn out that the US and its allies have 
liberated Iraq -  and handed its oil to China.’65
Accordingly, from the preceding analysis we can ascertain that there was a 
significant degree of potential for Saudi Arabia and other oil-rich states to have their 
production affected by internal instability during Labour’s time in government. This 
instability could have adversely affected global oil prices and the wider world economy 
and was therefore likely to be an important security consideration for the Labour 
administration. Actors at the declaratory and operational levels may have been prepared 
for possible intervention to ensure the continued security of important oil-rich states and 
the defence-industrial level of policy may have been eager to export equipment that could 
be used in internal security matters within the same states. The analysis conducted in later 
chapters will ascertain whether this possibility became a reality.
Transit Routes
In addition to the aforementioned considerations, the increasing potential for disruption 
of supply via incidents of piracy in international waters and the potential for terrorist 
attacks on oil and gas tankers was not something that could be easily overlooked. Perhaps 
the first major example of this threat between 1997 and 2010 was the attack on the USS 
Cole off the coast of Yemen in 2000, when 17 US sailors were killed by a small boat 
bomb, believed to have been driven by terrorists affiliated to Al-Qaeda. This incident
65 Derek Brower, ‘Crude Politics’, Prospect Magazine (August 2009).
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brought the renewed possibility of attacks on oil tankers and transit routes into policy­
makers minds. In addition, piracy off the coast of Somalia increased in the latter half of 
the decade, in part due to the continued civil war in this ‘failed’ state. Notable incidents 
included the hijacking of the Saudi oil tanker ‘Sirius Star’ in November 2008 and the 
capture of the Ukrainian cargo ship ‘MV Faina’ in September of the same year. Both 
ships were released once substantial ransoms had been paid by the owners.66 and the 
incidences of piracy led to an international naval presence in the area, including the 
despatch of a ship from the Royal Navy to head an international naval task force.67
These events appear to have denoted a significant alteration in the manner of 
attacks on global shipping. Such incidents had occurred during the Iran-Iraq war in the 
1980s but had been conducted by states and had failed to produce much disruption to 
international oil supplies. A view began to be propounded by certain commentators that 
there were a number of ‘chokepoints’ in world shipping lanes that could easily be 
attacked, and in the process disrupt world oil prices significantly.68 These included the 
Strait of Hormuz, the Suez Canal, the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, the Bosporus Strait and the 
Strait of Malacca. With an expected increase in oil transported in tankers from 40 million 
barrels per day (bpd) to 67 million bpd by 2020 the threat of an ecological disaster from 
an attack on or hijacking of a super-tanker appeared to be increasing.69 Indeed, according 
to 2010 figures from the US Energy Information Administration, an average of 15 crude 
oil tankers pass through the Strait of Hormuz every day, representing roughly 20% of oil 
traded globally.70 Combined with these dangers, there was the increasing fear that an oil 
tanker could be used by terrorists as a floating bomb or as a delivery vehicle for a 
concealed nuclear weapon. In many ways this would be the ideal ‘Trojan horse’ as any
66 Chris Smyth, ‘Somali pirates release hijacked supertanker Sirius Star and crew’, The Times (January 9
2009); Sam Jones and Chris McGreal, ‘Somali pirates release Ukrainian arms ship’, guardian.co.uk (6 
February 2009) accessed at http://vAvw.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/feb/05/somali-pirates-free-military-ship 
on 7 May 2012.
67 David Charter, ‘Royal Navy admiral Phillip Jones heads EU Somali pirate task force’, The Times (9 
November 2008).
68 See Carlos Pascual, ‘The Geopolitics o f Energy: From Security to Survival’, Brookings Institute (January
2008) accessed at http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2008/01 energy pascual.aspx on 4 May 2012 and 
Lehman Brothers Global Equity Research, ‘Global Oil Chokepoints: How Vulnerable is the Global Oil 
Market?’, Lehman Brothers Report (January 18, 2008) accessed at 
http://www.deepgreencrystals.com/images/GlobalOilChokePoints.pdf on 4 May 2012.
69 Daniel Yergin, ‘Ensuring Energy Security’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, Iss. 2 (2006) pp.78-79.
70 Energy Information Administration Website, ‘World Oil Transit Chokepoints’ (30 December 2011) 
accessed at http://www.eia.gov/cabs/world oil transit chokepoints/Full.html on 7 May 2012.
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nuclear device contained within such a massive structure as an oil tanker would be 
difficult to uncover and suspect in the first place.71
Thus, the ability to effectively police important sea routes and protect against the 
possibility of terrorist and pirate attacks on ocean-going oil and gas tankers certainly had 
the potential to influence British defence policy given the aforementioned dangers. The 
evidence analysed in succeeding chapters will demonstrate whether this proved to be the 
case.
Unexploited Energy Resources
Declining reserves and the desire for new sources of oil and gas created an increased 
possibility of conflict in areas that had hitherto been of little interest to the United 
Kingdom in terms of energy resources. The British-declared two-hundred mile ‘economic 
zone’ surrounding the Falkland Islands may contain around 60 billion barrels of oil -  
equivalent to the North Sea’s original estimated reserves -  and exploratory drilling 
resumed in 2010 following al2 year hiatus. This strained relations with the Argentinean 
government, who claimed that the British government reneged on an agreement made in 
1995 to co-operate in the exploration of offshore reserves.72 Indeed, in 2007 they 
scrapped a deal with the UK regarding cooperation on exploration, as they believed that 
Britain was using the deal to justify ‘illegitimate’ claims for ownership of the Falklands 
Islands.73 Therefore, the seeds of a future conflict in this region were present, based on 
the desire to exploit a potentially massive oil and gas resource. Consequently, the 
importance of this region may have entered into defence policy formulation and, despite a 
UK presence in the area since the 1982 Falklands War, there was a risk that British forces 
could be called into action in the region again.
The Arctic area also had the growing potential to develop into an area of real 
competition for energy resources. One of the more optimistic analyses conducted by the
71 Jonathan Medalia ,‘Port and Maritime Security: Potential for Terrorist Nuclear Attack Using Oil 
Tankers.’ CRS Report fo r Congress (7 December 2004) accessed at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RS21997.pdf on 4 May 2012.
72 Jasper Copping, ‘Drilling for oil to start in Falklands Islands’, The Daily Telegraph (9 March 2009).
73 BBC News Online, ‘Argentina ends Falklands Oil deal’ (28 March 2007) accessed at
http://news.bbc.co.nk/1/hi/world/americas/6501693.stm on 7 May 2012.
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US Geological Survey and the Norwegian company Statoil believed that the Arctic Circle 
held 25 percent of global undiscovered hydrocarbon reserves.74 It was estimated that 
Russia could lay claim to 69 percent of this figure and although currently difficult to 
exploit, this would only become easier as climate change was expected to lead to 
increased melting of the Arctic icecap and the concurrent opening of the Northern Sea 
Route and the North-West Passage.75
Despite Russia’s large claim to these resources there remained the potential for 
conflict with the other four countries that claimed sovereign territory within the Arctic 
Circle — the USA, Canada, Denmark and Norway. Under the terms of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) states are entitled to an exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) 200 nautical miles beyond their coastline. This gives the state the 
right to exploit all natural resources within the economic zone. If the state can then prove 
to the UN commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf that its undersea shelf 
extends beyond the EEZ, it has the right to exploit the resources of the seabed. With this 
in mind, Russia claimed that the Arctic seabed was a projection of the Siberian 
continental platform. These claims were rejected by the aforementioned UN 
commission.76 In its 2009 National Security Strategy, the Russian government did not 
rule out that, in future, it may have to use military forces to safeguard its natural 
resources. In an earlier document, the Kremlin had declared the Arctic a strategic 
resource for Russia and set out plans to establish army bases along the Arctic frontier.77 
In response to the Russian posturing in this area, the Canadian government were to 
submit a claim of ownership of portions of the seabed to the UN commission by 2013 and 
the new US administration were looking to ratify the UNCLOS in the near future so they 
could do likewise.78
74 Kristin Running and Geirr Harr ‘Exploring the Basins of the Arctic’, Statoil ASA Paper (2005) accessed 
at http://www.cge.iievora.pt/aspo2005/abscom/Abstract Lisbon Ronning.pdf on 4 May 2012.
75 Shamil Midkhatovich Yenikeyeff and Timothy Fenton Krysiek, ‘The Battle for the Next Energy Frontier: 
The Russian Polar Expedition and the Future of Arctic Hydrocarbons’, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies 
(August 2007) p.2, p.9.The Northern Sea Route is a shipping passage stretching from the Northern Atlantic, 
along the Siberian coast to the Russian Far East and the Pacific Ocean.
76 Ibid. p.4.
77 Tony Halpin, ‘Russia warns of war within a decade over Arctic oil and gas riches’, The Times (14 May
2009).
78 The Economist, ‘Not a Barren Country’ (18 July 2009) and Council on Foreign Relations Website, 
‘Transcript o f Hillary Clinton’s Confirmation Hearing’ (13 January 2009) accessed at
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Given that the UK did not have any territorial interests in the Arctic Circle, this 
unexploited area would appear to have been of little importance in terms of UK security 
and defence policy. However, the potential for disputes between fellow NATO members 
and Russia over likely access to resources, as well as the possibility of new energy transit 
routes (through the possible melting of the polar icecap) made it an issue that defence 
policy makers may have needed to bear in mind, especially in regards to possible areas of 
deployment.79
Security of Demand for Net Oil Producers
As well as the importance of security of supply for the UK there was also the often 
overlooked issue of security of demand. This became a prime concern for OPEC 
countries in particular, as their economies were heavily reliant on oil exports for large 
proportions of their national income. Certainly, there was the feeling, prior to the creation 
of OPEC in 1960, that net oil-exporting countries were being exploited by the West. 
Believing that exporting countries were, in effect, subsidising the economies of the
OECD nations via low oil prices, OPEC was created to provide security of demand and
• 80price. This it was able to do, but arguably for the price of a lack of economic 
diversification, which meant many of these countries were more dependent on oil than 
the OECD nations that were so often believed to be vulnerable to variability in world 
energy prices. Indeed, according to Dr Robert Skinner and Dr Robert Amott of the
http://www.cfr.org/publication/18225/transcript of hillary clintons confirmation hearing.html on 4 May 
2012 .
79 The Canadian government decided to establish an armed naval presence in Arctic waters in 2007 with the 
announcement of the construction of a naval docking and refuelling facility at Nanisivik. See Captain Phil 
Webster, ‘Arctic Sovereignty, Submarine Operations and Water Space Management’, Canadian Naval 
Review, Vol. 3, No. 3 (2007) and Canadian Navy Website, ‘Domestic Stories: Arctic Deep Water Port’, 
accessed at http://www.navv.forces.gc.ca/cms/3/3-a eng.asp?category=7&id=623 on 4 May 2012.
80 Alberto Quiros Corradi, ‘Energy and the Exercise o f Power’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 57, Iss. 5 (1979)
pp. 1144-1160. Mohammed Barkindo of OPEC was eager to emphasise the mutual interdependence of those 
countries requiring security of supply and those requiring security o f demand in a speech given in 2006.
See Mohammed Barkindo, ‘OPEC’s View on the Outlook for Oil/Supply Demand’, Speech given to the 7th 
International Oil Summit (7 April 2006) accessed at
http://www.opec.org/opec web/en/press room/1093.htm on 2 October 2011.
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Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, the so called ‘oil weapon’ had been used more 
readily by net consumers than producers of oil in the thirty years preceding 2008.81
Why should this have concerned the United Kingdom? The main reason for this 
to be considered as an important security issue was the importance of oil to the 
economies of most net oil producing countries. If oil prices dropped drastically or oil 
consumption became less important to the global economy due to any move towards 
alternative sources of energy, those countries excessively reliant on income from 
exploitation of their domestic fossil-fuel resources were likely to see significant drops in 
income. This could lead to less capital for investment in infrastructure projects and less 
money for social projects; in effect, the same amount of people fighting over a smaller 
slice of the economic pie. Instability could result, especially in countries with weak 
institutions, high corruption and heterogeneous ethnic make-ups.82
Hence, there was still likely to be the threat of regional instability in a situation in 
which the UK as a whole became less reliant on fossil fuels. Again, this scenario may 
have caused such disruption to the British and world economy that the issue of security of 
demand for states reliant on oil and gas production certainly had the potential to become 
an important consideration for British defence policy makers, as well as the wider 
defence community.
81 Dr Robert Skinner and Dr Robert Amott, ‘The Oil Supply and Demand Context for Security o f Supply to 
the EU from the GCC Countries’, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (2005) p.3.
82 Paul Rogers acknowledged that increased use o f alternative energy technologies by the West had the 
potential to cause instability in countries reliant on fossil-fuel exports for revenue. However, he saw this as 
being an unfortunate consequence resulting from the greater need to address the more pressing issue of  
climate change. Interview with Paul Rogers via telephone, 19 March 2009. Of course, ample resources are 
often considered to be an impediment to the development of states with weak institutions. This condition 
has been termed ‘the resource curse’. See Nicholas Shaxson ‘Oil, corruption and the resource curse’ 
International Affairs, Vol. 83, Iss. 6 (2007) pp.1123-1124. Thus, a counter-argument could be that lack of 
security of demand could be a good thing for countries that have failed to develop internally whilst having 
significant resources to call on.
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Energy Security: The British Government’s Conception
Of course, energy security was not a concept that could be considered from a purely 
military perspective, especially in the increasingly globalised world and in a time when 
the United Kingdom no longer enjoyed imperial pre-eminence on the international stage. 
Thus, before we can determine the likely effect of British energy security concepts on 
defence policy we need to understand what policies the Labour government believed 
would ensure energy security for the United Kingdom during its period in power. Firstly, 
it would be pertinent to look at varying definitions of energy security.
Most definitions o f ‘energy security’ have addressed the concerns of countries 
that are expected to be net importers of fossil fuels for the foreseeable future and thus 
reliant on the effective supply of these resources. As this thesis is essentially dealing with 
the role of the UK armed forces in relation to energy security these definitions are helpful 
in deciding what context the UK government views the security of its energy supply. 
Perhaps the simplest and most effective definition was provided by Daniel Yergin in his 
article ‘Energy Security in the 1990s’: ‘The objective of energy security is to assure 
adequate, reliable supplies of energy at reasonable prices and in ways that do not 
jeopardise national values and objectives’.83 Another valid definition was produced by 
Barton, Redgwell, Ronne and Zillman in their book ‘Energy Security: Managing Risk in 
a Dynamic and Regulatory Environment’: ‘[Energy security is] a condition in which a 
nation and all, or most, of its citizens and businesses have access to sufficient energy 
resources at reasonable prices for the foreseeable future, free from serious risk of major 
disruption of services’.84
Pierre Noel, a Cambridge University energy expert, believed that there was too 
much emphasis on availability, affordability and environmental sustainability when 
defining energy security. He advocated that, in reality, energy insecurity occurred when 
energy markets did not function properly. Thus, energy security policies should be aimed
83 Daniel Yergin, ‘Energy Security in the 1990s’, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 67, Iss. 1 (1988) p.l 1.
84 Barry Barton, Catherine Redgwell, Anita Ronne and Donald N. Zillman, '‘Energy Security: Managing 
Risk in a Dynamic Legal and Regulatory Environment ’, (London: Oxford University Press, 2004) p.5.
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at ‘making markets work\ 85 He advocated the ‘liberalisation’ of energy markets through 
the removal of state interference and the elimination of artificial price distortions, such as 
‘green’ energy subsidies. In this way, he believed that any elements that did cause energy 
insecurity could be more easily identified and addressed accordingly by affected 
governments.
Perhaps the most effective summation of what would provide energy security for 
any country (although the United Kingdom was the main emphasis of the study) was the 
one provided by the then Chief Executive of BP, Tony Hayward, in 2010. His analysis, 
echoing some of Pierre Noel’s thoughts, focused on three main components in drafting 
any effective energy policy: diversity, competition and efficiency. This meant diversity of 
supply by using the widest range of energy sources, increased competition in global 
markets to allow the greater technological expertise of international oil companies to 
extract resources more efficiently, along with greater energy efficiency within the UK 
meaning diminished demand for supplies from abroad and consequently less reliance on 
them.86
With these ideas in mind, what was the Labour government’s approach to the 
issue of energy security throughout its time in government? From a declaratory policy 
perspective, we can see that it essentially utilised the tenets that Tony Hayward outlined 
in his analysis of energy security. These precepts were essentially economic policies and 
there was little mention of the potential for military action to preserve access to important 
energy sources. At the beginning of Labour’s administration in 1997, the then president 
of the Board of Trade Margaret Beckett stated that the ‘Government’s broad energy 
policy is to ensure secure, diverse and sustainable energy’.87 This policy was reiterated in 
2000 with the extra addition of the importance of a competitive market for energy.88 
Certainly, the liberalisation of energy markets was a key policy aim of the UK
85 Pierre Noel, ‘Is Energy Security A Political, Military or Market Problem’, The Financial Times (17 
January 2008).
86 Chief Executive o f BP Tony Hayward, ‘The Challenge of Energy Security’, Speech at London Business 
School (4 February 2010) accessed at
http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryld=98&contentld=7059562 on 4 May 2012.
87Hansard' HC Deb Volume 302, Column 531W (9 December 1997).
88 Hansard, HC Deb Volume 355, Column 576W (2 November 2000). Helen Liddell MP stated in a written 
answer: ‘The Government are committed to competition and to an energy policy based on secure, diverse 
and sustainable energy supplies at competitive prices’.
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government and was made explicit in the 2007 Energy White Paper Meeting the Energy 
Challenge with one of the key elements of the strategy being to ‘secure reliable energy 
supplies at prices set in competitive markets.’59 Indeed, the UK tried to facilitate more 
competitive energy markets through energy ‘unbundling’: in essence, the separation of 
energy companies’ production and transmission assets. This resulted in foreign energy 
companies such as EDF of France and E.ON of Germany being given permission to 
purchase UK energy firms.90 As a result of these changes some argued that, under 
Labour, the UK developed the most market-orientated energy generation sector within 
the European Union, which often left it a disadvantage in purchasing energy in a 
European energy market that remained far from achieving the ideals of free market 
economics.91
Other important elements of the strategy included energy conservation and the 
development of cleaner energy supplies to combat climate change.92 In this way, despite 
moving considerably towards a market-based approach to energy generation, the UK 
government placed much more emphasis on certain policies aimed at the promotion of 
green energy sources. The creation of the Department of Energy and Climate Change in 
October 2008 perhaps best illustrated the increasing political importance of 
environmental issues within energy policy as Labour’s period in power progressed.93 This 
was after the three Energy White Papers of 2003, 2006 and 2007 had all stressed the
89 Meeting The Energy Challenge: A White Paper on Energy, p.8.
90 BBC News Online, ‘EDF agrees to buy British Energy’ (24 September 2008) accessed at 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/1/hi/business/7632853.stm on 7 May 2012 and E.ON UK Website, ‘E.ON buys 
Midlands-based energy services company CHN Group’ (17 January 2008) accessed at 
http://pressreleases.eon-uk.eom /blogs/eonukpressreleases/archive/2008/01/17/1169.aspx on 7 May 2012.
91 See Michael Pollitt, ‘The arguments for and against ownership unbundling o f energy transmission 
networks’, ESRC Electricity Policy Research Group (7 August 2007) accessed at 
http://www.electricitvpolicv.org.uk/pubs/wp/eprg0714.pdf on 4 May 2012. Also, see The Economist, 
‘Britain’s Energy Crisis: How long till the lights go out?’ (6 August 2009).
92 Ibid.
93 This new department brought together energy policy (previously under the remit o f the now defunct 
BERR -Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform) and climate change mitigation policy 
(previously formulated by DEFRA -  the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs). To further 
its environmental goals the government also introduced the Renewables Obligation Certificate (ROC) and 
the Carbon Reduction Commitment (CRC). The ROC placed an obligation on UK suppliers o f electricity 
to source a certain proportion o f their electricity from renewable sources. Failure to do this would result in 
a financial penalty being applied to the company concerned. The CRC was a UK-wide emissions trading 
scheme that aimed to cut carbon dioxide emissions through promotion of energy-efficiency measures in 
many large organizations. As with the ROC, failure to comply with the obligations o f the scheme would 
result in financial penalties.
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increasing desire and need for government energy policy to focus on mitigating climate 
change, in addition to supplying secure and diverse supplies of energy.94 Diversity of 
supply, as outlined by Tony Hayward, was also much emphasised in the government 
literature.95
As regards any specific focus on the issue of energy security, a paper entitled UK 
International Priorities: The Energy Strategy was published by the FCO, DTI and 
DEFRA in 2004. There was no input from the MOD, reinforcing the notion that the 
armed forces did not have a role to play in this issue. This document reiterated many of 
the policies outlined in 2003’s Energy White Paper, with an emphasis on the importance 
of improved international collaboration on climate change mitigation, the need to 
increase energy market liberalisation in the EU and the desire to increase uptake of 
renewable sources of energy.96 There was no direct mention of any need for military 
intervention in the document, although the importance of ‘hard security’ in ensuring the 
security of international energy supplies was cited. Attacks against oil installations and 
personnel in Iraq and Nigeria were mentioned as aspects o f ‘hard security’ that needed to
07be anticipated in the overall energy security picture. There was also a call for ‘better
QO
governance of natural resource wealth in producer countries’. From this we can see that 
there were allusions towards possible military involvement in energy security issues, with 
‘hard security’ seemingly being analogous to the notion of ‘hard power’ in diplomacy.
Malcolm Wicks’ 2009 paper Energy Security: a national challenge in a changing 
world, in many ways provided the most comprehensive summary of the evolution in the 
Labour government’s appreciation of energy issues.99 In essence, energy efficiency was
94 DTI, Our Energy Future: Creating a Low Carbon Economy, Cm. 5761 (London: TSO, 2003) p.3; DTI, 
The Energy Challenge: Energy Review Report 2006, Cm. 6887 (London: TSO, 2006) p.4 and DTI, Meeting 
the Energy Challenge: a White Paper on Energy, Cm. 7124 (London: TSO, 2007) p.4.
95 The importance o f diversity o f supply was mentioned on numerous occasions in all o f the Energy White 
Papers published between 2003 and 2008: Our Energy Future: Creating a Low Carbon Economy:
‘diversity is the best way of protecting ourselves against interruptions o f supply, sudden price rises, 
terrorism or other threats to reliability o f supply’ p. 16; The Energy Challenge: Energy Review Report 2006: 
‘... the Government believes that the best way to maintain energy reliability is through energy diversity’
p. 19; Meeting the Energy Challenge: a White Paper on Energy, '... diversity helps avoid over-dependence 
on a single fuel type, contributing to security of supply’, p. 13.
96 FCO, UK International Priorities: The Energy Strategy (London: TSO, 2004) p. 12, p. 16.
97 Ibid. p. 16.
98 Ibid. p.22.
99 Malcolm Wicks, Energy Security: a national challenge in a changing world (DECC, 2009). In October 
2008 he was appointed by the Prime Minister as his Special Representative on International Energy Issues.
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considered to be the most important means of achieving energy security for the UK, both 
domestically and in pushing this agenda in relations with other states. Alternative sources 
of energy were also considered a priority with the caveat that the UK would continue to 
rely on large supplies of gas and oil from abroad. Importantly, it was mentioned that this 
reliance could pose risks to the UK, in terms of reliable gas supply, and also the danger of 
significant fluctuation in global oil prices. The importance of liaison with multi-lateral 
institutions was also emphasised although their utility in resolving energy questions was 
questioned due to overlapping responsibilities and the continued lack of clear 
demarcation of responsibility in the international system.100
Thus, despite moves towards energy efficiency and renewable energy, by the end 
of Labour’s time in power there remained the recognition amongst government officials 
that security of supply issues would continue to be of importance to the UK for the 
foreseeable future. The importance of multilateral institutions in forging energy 
agreements was mentioned but, in Malcolm Wicks’ analysis at least, there is a belief that 
the government should recognise their limitations.101 This seemed to point towards the 
potential for UK unilateral action in forging agreements regarding energy although the 
possibility of military involvement was never mentioned.
Ultimately, it is important to note here that all governmental policy papers on 
energy failed to refer to any British defence establishment involvement in energy security 
issues. As outlined in Chapter One, this was likely to be due, in part, to the negative 
public connotations attached to any military intervention to secure energy resources, as 
we have seen from this chapter that there were threats to the security of supply of 
important fossil fuels that could have necessitated prior military planning and possible 
intervention. Thus, in order to effectively analyse whether this issue was significant for 
defence policy planners in Britain we must solely scrutinize the defence establishment’s
100 Ibid. ‘The effectiveness of multilateral institutions depends a lot on the membership list and their 
willingness to cooperate with one another and translate multilateral agreement into multilateral action a 
challenge when you get a number of countries around a table all with different needs, aims and objectives’
p.86.
101 Ibid. ‘the UK needs constantly to evaluate which o f the multilateral organisations has the best chance of  
making a direct and practical impact on delivering one or more o f the desired outcomes’. See DECC, 
Government Response to Malcolm Wicks’s Review of International Energy Security, ‘Energy Security: a 
national challenge in a changing world’ (DECC, 2010). This official government document provided an 
overall positive response to the recommendations of Malcolm Wicks’s paper.
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actions and statements between 1997 and 2010, using the methodology outlined in 
Chapter One.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we have observed the major importance of fossil fuels to the UK economy 
as a whole during Labour’s tenure in government. We have also observed the 
significance of particular regions of the world, in particular the Middle East, in supplying 
the global oil and gas markets, as well as the emerging importance of areas such as the 
Arctic and the Falkland Islands. There was also the likelihood of increased competition 
for energy resources between developed countries and the emerging economies of China 
and India, as well as possible asymmetric threats to important energy transit routes. All 
these were issues of major economic and political interest to the United Kingdom that 
had the potential to necessitate military intervention.
Still, the British government’s articulation of how to maintain energy security for 
the UK did not directly espouse or discuss any need for military involvement despite the 
understanding that energy imports (and the concomitant need to ensure their continued 
supply) would increase in importance in the foreseeable future. Instead, they preferred to 
concentrate on the subject of increasing diversification of supply and the promotion of 
more competitive energy markets, with energy security policy being the responsibility of 
civilian departments. The only insinuation of the armed forces potential utility in this area 
was seen in the discussion o f ‘hard security’ in ‘UK International Priorities: The Energy 
Strategy’ of 2004. Thus, with the findings of this chapter in mind, it is now time to use 
the information we have seen on the possible areas of intervention for energy security 
purposes to gauge the effect of energy security considerations within British defence 
policy in the succeeding chapters.
Chapter Three
Declaratory Policy
Defence policy as a whole under the Labour administration became a prominent issue of 
discussion in the nation’s media, as deployments in Sierra Leone, Kosovo, Iraq and 
Afghanistan hit the headlines and, in the case of Iraq, resulted in large-scale public opposition 
and demonstrations.1 The justification for these actions, particularly the British involvement 
in Iraq, was questioned by many, resulting in the Iraq Inquiry, which was set up to ascertain
publicly why the war took place and how governmental decisions were made in the run-up to
>•)
the conflict." Indeed, British military involvement in Afghanistan from 2001 onwards became 
increasingly controversial, with some commentators calling for a prompt withdrawal of 
British forces. Towards the end of Labour’s time in power, there were also calls from 
military analysts and Members of Parliament for a new Strategic Defence Review, following 
the White Paper published in 1998.4 This indicated that the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) 
failed to deliver the coherent approach to defence policy that it was meant to have heralded
1 See Ipsos MORI Website, ‘War with Iraq’ (5 March 2003) accessed at http://w w w .ipsos- 
m ori.com /researchpublications/researcharchive/poll.aspx?oltem ld=830 on 30 April 2012. This poll indicated 
that only 25% o f the British public would support British involvement in the invasion o f Iraq if  inspectors failed 
to find WMDs and there was a failure to gain a second UN resolution in favour o f the war. If both conditions 
were met the figure would have been 75% in favour o f the war. The UK’s largest demonstration took place 
against the war in London on 16 February 2003. Numbers were estimated to have been between 750,000 and 2 
million. See “ Million’ march against Iraq war’, BBC News Website (16 February 2003) accessed at 
http://new s.bbc.co .U k/l/h i/2765041 .stm on 15 February 2010.
2 See Iraq Inquiry Website, ‘Homepage’ (2012) accessed at http://www.iraqinquirv.org.uk/ on 7 May 2012.The 
Chair o f the Inquiry is Sir John Chilcot, leading much o f the media to label it as ‘The Chilcot Inquiry’.
3 Kim Howells, former Minister o f State at the FCO and then Chairman o f the Parliamentary Intelligence and 
Security Committee, called for British troops to be withdrawn early from Afghanistan following the deaths o f 5 
British soldiers in November 2009. See James Kirkup, ‘Kim Howells: Afghan killings ‘blow to the heart of  
British strategy” , telegraph.co.uk (4 November 2009) accessed at
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/6501898/Kim-Howells-Afghan-killings-blow-to-the-heart-of-British- 
strategy.html on 7 May 2012. Also, see The New Statesman, ‘Leader: Why Britain must abort mission in 
Afghanistan’ (October 22 2009). An Ipsos MORI poll conducted between 17-19 July 2009 illustrated that 52% 
of the public opposed Britain’s continued involvement in the campaign. See Ipsos MORI Website, ‘Attitudes to 
Afghanistan Campaign’ (24 July 2009) accessed at http://www.ipsos- 
mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/poll.aspx?oItemId=2414 on 6 May 2012.
4 See Michael Clarke, ‘The Overdue Defence Review: Old Questions, New Answers’, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 
153, No. 6 (2008); IPPR Committee on National Security in the 21st Century, ‘Shared Responsibilities: A 
National Security Strategy for the United Kingdom’, Institute fo r  Public Policy Research (IPPR) Report (30 
June 2009) and ‘Liam Fox: The way we treat our armed forces is a national disgrace’, The Independent (28 
January 2009).
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upon its publication.5 However, this was by no means the only important government paper 
concerning defence between 1997 and 2010, so any belief that defence declaratory policy was 
wholly neglected during the intervening period would be misplaced.
In view of the aforementioned controversy over many aspects of British defence 
policy, this chapter will seek to establish whether there was any consistent and coherent 
recognition of the importance of energy security in defence declaratory policy during the 
examined period, and if so, whether this followed a control paradigm or a sustainable security 
paradigm. The chapter will then seek to explain the reasons for the eventual policy outcomes 
through the use of Allison’s and Dorman’s models of government that were previously 
outlined in Chapter One. However, before the main body of analysis is embarked upon it 
would first be pertinent to revisit the findings of the last chapter.
In Chapter Two we saw that the British energy sector and wider economy remained 
heavily reliant upon fossil fuels from 1997 to 2010, with this reliance becoming arguably 
more precarious in terms of energy security as North Sea oil and gas reserves began to 
diminish. The resulting regression from oil and gas autarky for the United Kingdom (which 
had, in any case, always been prone to price disruptions due to international market 
fluctuations) led to an increasing reliance on fossil-fuel imports, particularly LNG, as natural 
gas replaced coal as the energy source of choice for power-generation. Similarly, oil-derived 
fuels remained of paramount importance within the transportation sector and there was little 
movement nationally towards uptake of alternatively-powered vehicles such as those utilising 
bio-fuels, hydrogen or mains electricity. In terms of potential threats to UK energy security, 
instability in the Middle East, Russia’s potential use of its ‘energy weapon’, the rising 
demand for oil and gas emanating from China and India, the danger of energy ‘bottlenecks’ at 
key transit routes and the potential for conflict in regions where there could be large 
unexploited energy reserves were all outlined as areas of possible concern for the British 
government. Still, the government’s stated energy policy remained remarkably unchanged 
throughout its time in power, with the emphasis placed upon ‘secure, diverse and sustainable 
energy at competitive prices’.
This chapter will examine the declaratory circle of defence policy. As already 
demonstrated in the introduction, when we refer to declaratory policy we mean simply, in Ian
5 Hansard, HC DebVolume 315, Column 1073 (8 July 1998) Secretary o f State for Defence, George Robertson: 
‘The review will fundamentally reshape and modernise Britain's armed forces, sorting out the weaknesses, 
building on our strengths and providing a structure to deal with tomorrow's threats, not yesterday's enemies. Our 
forces will be more mobile, better manned, better supported and equipped, and better able to act as a force for 
good in the world, where we can and when we choose.’
Bellany’s words, ‘what government states defence policy to be’.6 For the purposes of this 
thesis we will therefore scrutinize the Labour government’s conception of what the role of the 
armed forces was during its period in power. This will mean outlining the threats that were 
deemed important at the time and the associated roles that were assigned to the armed forces 
in order to counter these threats.
Important government papers concerning defence policy published during Labour’s 
time in government will be utilised as key junctures in declaratory policy, as these were 
meant to espouse the then government’s overall vision of British defence policy. Additional 
source material will then be employed to enlighten the reader further as to what was said in 
intervening periods between their publication and any themes highlighted will be elaborated 
upon. These additional sources include the MOD’s annual defence plans, Hansard, National 
Audit Office (NAO) Reports, Ministerial statements, various journal articles and an interview 
conducted with former Defence Minister Kevan Jones.
Using the above methodology, this chapter will proceed chronologically through the 
abovementioned source material and outline where energy security considerations were given 
specific policy emphasis. We can then ascertain whether declaratory policy fitted more 
closely to a control paradigm or sustainable security conception of security as earlier outlined 
with reference to the ORG’s ideas. In the former case, we would expect to see continued 
emphasis on the importance of key fossil-fuel producing regions to UK security (along with 
the requisite ability to intervene in these regions), the importance of maintaining the security 
and integrity of global shipping routes highlighted (with ships remaining the key transporters 
of the majority of the world’s energy supplies) as well as little discussion of the need for the 
development of alternative energy technologies for use by the British armed forces. In the 
latter case, we should expect to see an articulation of the importance of competition over 
energy resources and climate change as potential international conflict drivers, along with the 
subsequent need for the British armed forces to move towards development of alternative 
energy sources, as well as increased energy efficiency so as to combat these issues. A 
sustainable security approach would also de-emphasise the ability to intervene in fossil fuel 
producing areas such as the Middle East as the wider governmental energy strategy should 
have made the UK’s energy mix more diverse and less reliant on this region. Similarly, the 
possible operational benefits of alternative energy technologies to the military should be 
propounded, as well as the importance of inter-departmental cooperation on energy issues. In
6 Ian Bellany ‘Reviewing Britain’s Defence ’ (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994) p.2.
essence, a sustainable energy security paradigm would see a more preventative approach 
adopted to energy security issues, with defence declaratory policy articulating a greater need 
for the military to address issues of energy security via renewable energy technologies and 
the imposition of greater energy efficiency measures across the armed forces.
Given these parameters, this chapter will demonstrate that the Labour government 
displayed a clear control paradigm approach to energy security considerations within defence 
policy until 2008, at which time environmental issues became more salient in overall British 
political discourse and sustainable security approaches began to be espoused more fervently 
in advance of the 2010 General Election. Despite this, the desire to have a military ability to 
intervene in the Middle East and secure key fossil fuel resources remained a significant factor 
in defence policy throughout this period. Indeed, the Defence White Papers and statements 
from government ministers in the period under examination show a continuity with all post- 
1945 British governments in seeing the Middle East as a vital region for UK interests. In turn, 
this approach helped to justify the expeditionary stance that the armed forces increasingly 
moved towards during the Labour administration. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the 
government could not have put forward definite plans to revolutionise military logistical 
support by concerted research and development into this area. In reality, this potential was 
not properly articulated until the publication of the Ministry of Defence’s Sustainable 
Procurement Strategy and the MOD paper Defence in a Changing Climate three months
n
before the general election of 2010.
Why was this control paradigm approach to energy security within defence policy 
taken in the early years of the Labour government? Ultimately, it can be ascribed to what the 
Labour government believed to be rational considerations because, as we saw from the 
previous chapter, British energy needs remained heavily reliant on fossil-fuels throughout the 
examined period. If there had been any desire for radical change in the logistical support or 
transportation technologies of the British armed forces this would have been hamstrung by 
the fact that there were no real alternatives to fossil fuels within the civilian sector, nor were 
there any real foreign technological alternatives that could have been adopted or imitated by 
the British defence establishment in order to enhance any sustainable energy security ideals.
7 Ministry o f Defence, Sustainable Procurement Strategy (MOD, 2010) and Ministry o f Defence, Defence in a 
Changing Climate (MOD, 2010).
8 For example, despite the increasing recognition by the American armed forces that heavy reliance on fossil 
fuels was economically costly (not to mention logistically difficult to sustain and tactically dangerous) it was 
reported in 2011 by an ex-chief logistician in the US Army that the United States had been spending an 
approximate figure o f $20 billion annually on fuel and fuel infrastructure in the conflicts in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. Much o f this was believed to have been spent on providing fuel for air-conditioned tents and
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For these reasons, Allison’s Rational Actor Model (RAM) best explains the control paradigm 
approach taken in British defence policy within the examined period, as shall be explained in 
more depth in the main body of this chapter.
Of course, the control paradigm approach to energy considerations within defence 
policy was not purely due to continued reliance on fossil fuels. The desire of the Labour 
government for Britain to be a key player in international affairs and to maintain or enhance 
British global influence must also be given as a reason for this approach to defence policy. 
Thus, Labour’s foreign policy ideals also played an important role in shaping the defence 
establishment’s stance towards energy issues. Tony Blair stated (and continues to believe) 
that Britain’s armed forces were essential in advancing Britain’s international interests and 
influence.9 In 2007, in a speech made to RUSI aboard HMS Albion, Blair was eager to point 
out that the military required both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ power capabilities. Only by possessing 
both of these abilities could Britain continue to ‘protect [its] security and advance [its] 
interests and values in the modem world’.10
Thus, the control paradigm approach within British defence policy was not only a 
result of the need to secure energy resources but was also related to the Labour government’s 
desire to maintain British international influence through the ‘hard’ power capabilities of the 
armed forces. Therefore, these two aims mutually reinforced each other. Consequently, this 
policy line followed the ORG definition of a control paradigm outlined in Chapter One ‘as an 
approach based on the false premise that insecurity can be controlled through military force 
... thus maintaining the status quo’.11 It appears that it did not countenance any move towards 
a sustainable security paradigm in defence policy, with its attendant focus on developing 
green energy technologies in the military and conflict prevention rather than conflict 
intervention, as this could have potentially led to declining international influence for the 
United Kingdom. Accordingly, concepts of energy security within defence policy followed 
the same course as previous governments. They were affected in large part by a British desire 
to still be seen as a state with significant global influence. Thus, the United Kingdom retained 
the same default approach towards energy security that every British government had
temporary structures. National Public Radio Website, ‘Among the Costs o f War: Billions a Year in A.C.?’ (25 
June 2011) accessed at http://www.npr.org/2011/06/25/137414737/among-the-costs-of-war-20b-in-air- 
conditioning on 6 May 2012.
9 ‘... the armed forces [are a] significant part o f what gives Britain influence, reach and power.’ Tony Blair, A 
Journey (London: Arrow, 2011) p.647.
10 Tony Blair ‘Defence Perspectives: Defending the United Kingdom and its Interests’ The RUSI Journal, Vol. 
152, No. 1 (2007) pp. 15-16.
11 Chris Abbot and Thomas Phipps, ‘Beyond Dependence and Legacy: Sustainable Security in Sub-Saharan 
Africa’, Oxford Research Group Briefing Paper ( ORG, 2009) p. 1.
displayed since 1945 (which we saw outlined in Chapter One). The main body of this chapter 
will further elaborate on this point.
This chapter will also demonstrate how the emergence of international terrorism and 
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation as key security issues diverted much of 
the government’s focus on defence policy away from other potential concerns between 2001 
and 2010. With these twin threats to contend with it was somewhat understandable that 
defence policy continued with its default attitude towards energy security considerations 
rather than any concerted attempt towards sustainable security notions. This was because the 
control paradigm approach remained an enabler for the conduct of overseas operations 
against terrorist states as well as for any need to secure essential energy resources.
In terms of technological research and development, the MOD was focussed upon the 
so-called Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) throughout the examined period. This meant 
a concentration on advances in Information Technology and its military applications, 
encompassed in what the British defence establishment termed Network Enabled Capability
1 J(NEC). In terms of new technology, this appeared to herald a real change in the way wars 
could be fought, in contrast to the benefits that could be provided to the military through the 
development of new energy technologies. NEC’s foundation was based upon established and 
proven systems whereas any focus on new energy sources for transportation would have been 
starting with largely unproven technology whose military benefits had not been clearly 
demonstrated in the civilian or military sectors.13 With this in mind, it is understandable to a 
certain extent that sustainable energy ideas were not investigated thoroughly or given the 
conceptual attention that they perhaps could have been.
Despite the aforementioned explanations as to the reasons for the continued use of a 
control paradigm approach, there were movements towards sustainable security principles 
within declaratory policy from 2003 onwards. The first Ministry o f Defence Sustainable 
Development Report was published in 2005 and there were 3 subsequent Sustainable 
Development Reports published after this.14 Similarly, the MOD’s first Climate Change
12 See MOD, Network Enabled Capability: JSP 777 (MOD, 2005). The American term for this concept 
(although with arguably different emphases) is Network-Centric Warfare (NCW).
13 See John Luddy, ‘The Challenge and Promise o f Network-Centric Warfare’, Lexington Institute Paper, 
(February 2005) pp. 4-5. According to John Luddy, a US Special Forces soldier was able to send targeting data 
from a laptop computer to a B-52 bomber which then proceeded to bomb the intended target within 20 minutes 
of the data being received. A similar story is recounted in Network Enabled Capability: JSP 777, p. 5.
14 MOD, Ministry o f  Defence Sustainable Development Report: October 2003 - October 2004 (MOD, 2005); 
MOD, Ministry o f Defence Sustainable Development: Annual Report 2005 (MOD, 2005); MOD, Ministry o f  
Defence Sustainable Development Report and Action Plan 2008 (MOD, 2008); MOD, Ministry o f  Defence 
Sustainable Development Report 2009 (MOD, 2009).
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Strategy was published in 2008 and in 2010 there were MOD papers addressing sustainable 
procurement and the possible future effects of climate change on defence policy.15 All these 
examples indicated that the declaratory sphere of defence policy was certainly not ignorant of 
the issues of climate change and energy security and was beginning to address them in a 
serious manner through the adoption of carbon emissions reduction targets for the armed 
forces in terms of its operational use of fuel.16 Indeed, the publication of The National 
Security Strategy o f the United Kingdom in 2008 addressed competition for energy resources 
as a key future driver of conflict as well as emphasising the need for greater inter­
departmental cooperation in addressing future security threats to the UK.17
As regards The National Security Strategy o f the United Kingdom, (hereafter referred 
to as the NSS) its formulation could be deemed as evidence of a positive aspiration from the 
government to integrate UK security strategy and move towards aspects of a sustainable 
security approach. However (as we shall see outlined later in this chapter) the competing 
security ideas and perceived responsibilities of separate governmental departments resulted in 
a vague outline of what the actual inter-departmental responses to threats would be.18 As 
such, the governmental recognition of the need to integrate the visions of different 
departments was hamstrung by a lack of specificity. This could be ascribed to inter­
departmental compromise and, due to this fact, Allison’s Governmental Politics Model 
(GPM) provides the best explanation as to the content of the NSS.
Certainly, from 2008 onwards, the publication of MOD papers such as the Climate 
Change Strategy could be seen as a governmental response to the increased saliency of the 
issue of climate change within British political discourse and the need to address these issues 
within defence policy in the face of the upcoming general election. Indeed, the appointment 
of David Cameron as leader of the Conservative Party in December 2005 and his desire to 
change the public perception of the Conservatives through a greater focus on environmental 
issues meant that Gordon Brown recognised that ‘he needed to strengthen his environmental
15 MOD, Climate Change Strategy (MOD, 2008); MOD, Sustainable Procurement Strategy (MOD, 2010); 
MOD, Defence in a Changing Climate (MOD, 2010).
16 under the Climate Change Act 2008, the Ministry o f Defence (MOD) now has its own Carbon Budget 
which we must stay within, covering both emissions from our estate and business travel, as well as those from 
our vehicles, ships and aircraft’. MOD, MOD Climate Change Strategy 2010 (MOD, 2010) p.2.
17 Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy o f  the United Kingdom: Security in an interdependent world, 
Cm. 7291 (London: TSO, 2008) pp. 18-19, p.8.
18 James Gow, ‘The United Kingdom National Security Strategy: the Need for New Bearings in Security 
Policy’, The Political Quarterly, Vol. 80, No. 1 (2009) p. 129.
reputation in readiness for his future leadership confrontation with Cameron’.19 As such, 
Andrew Dorman’s time cycle model serves as the key explanatory tool for the increased 
espousal of sustainable security tenets in defence policy in the last two years of the Labour 
administration. With environmental issues more prominent on the political agenda than in 
previous general elections, Gordon Brown’s government was eager to prove that it was 
properly addressing these issues in all areas of government policy in the two years leading up 
to the 2010 General Election. Thus, the Climate Change Act of 2008 (which placed legally 
binding emissions reduction targets on the British government) had ramifications for defence
90policy, along with all other areas of government policy.
Still, regardless of the positive steps that were made towards sustainable security 
notions at the declaratory level of defence policy (with various statements on the need to cut 
emissions to address climate change, as well as the need to ‘develop and introduce 
technologies, particularly those around renewable and sustainable energy’) these documents 
cannot entirely be seen as believable statements of an ultimate intention to transform the 
armed forces operational outlook as alternative energy technologies were developed (such as 
the description of NEC in Delivering Security in a Changing World: Future Capabilities) but 
rather the recognition that the military and defence estates would have to play some part in 
reducing their emissions along with all other government departments’ targets following the 
stipulations of Energy White Papers from 2003 onwards, the findings of the Stem Review of
912006 and the Climate Change Act of 2008. Certainly, Kevan Jones, Parliamentary Under­
secretary of State for Defence from October 2008 until May 2010, commented that changes 
to energy use during his time at the MOD were more focussed upon improving energy 
efficiency and introducing green energy technologies to bases and barracks, as opposed to
• • 99any concentration on front-lme units. He also noted that energy policy issues were not 
considered one of the defence establishment’s main concerns during his time as a Defence
9-2 ^
Minister. With this in mind, we will now proceed to the main body of this chapter.
19 Neil Carter, ‘Combating Climate Change in the UK: Challenges and Obstacles’, The Political Quarterly, Vol. 
79, No. 2 (2008) p. 198.
20 HM Government, The Climate Change Act (2008), accessed at 
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2008/27/contents on 3 October 2011.
21 MOD, Delivering Security in a Changing World: Future Capabilities, Cm. 6269 (London: TSO, 2004) and 
Nicholas Stem, The Stern Review Report on the Economics o f  Climate Change (HM Treasury, 2006).
22 Interview with Kevan Jones MP, 12 May 2011.
23 Ibid.
The Stratesic Defence Review (1998)
The first document to examine in respect of the question in the title is the Strategic Defence 
Review (SDR) of 1998. The SDR was intended as a ‘comprehensive’ overview of British 
military capabilities and intent, and aimed to frame the context for the British armed forces 
under the Labour government. There was a widespread consultation with foreign policy and 
defence academics and the FCO and it was stated clearly that the document was to be a 
policy review, not a budgetary or organizational review as the mini-reviews of the 
Conservatives in the 1990s had been.24 In many ways it presented continuity with previous 
Conservative policy. This continuity was shown in statements that emphasised the UK as 
having a leading role in the international community and the continued importance of NATO 
in the defence thinking of Great Britain. For example, the SDR stated that ‘Britain’s place in 
the world is determined by our interests as a nation and as a leading member of the 
international community’ and ‘Membership of NATO will continue to provide the UK with
9^its best insurance against a l l ... risks’. These statements differed little compared to those in 
the Statement on the Defence Estimates of 1996 which said ‘we believe that we derive 
benefit from being a major participant in world affairs ... we have assets on which we can 
draw for our benefit and the international community...’ and ‘NATO is, and will remain, the 
lynchpin of European defence arrangements.’26
As regards explicit mention of the need to obtain safe access to energy resources in 
the SDR, the Persian Gulf area was referred to as being the area of most importance to British 
security outside Europe, and the need for secure supplies of oil was also emphasised:
‘Outside Europe our interests are most likely to be affected by events in the Gulf... Instability 
in these areas also carries wider risks. We have particularly important national interests and 
close friendships in the Gulf. Oil supplies from the Gulf are crucial to the world economy. 
Confrontation in the Middle East carries the risk of escalation and since the region borders on
24 Colin Mclnnes, ‘Labour’s Strategic Defence Review’, International Affairs, Vol. 47, Iss. 4, (1998) p.830 and 
Lawrence Freedman, ‘Defence’ in Anthony Seldon ed., B lair’s Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2007) p.619. Freedman comments that the consultation process prior to the publication o f the document 
was unusually open (Freedman was one o f those consulted). The Conservatives mini-reviews include ‘Options 
for Change’ o f 1990, which was a defence organization study whose initial findings were presented to the House 
o f Commons 23 July 1990 and subsequent policy changes outlined in annual Statements on the Defence 
Estimates throughout the 1990s. MOD, Front Line First: The Defence Costs Study (London: TSO, 1995) also 
outlined changes in defence organisation, with cuts aimed at the support sections o f the armed services.
25 MOD, The Strategic Defence Review, Cm. 3999 (London: TSO, 1998) Chapter II, Paragraphs 17 and 37. 
Hereafter, this document will be referred to as the SDR There are no page numbers hence the need to specify 
references with the chapter and paragraph number.
26 Statement on the Defence Estimates 1996, Cm. 3223 (London: TSO, 1996) pp.3-5, p.9.
NATO, in some circumstances crises could involve the Alliance directly.’27 Indeed, the 
Middle East was specifically mentioned in the introduction as an area where there was ‘a 
complex mix of uncertainty and instability’ that could ‘pose a real threat to our security’.28 
The threat of instability caused by the regime in Iraq was also alluded to on a number of 
occasions in the paper: ‘There are still dangerous regimes in the world ... As Iraq has amply 
demonstrated, such regimes threaten not only their neighbours but vital economic interests 
and even international stability’ and ‘There are already significant sources of instability in 
[the Middle East and North Africa] - including the continuing threat represented by Saddam
90Hussein's Iraq’. Thus, although Iraq was not specifically mentioned as a threat to energy 
security it was singled out as a cause of instability in an important economic area that had 
been highlighted as cmcial to global oil supplies and the wider world economy. In 
comparison to the previous Defence White Papers of the 1990s, where there was no precise 
mention of any threat from the Middle East, there is therefore a real importance placed upon 
security in the Persian Gulf region, and the danger of Iraq in particular.30 In light of the 
subsequent invasion of Iraq in 2003, this emphasis showed that the incoming Labour 
government already perceived Saddam Hussein’s regime to be a menace in an area of vital 
economic interest. Thus, energy security (and the importance of the Persian Gulf region to 
this) was an issue that was explicitly recognised by the Labour Party upon being elected to 
power and we can see its definite impact on defence policy in the aforementioned policy 
statements.
Issues of energy efficiency within the armed forces were barely mentioned in the 
SDR. This remained consistent with a control paradigm approach to energy concerns. A short 
paragraph stated ‘In implementing the Review, we will take environmental factors into 
account, including environmental appraisal wherever appropriate, and we will also continue
• 91to take part in wider Government initiatives such as green transport and energy efficiency’. 
Therefore, the importance of energy efficiency in a military establishment that continued to 
rely on large amounts of fossil fuels was not something that warranted any great deal of 
consideration. Additionally, the phrasing also highlights that defence was not likely to initiate
27 SDR, Chapter 2, Paragraph 40.
28 SDR, Introduction, Paragraph 2.
29 SDR, Chapter 1, Paragraph 6 and Chapter 2, Paragraph 41.
30Statement on the Defence Estimates 1992, Cm. 1981 (London: TSO, 1992) has a substantial section outlining 
the work o f weapons inspectors in Iraq and patrol o f the no-fly zones following the 1990-91 Gulf War but does 
not outline in any depth the perception o f any future danger from Saddam Hussein’s government.
31 SDR, Chapter 9, Paragraph 192.
any energy policy changes itself but merely ‘as part [of] wider Government initiatives’.32 
Undeniably, this approach was consistent with wider governmental policies on energy as 
there were no major policy statements on the need to develop renewable energy technologies 
in 1997 or 1998.33
Further evidence of the impact of the government’s control paradigm approach to 
energy issues within defence was provided by Ministerial statements made between 1997 and 
1999, which demonstrated a clear concentration on the importance of the Persian Gulf, as 
well as areas that were deemed to be important producers of crude oil. For instance, in oral 
evidence given to the Defence Select Committee in 1997, Defence Secretary George 
Robertson commented that ‘Beyond Europe, risks to our interests are likely to be greatest in 
the Gulf and the Near East. We must be ready to respond appropriately, in combination with 
others, to support stability in that region’.34 In evidence given to a Parliamentary Joint 
Committee in 1999, Foreign Secretary Robin Cook believed that naval exports to Indonesia 
were justified as ‘Indonesia does have a legitimate requirement for a navy. This is a country 
which consists of 1,600 inhabited islands and a lot more uninhabited islands. It does have one 
other power in the region seeking to encroach upon its oil fields which are offshore and in
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which we also have a national interest’. The Permanent Under-Secretary for Defence, Sir 
Kevin Tebbit, also commented in 1999 that one of the key measures of the efficacy of the 
Joint Rapid Reaction Force (JRRF) was to see whether it would be able to deploy in an area
9 fkof crisis such as the Middle East in a short time-frame.
In continuance of this theme, the MOD Defence Plans of 1999 and 2000 made no 
mention of energy efficiency or alternative energy targets within broader departmental 
objectives. This was despite the desire ‘to produce a defence strategy, policy and programme 
matched to our security needs now and in the future’ and ‘To deliver appropriately motivated,
! 32 Ibid.
33 DECC, Digest o f UK Energy Statistics 2011 annex D: Major Events in the Energy Industry (London: TSO,
2011) pp. 266-268.
34 House o f Commons Defence Committee, Eighth Report -  The Strategic Defence Review: Volume II, Minutes 
o f  Evidence and Memoranda taken on 30 July 1997, HC. 138-11, session 1997-1998 (London: TSO, 1998) 
answer to question 101.
35 House o f Commons Joint Committee on Defence, Foreign Affairs, International Development and Trade and 
Industry, Minutes o f Evidence: 3 November 1999, HC. 541-1, session 1998-1999 (London: TSO, 1999) answer 
to question 54.
36 ‘One o f the key goals we have set ourselves is to exercise o f the [sic] Joint Rapid Reaction Force by October 
2001: the ability to show that we can indeed conduct expeditionary action beyond the immediate European 
boundary— for example, into the Middle East—moving a brigade with significant naval and associated air 
elements. That will be a real test o f whether we have achieved what we say we have achieved in the SDR: o f  
moving to a much more expeditionary force and going to the crisis rather than waiting for it to come to us.’ 
House o f Commons Defence Committee, Minutes o f  Evidence: 10 February 1999, HC. 241-1, session 1998- 
1999 (London: TSO, 1999) answer to question 7.
armed, trained and equipped forces ... with the necessary support, sustainability (author’s
♦ 97italics) and deployability’. The Defence Corporate Plan of 2000 noted that the MOD 
wanted to ‘make sure we can match revolutionary changes in technology with revolutionary
• 9cchanges in military doctrine’. Thus, there was either a deep ignorance of the future potential 
of green energy technologies when these views were propounded or there was an informed 
recognition that there were no viable alternatives available (or the need for any viable 
alternatives) that had the capacity to effect significant change in departmental and military 
operations for a significant period of time. As we shall see from succeeding paragraphs the 
latter view was essentially correct between 1997 and 2000.
So why was there this apparent control paradigm approach to energy issues within 
defence policy in this period? Firstly, as already mentioned in this chapter, there were no real 
alternatives to fossil fuels as the main energy source during this period of Labour’s time in 
government. Oil-derived fuels remained essential to the civilian transportation sector, as well 
as in the military, with the only non-fossil fuel powered vehicles within the armed forces at
9 0this time being the Trident nuclear submarine fleet. Gas was also becoming increasingly 
important for electricity generation as the United Kingdom moved away from coal-powered 
power stations towards the former energy type so as to cut carbon dioxide emissions.40 At the 
time of Labour’s election to power worldwide energy prices were exceptionally low in 
historical terms. The dominant global supposition was that these low prices would continue 
for years. As Ian Rutledge has observed ‘the popular phrase among many oil market experts 
was that the world was not ‘running out of oil’ -  on the contrary, it was ‘running into it” .41 
This market position did not last, with oil and gas prices effectively doubling in price from 
the beginning of 1999 until the end of the year.42 Indeed, the concomitant increase in fuel 
prices for civilian consumers of oil-derived fuels presaged the fuel protests of September 
2000, which had a dramatic effect on the functioning of the UK economy.
In view of these facts, there was no real imperative for the Labour government to 
move away from the default position of the control paradigm that, as we saw from Chapter
37 MOD, The Departmental Plan 1999 (MOD, 1999) p. 1-3.
38 MOD, Defence Corporate Plan 2000/1 -  2003/4: Volume 1 (MOD, 2000) p.23.
39 See Chapter Two.
40 Andrew Jordan and Irene Lorenzoni, ‘Reviews and Surveys: Is There Now a Political Climate for Policy 
Change? Policy and Politics after the Stem Review’, The Political Quarterly, Vol. 78, No. 2 (2007) p. 312.
41 Ian Rutledge, ‘New Labour, energy policy and ‘competitive markets” , Cambridge Journal o f  Economics, 
Vol. 31, Iss. 6 (2007) p.902. For example, in 1998 the world oil price fell to $12.72/barrel, in real terms the 
lowest level since 1972. Gas prices had also reached an unprecedented global low in the summer o f 1997, 
according to Rutledge.
42 Ibid. p.908.
One, had been government policy since at least 1945. Fossil fuels remained extremely 
important to the UK economy and whilst they remained so the UK government may have 
deemed that the UK’s armed forces would need to have the capability and readiness to 
intervene in key energy extraction regions to safeguard any major disruption to world energy 
supplies. This was also at a time when Iraq was still considered to pose a viable threat to 
regional stability in the Middle East.43 Accordingly, although the United Kingdom was not 
yet a net importer of oil and gas, its economy was still likely to be affected adversely by any 
world oil price volatility as, as mentioned in Chapter Two, oil continued to be traded on 
international markets with Saudi Arabia remaining the important global swing producer.44
In addition to this factor, there was an attendant desire for Britain to exhibit continued 
global influence and prestige, which a control paradigm approach to energy issues helped to 
demonstrate through the British influence that could be brought to bear on a key world region 
such as the Middle East. For example, the SDR stated that the key defence mission of 
‘Support to Wider British Interests’ consisted of providing forces to ‘conduct activities to 
promote British interests, influence and standing abroad’.45 As with previous governments, 
British armed forces personnel continued to be stationed in various Gulf States in this period 
with the expressed intention of ‘building bridges’ with the respective governments whilst also 
training military forces to deter would be aggressors in the region.46 Certainly, in 1998 the 
Defence Select Committee saw the continuance of the UK’s worldwide military role as 
having the potential to have benefits in terms of the United Kingdom’s ‘power and prestige’ 
as well as economic gains. In the same report, the significance of Persian Gulf oil to UK 
interests was similarly outlined.47 Thus, a control paradigm approach not only helped to 
secure security of oil supplies, but also had the associated effect of displaying British military 
and diplomatic power. A move towards a sustainable security paradigm and less reliance on 
fossil fuels would likely entail the loss of this influence and Britain’s historical links with the
48region.
43 ‘The UK's commitment and that of many other countries, most notably the United States, to uphold the 
security o f the region was demonstrated in the Gulf War. This determination to preserve stability and guarantee 
the West's oil supplies remains a key issue. Iraq has remained the main threat to regional stability since the Gulf 
War and the operations to enforce the no-fly zones are part of a policy aimed at containing Iraq’. House of 
Commons Defence Committee, Thirteenth R eport-Iraq i No-Fly Zones, HC. 453, session 1999-2000 (London: 
TSO, 2000) paragraph 8.
44 House o f Commons Defence Committee, Eighth Report -  The Strategic Defence Review: Volume I  - Report, 
HC. 138-1, Session 1997-1998 (London: TSO, 1998) paragraph 115.
45 SDR, paragraph A2.
46 Eighth Report -  The Strategic Defence Review: Volume I  - Report, Paragraphs 60-69.
47 Ibid. Paragraph 115.
48 Interview with Kevan Jones MP, 12 May 2011.
In relation to the aforementioned comments of the Defence Select Committee in 1998, 
the RAM explanation for the continued control paradigm approach within declaratory policy 
can be further demonstrated by the fact that the control paradigm approach appeared to be 
self-evident to the wider political establishment within the United Kingdom throughout the 
Labour Party’s time in government. For example, there was no real questioning of this 
approach within British defence policy by the Defence Select Committee in any of the reports 
they produced throughout Labour’s time in power. Certainly, there were never any serious 
concerns raised as to whether the British armed forces should be researching more actively 
the possibilities and operational benefits of alternative energy technologies, the need for the 
military to take seriously its contribution to climate change by imposing more stringent 
energy efficiency standards or the prospect that the armed forces could actually aid in the 
prevention of conflict by adopting the above measures. Where there were concerns raised 
over the direction of defence policy in the examined period, these tended to concentrate on 
resource issues and the fact that it often appeared that policy was being led by the equipment 
and operational structures available to the armed forces, rather than the political effects that 
the British military were trying to achieve in their deployments. These concerns could be 
seen in the Defence Select Committee’s responses to the Strategic Defence Review: A New 
Chapter and Delivering Security in a Changing World.49 Indeed, the Defence Select 
Committee were (as should be expected) quite prepared to question those aspects of defence 
policy that it deemed poorly thought-out or implemented.50 However, the belief that the UK 
should continue to exert a sizeable influence within the Middle East region was not 
something that was ever queried. Certainly, the Defence Select Committee considered
49 ‘It is far from clear whether the [Delivering Security in a Changing World] White Paper has been effects-led, 
or rather resource-driven.’ House o f Commons Defence Committee, Fifth Report - Defence White Paper 2003: 
Volume 1, HC. 465-1, session 2003-2004 (London: TSO, 2004) p.3 and ‘We have the impression that too often 
the practical implications o f the policy developments set out in the New Chapter have not been properly thought 
through. To date virtually all the equipment programmes which have been linked with the New Chapter have 
been existing programmes, which in a few cases the department has said are being accelerated. We are 
concerned that this suggests the policy making process and the ability to deliver the implementation o f  that 
process quickly enough are out of step with each other, or that the MoD has scaled back its practical ambition 
from the vision set out by the early stages of the New Chapter work’. House o f Commons Defence Committee, 
Sixth R ep o rt-A  New Chapter to the Strategic Defence Review, HC. 93-1, session 2002-2003 (London: TSO, 
2003) p.48.
50 ‘It is in this context that the MoD’s overarching personnel strategy for the Armed Forces must be evaluated ... 
it may be that they are guilty of a lack o f imagination: particularly in a ‘one size fits all’ approach to the three
f Services ... The evidence that we have seen so far has not convinced us that the right prescription is more o f the 
[ same’. House o f Commons Defence Committee, Second Report - The Strategic Defence Review: Report and 
j Proceedings o f  the Committee, HC. 29-1, session 2000-2001 (London: TSO, 2001) Paragraph 174 and ‘Given 
! that the original target date for Main Gate approval on the CVF programme was two years ago, it seems to us 
i. extraordinary that there is now no target date at all’. House o f Commons Defence Committee, Second Report - 
j Future Carrier and Joint Combat Aircraft Programmes, HC. 554, session 2005-2006 (London: TSO, 2005) 
p .i i .
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Britain’s continued military deployment in Iraq in 2008 to be a positive aspect of defence 
policy as it was believed it would greatly enhance the ability of the United Kingdom to 
influence the government within Iraq, as well as the region as a whole.51
In addition, the importance of maintaining an expeditionary strategy and the emphasis 
on the Middle East within defence policy failed to be questioned by the major opposition 
parties throughout Labour’s tenure in government. There was a similar failure to call for the 
development of alternative energy technologies within the British armed forces by the 
Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. This indicated that there was little chance to make 
political capital out of this approach as there were no other major military powers that had 
adopted such sustainable security measures within their respective defence policies.
Certainly, following the appointment of David Cameron as Leader of the Conservative Party 
in December 2005 and the subsequent Conservative emphasis upon environmental issues as a 
‘rebranding’ exercise for the party, one would have expected them to question energy policy 
within defence if other nations’ armed forces had been forging ahead in this particular 
technological area. They were certainly prepared to question such issues as the lack of 
helicopters for front-line forces deployed in Afghanistan.
Further evidence for the view that there was no viable alternative to Labour’s energy 
approach is provided by the following examples: In 2002, the then Liberal Democrat 
Spokesman on Defence Paul Keetch stated in The RUSI Journal that ‘We agree that the 
primary task of the UK’s Armed Forces is to ...defend our vital interest at home and abroad ... 
We agree that this requires a strategy of forward defence -  the expeditionary strategy ... The 
Afghan deployment, as with our deployments in Kosovo and Bosnia, and the operations 
undertaken in Sierra Leone and East Timor, are concrete examples of our troops being a 
‘force for good” .53 In the same issue, Conservative MP Bernard Jenkin, the then Shadow 
Defence Secretary, said that ‘The expeditionary nature of our military capabilities set out in
51 ‘The larger the military training commitment we can maintain, the greater will be UK influence in Iraq, and in 
the region as a whole, as Iraq recovers its position as a wealthy and powerful Middle East nation. The UK has an 
opportunity to maintain a substantial position o f influence for the common good in southern Iraq, if  we can 
commit the military capacity to do so.’ House of Commons Defence Committee, ''Fifteenth Report - UK 
operations in Iraq and the G ulf HC 982, session 2007-2008 (London: TSO, 2008) p.l 1.
52 Iain McLean, ‘Climate Change and UK Politics: From Brynle Williams to Sir Nicholas Stem’, The Political 
Quarterly, Vol. 78, No. 2 (2008) p. 187; Conservative Party Website, ‘David Cameron: One World 
Conservatism’ (13 July 2009) accessed at
http://www.conservatives.com/News/Speeches/2009/07/David CameronOneW orldConservatism.aspx on 4 
May 2012; See also The Conservative Party, Invitation to Join the Government o f  Britain: The Conservative 
Manifesto 2010 (Uckfield: Pureprint, 2010) pp. 104-105.
53 Paul Keetch, ‘The Future of British Defence: The Liberal Democrat View’, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 147, No. 
4, (2002) p.24.
the SDR is ... vital’.54 Indeed, in 2010 pre-election statements on defence, David Cameron 
and Nick Clegg did mention energy issues as being of importance to national security but 
neither of the parties they represented put forward any concerted proposals in their election 
manifestos to suggest that they considered the British armed forces would need to do more to 
incorporate energy efficiency measures or green energy technologies in order to mitigate the 
chances of future conflict caused by climate change. Instead, a similar control paradigm 
approach to the Labour government persisted with Baroness Neville-Jones, Conservative 
Shadow Security Minister, stating that ‘British strategic energy interests and security of 
supply should be at the heart of... Ministry of Defence (MoD) priorities and decisions;... for 
the MoD in the tasking of our armed forces, especially the Royal Navy, concerning the 
security of the sea lanes and the safety of maritime traffic’.55 Thus, the evidence from 
opposing political parties adds further weight to the RAM argument by displaying that there 
appeared to be no real alternatives when it came to the military’s use of fossil fuels for front 
line transportation and power generation, or at the very least there were no alternatives that 
were considered politically viable in terms of creating the opportunity for an attack on the 
ruling party’s strategy on energy use within the defence establishment. There had been no 
gross oversights in this technological area.
The Future Strategic Context for Defence (2001) and The Strategic Defence 
Review: A New Chapter (2002)
The Defence White Paper The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter emerged in the 
wake of the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Thus, the 
policy emphasis within the document was squarely on the potential responses to what seemed 
a changed global security situation. In some ways it was ironic that the assumption of the 
preceding MOD strategy document The Future Strategic Context fo r Defence (published in 
2001) that ‘Accurately predicting the future course of military events is a tricky business’ had 
been proven correct.56
54 Bernard Jenkin, ‘The Future o f British Defence: The Opposition View’, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 147, No. 4, 
(2002) p. 19.
55 Baroness Neville-Jones, ‘Moving towards a low-carbon economy: the national security rationale’ in Thomas 
Lingard and Ben Caldecott eds., ‘Conservatism in a changing climate: security, prosperity and a low carbon 
future’ (London: Green Alliance, 2010) p. 15.
56 MOD, The Future Strategic Context For Defence (MOD, 2001) and MOD, The Strategic Defence Review: A 
New Chapter, Cm. 5566 (London: TSO, 2002).
With regard to The Future Strategic Context for  Defence, its purpose was to outline 
the government’s analysis of the long-term trends in international security up until 2030. It 
demonstrated that energy security issues continued to have an impact on governmental 
defence thinking with its analysis of the likely world energy situation in 2030. For instance, it 
was considered that oil supplies from the Persian Gulf were likely to increase in importance 
and that alternative energy technologies would not begin to challenge fossil fuel dominance 
in power generation and transportation until the end of the period under examination.57 The 
prospect of likely conflict for offshore oil resources was also delineated.58 Thus, we can see 
here a definite governmental opinion that alternative energy sources would continue to be of 
lesser importance than fossil fuels until at least 2030. Again, given the fact that in 2011 
alternative energy continues to play only a small role in the UK’s overall energy mix this 
opinion appears to have been prescient and displayed a rational appreciation of the energy 
challenges facing Britain. Indeed, Professor Sir Keith O’Nions, the Chief Scientific Adviser 
(CSA) to the MOD commented in 2000 that he had not seen any significant oversights in the 
direction or funding of the MOD’s research and development unit, again indicating that there 
was no up-and-coming fuel technology that the British defence establishment were remiss to 
neglect.59
The publication of The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter (henceforth termed 
the SDR: New Chapter) and its concentration on the threats of terrorism and WMD 
proliferation indicated the importance of time cycles within defence policy and how 
unforeseen events can affect government policy. British defence policy had had a clearly 
articulated expeditionary posture since the SDR was published but this was focussed on 
possible military involvement in Europe, the Mediterranean and the Middle East. The SDR: 
New Chapter gave a clearer focus to this interventionist approach. The capability to intervene 
militarily in areas further afield than to combat these twin threats was now considered an 
important requirement for the armed forces.60 The reason for the White Paper’s publication 
(the response to the apparent ‘strategic effect’ of terrorism) meant that there were no 
references to energy security issues in this document and it dealt specifically with the new
57 The Future Strategic Context For Defence, paragraph 13.
58 Ibid. paragraph 15.
59 House o f Commons Defence Committee, Sixth Report -  The Appointment o f  the New Chief Scientific Adviser:
[ Minutes o f  evidence, 19 April 2000, HC. 138, session 1999-2000 (London: TSO, 2000) paragraph 46. Also, see
[ NAO, Ministry o f Defence Major Projects Report 2001 -  Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, HC.
330, session 2001 -2002 (London: TSO, 2001) and NAO, Ministry o f  Defence Major Projects Report 2002 -  
\ Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, HC. 91, session 2002-2003 (London: TSO, 2002). None o f the 
| major equipment projects at this concerned or contained alternative energy technologies, 
i 60 The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter, pp. 12-13.
challenges that international terrorism was considered to pose to international security. As 
such, any small possibility that a more sustainable approach to energy security could have 
been articulated within defence declaratory policy from 2001 onwards was affected adversely 
by the events of 9/11 and the subsequent involvement of British armed forces personnel in 
the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. Certainly, what were both expected to be relatively 
short campaigns became protracted affairs as comments from Geoff Hoon in March 2002 
seem to indicate, as well as those from Tony Blair in his account of his time as Prime 
Minister.61 Understandably, government defence policy became heavily focussed upon these 
two conflicts as British casualties mounted and the British media began to criticise what often
fOappeared to be inadequate provision of equipment. Indeed, Kevan Jones observed that the 
government and MOD’s main concern during his tenure as Defence Minister (October 2008 
to April 2010) was on providing ballistic protection to soldiers in theatre as well as fulfilling 
Urgent Operational Requirements (UORs) for the provision of vehicles with greater 
protection against Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). Hence, the chance for any 
sustainable security doctrine to be properly investigated and propounded drastically 
diminished once the government’s main focus became the day-to-day fighting of these two 
conflicts. Of course, the possible operational benefits of alternative energy technologies were 
eventually grasped to a certain degree with the publication of the Ministry o f  Defence 
Sustainable Procurement Strategy in 2010.64 However, the more immediate concerns of Iraq 
and Afghanistan took precedence in this period and may go some way to explaining why 
there were no major reappraisals of defence policy following the publication of Delivering 
Security in a Changing World in 2003.
61 Hansard, HC Deb Volume 382, Column 37 (18 March 2002) Secretary of State for Defence, Geoff Hoon: 
‘Five months later, it is clear that that action has been remarkably successful. Afghanistan is now a very 
different country. The Taliban Government, who harboured the al-Qaeda terrorists, are no more. Terrorist 
training camps have been put out o f action. The first steps towards creating a functioning state have been taken.’ 
Tony Blair: ‘That the planning for the aftermath was inadequate is well documented ... The military campaign of  
conquest was a brilliant success. The civilian campaign o f reconstruction wasn’t ... We in the British sector 
could have done better ...’. Tony Blair, A Journey (London: Arrow, 2011) p.441.
62 Michael Smith, ‘Colonel quits as troops are denied armoured land rovers in Iraq’, The Sunday Times (23 
October 2005); Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘Iraq equipment shortages ‘beggared belief -  ex-Basra commander’,
The Guardian (12 January 2010); The Daily Telegraph, ‘Ministers were warned that troops would die in Snatch 
Land Rovers’ (27 July 2010).
63 Interview with Kevan Jones MP, 12 May 2011.
64 MOD, Sustainable Procurement Strategy (MOD, 2010).
Delivering Security in a Changing World (2003) and Delivering Security in a
Changing World: Future Capabilities (2004)
Delivering Security in a Changing World maintained the government’s focus on terrorism as 
a prime security issue, along with the added security concerns of the proliferation of WMDs 
and the instability caused by failed states. The White Paper stated that ‘International terrorism 
and the proliferation of WMD represent the most direct threats to our peace and security’ and 
‘Weak and failing states are an increasing problem for the stability of several regions ...\65 
The importance of expeditionary capabilities also continued to be emphasised, so that the 
United Kingdom had the ability to counter threats before they directly affected the UK: 
‘Priority must be given to meeting a wider range of expeditionary tasks, at greater range from 
the United Kingdom and with ever-increasing strategic, operational and tactical tempo ...\66 
Still, the importance of the armed forces in maintaining the capability to secure 
important overseas energy resources remained a key consideration for defence policy 
planners. Consequently, there was a reassertion of the importance of energy resources similar 
to that seen in the SDR. Firstly, the opening paragraph of chapter two stated ‘More widely the 
UK has a range of global interests including economic well-being based around ... the
fC Icontinuing free flow of natural resources’. Failed or failing states were also outlined as 
acting as having the potential to be havens for ‘terrorist groups and criminal networks 
involved in drugs production or the plundering of natural resources’. Thus, the British 
government viewed instability in certain states as having the potential to disrupt the free flow 
of important natural resources (such as oil and gas) to the United Kingdom. Also, the 
emergence of non-state threats from terrorist groups and criminal gangs was seen, seemingly 
for the first time in British defence policy, as a potential impediment to the economic well­
being of Britain. Consequently, in this analysis, terrorists and criminals did not simply have 
the potential to undermine the social fabric of the UK through drug trafficking and terrorist 
attacks that could engender fear amongst the British population. They also had the ability to 
undermine the flow of vital resources to the UK. Therefore, the shift in emphasis towards the 
combating of the threats of terrorism and WMD proliferation did not see any attendant 
alteration in the importance of energy security issues within defence policy. Non-state actors
65 MOD, Delivering Security in a Changing World: Defence White Paper, Cm. 6041-1 (London: TSO, 2003) 
p.4, p.5.
66 Ibid. p .l l .
67 Delivering Security in a Changing World, p.4.
68 Ibid. p.5.
|97
were now considered to pose the same threat to security of energy supply as ‘rogue states’ 
such as Iraq had in the SDR. The default control paradigm approach to energy security, with 
its associated need to ensure the security of fossil fuel resources through military force, had 
merely assimilated these new threats into the government’s overall energy security approach.
As in the SDR, the importance of the Middle East to national security was again 
emphasised. Demographic pressures and competition for increasingly limited resources were 
outlined as having the potential to affect this region (along with North Africa, Latin America 
and much of Asia).69 The Middle East was given major policy emphasis with the statement 
‘The Middle East presents the most significant security challenges within this broad area.’70 
The significance of the Persian Gulf area to global oil supplies was also outlined with the 
sentence ‘The Gulf will remain a region of considerable strategic importance, with its energy
n t
supplies being crucial to the world economy’. Overall, the importance of the Middle East to 
energy security was mentioned in a similar manner to the SDR demonstrating the control 
paradigm outlook we saw in the analysis of that White Paper. There was still no outline of 
any desire for a preventative approach to energy security through research into alternative 
energy technologies.
Along with the policy attention given to terrorism and WMD proliferation and the 
lack of viable technological alternatives to fossil-fuels, a further reason for the continued 
failure to contemplate sustainable energy options can be ascribed to the emphasis placed 
upon NEC in Delivering Security in a Changing World and the follow-up White Paper 
Delivering Security in a Changing World: Future Capabilities. The concept had initially been 
termed ‘Network Centric Capability’ in The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter. In 
essence, NEC referred to the potential to rapidly transfer information between units on the 
battlefield using newly developed information technology systems. A ‘virtual’ picture of the 
battlefield could then be obtained by commanders and military force subsequently applied
77 ♦with precise effect on any enemy targets. In this way, the doctrine fitted in neatly with the 
likely conduct of operations against the asymmetric threats outlined in Delivering Security in 
a Changing World and the newly coined expression of Effects-Based Operations (EBOs). As
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
72 ‘At the heart o f this transformation is Network Enabled Capability (NEC). NEC is about the coherent 
integration o f sensors, decision-makers and weapon systems along with support capabilities. NEC will enable us 
to operate more effectively in the future strategic environment through the more efficient sharing and 
exploitation of information within the UK Armed Forces and with our coalition partners’. MOD, Delivering 
Security in a Changing World: Future Capabilities, Cm. 6269 (London: TSO, 2004) p.5.
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the 2003 White Paper put it ‘Effects-Based Operations is a new phrase, but it describes an 
approach to the use of force that is well established -  that military force exists to serve 
political or strategic ends’.
Essentially, the increased likelihood of the British armed forces being involved in 
conflicts involving terrorist groups and various non-state actors placed a premium on the 
ability to target and attack likely threats with precision so as not to cause unnecessary civilian 
casualties and to enhance the military effect of the smaller numbers of units that were likely 
to be deployed due to operational constraints.74 In a time of apparent overstretch (with 
lengthy operational deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq), this doctrine was understandably 
appealing for the government and had the added bonus of offering the continued prospect of 
inter-operability with the United States armed forces, who had their own information 
technology doctrine known as Network Centric Warfare (NCW).75 Thus, this remained the 
chief technological and doctrinal development area in defence policy during Labour’s tenure 
in government. Indeed, it was believed that NEC’s contribution to logistics through the 
monitoring of supplies in storage and transit could significantly enhance the planning and
7 zr
overall conduct of overseas operations. The lack of any reference to the possibilities of 
alternative energy technologies in augmenting the capabilities of expeditionary forces can 
therefore be partly attributed to the belief that NEC was almost a panacea to many of the 
problems that the military were likely to face in the course of future and existing operational 
commitments.
The Future o f  the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent (2006)
The Future o f the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent (published in 2006) was primarily 
concerned with justifying the continued existence of the UK’s nuclear-armed submarines and 
the policy reasons for the development of a new breed of ballistic-missile armed nuclear 
submarines beyond 2020. As such, there was an explanation of existing and emerging threats 
that were meant to substantiate the need for an independent British nuclear deterrent. The 
threat analysis here mirrored that of Delivering Security in a Changing World with failing
73Delivering Security in a Changing World, p. 10.
74 MOD, Understanding Network Enabled Capability, (London: Newsdesk, 2009) p.24 and Delivering Security 
in a Changing World, p. 11.
75 For more information see Erik J. Dahl, ‘Network centric warfare and the death o f operational art’, Defence 
Studies, Vol. 2, Iss.l (2002).
76 Understanding Network Enabled Capability, pp.56-57.
states expected to contribute to interstate tension by providing terrorist safe havens: ‘Weak 
and failing states will continue to offer safe havens for international terrorists and potentially 
create wider instability’.77 Within this framework, competition for energy resources was 
highlighted as a possible driver of global tension: ‘Increasing pressure on key resources such
7Ras energy ... may increase interstate tension’. In this instance, energy competition was seen 
as a driver of conflict rather than a reason for (nuclear) intervention. Consequently, there was 
a reiteration of certain themes underlined in Delivering Security in a Changing World, with 
competition over energy resources in unstable parts of the world contributing to instability, 
which could then necessitate a military response.
The Future o f  the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent used the issue of the threat of 
WMD proliferation as an important justification for the need to maintain a minimal nuclear 
deterrent for the foreseeable future: ‘In view of the continued existence of large nuclear 
arsenals, the possibility of further proliferation of nuclear weapons in combination with the 
risk of increased international instability and tension, we believe that a nuclear deterrent is
70likely to remain an important element of our national security in the 2020s and beyond.’
The need to provide a potential nuclear response to state-sponsored nuclear terrorism was 
also stated as continued justification for the renewal of Trident: ‘While our nuclear deterrent 
is not designed to deter non-state actors, it should influence the decision-making of any state 
that might consider transferring nuclear weapons or nuclear technology to terrorists ... Any 
state that we can hold responsible for assisting a nuclear attack on our vital interests can
OA
expect that this would lead to a proportionate response.’ Thus, the twin security themes of 
terrorism and WMD proliferation (along with the perception of an increasingly uncertain 
future that has been evident in defence policy since the SDR) had affected British nuclear
o 1
defence policy in a similar manner to their effect on conventional defence policy.
From this evidence, we can see that the national security concerns precipitated by the 
9/11 and 7/7 terrorist attacks on New York, Washington and London and first outlined in 
depth in the SDR: New Chapter had become the main axis upon which defence policy 
pivoted in this period. A speech concerning national security made in 2006 by the then 
Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown adds further credence to this contention. The 
speech focussed purely on the threat of terrorism and presaged the National Security Strategy
77 MOD, The Future o f  the United Kingdom’s Nuclear Deterrent Cm. 6994 (London: TSO, 2006) p. 18.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid. p. 19.
80 Ibid.
81 Ibid. See p. 18 of the White Paper for the section entitled ‘Insuring Against an Uncertain Future’.
o f 2008 with its call for greater inter-departmental cooperation in security matters. Certainly, 
Gordon Brown stated ‘It is not just the Treasury that is a department of security. So too is 
almost every other department’. Brown also said that ‘coordinating the way we address 
international terrorism will be a central feature of the coming spending review. The reason is 
clear: addressing the reality, causes and roots of international terrorism are some of the 
greatest new challenges of our times’. Energy concerns were alluded to merely in passing, 
with energy mentioned as one of a myriad of national and international security concerns, 
along with transport, immigration and even health and social security.84 Hence, as we have 
seen demonstrated throughout this chapter, there continued to be no articulation of any need 
or desire to move away from the default control paradigm approach to energy security issues 
within defence policy. Terrorism and WMD proliferation were considered more pertinent 
threats to British security and, as we saw from the previous section, NEC had taken up much 
of the doctrinal space within the declaratory policy. Still, there remained no viable front-line 
military (or civilian) vehicles that could utilise alternative energy technologies and, as such, 
the control paradigm approach continued to be a rational appraisal of the energy environment.
Returning to the 2006 Defence White Paper, we can observe that, interestingly, there 
was no mention of any danger of confrontation with Russia over the issue of gas supplies. 
Indeed, more is made of the desire for cooperation with Russia than the potential for conflict 
over any issue, let alone the supply of essential energy resources: ‘The UK ... currently 
supports projects to help dismantle old Russian nuclear submarines, dispose of 34 tonnes of 
plutonium in Russia, destroy Russia’s stocks of chemical weapons (a total of 40,000 tonnes) 
and create new employment for former Soviet weapons scientists.’ Still, the re-emergence of 
a major nuclear threat from one of the existing nuclear weapons states is identified as a 
reason for maintaining the nuclear deterrent: ‘There are risks that, over the next 20 to 50 
years, a major direct nuclear threat to the UK or our NATO Allies might re-emerge.’
Certainly, the Defence Select Committee was moved to publish a report entitled 
Russia: a new confrontation? in 2009, in order to address concerns regarding the potential for 
future conflict with the old Cold War adversary. Russia’s continued use of its ‘energy 
weapon’ was scrutinized and seen as a cause for concern. Diversity of energy supply was 
ultimately seen as the best way to counter any uncertainty over energy imports from Russia,
82 Gordon Brown, ‘Securing the Future’ The RUSI Journal, Vol. 151, No. 2 (2006) p. 12.
83 Ibid.
thus mirroring the government’s own analysis that we saw demonstrated in Chapter Two.86 
Sustainable energy security movements towards greater energy efficiency and alternative 
energy technologies were again overlooked in the analysis. Thus, we see a further 
demonstration of the RAM as an apt explanation for the government’s approach to energy 
security issues throughout this period. If there had been feasible alternatives to reliance on 
gas and oil it is likely that the Defence Committee would have raised some concerns that 
these were not being investigated or developed in an adequate manner.
The continued control paradigm desire to secure oil resources and British influence in 
the Middle East through the use or threat of military force was further demonstrated by other 
Ministerial statements made towards the end of Labour’s time in government. Margaret 
Beckett, the then Foreign Secretary, stated in 2006 that the Middle East region was ‘a classic 
hard security issue’ and that despite the fact that the FCO were looking to address the deep- 
rooted causes of insecurity in the region it attached ‘no less importance to the hard security
87agenda.’ Here we can see an implicit recognition that the application of military force 
would still possibly be needed in this area, despite the apparent purpose of the statement 
being to outline the government’s appreciation of the importance of climate security and the 
associated desire to prevent conflict through a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, 
increasing energy efficiency and the use of greener energy technologies.88
Similarly, Defence Secretary John Hutton indicated in October 2008 that the UK 
government would seek to further the interests of British companies in Iraq as the security 
situation improved: ‘I would like more British companies to get interested in Iraq and the 
opportunities for development there. As the Foreign Secretary said, the potential is enormous 
... As our military mission changes, and it is changing, we have to focus on this new aspect of 
our relationship with Iraq ... The recent agreement that Shell made with the Iraqi Government 
on gas flow is a harbinger, I hope, of similar deals, particularly around the energy sector 
[author’s italics]. We should be and we are resolved to focus on this in the months and years 
ahead. We should try to maximise the opportunities for British companies to do good 
business in Iraq, for the mutual benefit of themselves and, not least important, Iraqi
on
citizens.’ Here again we see can see the impact of energy security considerations on British 
defence policy. A control paradigm approach to energy security in the Persian Gulf was
86 House o f Commons Defence Committee, Tenth Report - Russia a new confrontation?, HC. 276, session 2008- 
2009 (London: TSO, 2009) p.79.
87 Margaret Beckett, ‘The Case for Climate Security’, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 152, No. 3 (2007) p.55.
88 Ibid. p.57.
89 House o f Commons Joint Committee on Defence and Foreign Affairs, Iraq and Afghanistan: Minutes o f  
Evidence 28 October 2008, HC. 1145-1, session 2007-2008 (London: TSO, 2008) answer to question 33.
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followed, not just because of the need to safeguard energy resources from this area, but, as 
explained in the introduction, also to demonstrate British power by extending and 
maintaining the influence of British companies in a strategically vital region. As we shall see 
in the next two sections of this chapter, this approach remained the default position in defence 
policy despite movements towards elements of sustainable security in the latter part of the 
Labour administration.
The National Security Strategy o f  the United Kinsdom: Security in an 
interdevendent world (2008)
Despite the impact that energy security issues had on defence policy through the continued 
use of the control paradigm approach, there were movements towards elements of a 
sustainable security approach to energy security as Labour’s time in government progressed. 
A sustainable security approach, as explained by the ORG, must ‘go beyond military 
intervention and take into account the other social, environmental and economic issues that 
are vital to national stability’.90 For Britain, this required greater cooperation between the 
FCO, DFID, DECC and the MOD in addressing security threats: what came to be known as 
the ‘Comprehensive Approach’.91 This meant, in Des Browne’s words, ‘the inter-weaving of 
different elements -  security, reconstruction, law and order, and governance -  reinforcing
Q'J
each other ‘like the strands of a rope’.’ Essentially, post-conflict reconstruction and 
stabilisation required a full comprehension between different government departments of 
their respective roles and duties and this could ultimately also lead to understanding and 
unified efforts towards conflict prevention. In this regard, there was a gradual move towards 
this sustainable security aspect in declaratory policy from 1997 onwards, with this approach 
eventually being enshrined in the Cabinet Office Paper of 2008 The National Security 
Strategy o f the United Kingdom: Security in an interdependent world (hereafter referred to as 
The National Security Strategy) and its successor of 2009, Security for the Next Generation.93
90 Chris Abbot and Sophie Marsden, ‘From Within and Without: Sustainable Security in the Middle East and 
North Africa’, Oxford Research Group Briefing Paper (ORG, 2009) p.2.
91 See House o f  Commons Defence Committee, Seventh Report -  The Comprehensive Approach: the point o f  
war is not just to win but to make a better peace, HC. 224, session 2009-2010 (London: TSO, 2010) for a 
detailed exposition o f this.
92 Des Browne, ‘Afghanistan: A Comprehensive Approach to Current Challenges’, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 151, 
No. 5 (2006) p. 12.
93 Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy o f  the United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent World, 
Cm. 7291 (London: TSO, 2008) and Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy fo r  the United Kingdom: 
Update 2009. Security fo r  the Next Generation, Cm. 7590 (London: TSO, 2009).
Before the publication of these two documents the SDR had made little mention of 
any desire for greater inter-departmental cooperation, merely emphasising the need for the 
go-ahead from the FCO or DFID before embarking on humanitarian operations: ‘When 
appropriate, and at the request of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office or Department for 
International Development, the Armed Forces contribute to humanitarian and disaster relief 
operations...’.94 However, the SDR: New Chapter described the importance of inter­
departmental cooperation in the prevention of terrorism: ‘The Government has committed 
significant additional resources to improved conflict prevention, management and resolution, 
and has established cross-Departmental budgets to enable a more joined-up approach.’95 This 
followed the creation of the Global Conflict Prevention Pool and the Africa Conflict 
Prevention Pool in 2001, which saw the FCO, DFID and MOD jointly administering a budget 
that was used to enhance conflict prevention measures (such as small arms control, land mine 
clearance and educational efforts) in countries deemed prone to instability.96 Following on 
from this, we can see that Delivering Security in a Changing World made the statement that 
‘...working with Other Government Departments, we need also to consider and address the
07underlying causes o f ... threats.’ Indeed, Delivering Security in a Changing World was 
published simultaneously with the FCO White Paper UK International Priorities: A Strategy 
fo r  the FCO.98
These initiatives can be seen as displaying a degree of understanding as to the nature 
o f modem conflict and the increased likelihood of what General Rupert Smith has termed 
‘war amongst the people’.99 The joint publication of the FCO and MOD White Papers also 
reflected the challenges presented by the continuing deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, 
which would require greater cooperation and coordination between the separate government 
departments to help secure lasting stability in the two countries.100
These movements towards greater cooperation between government departments 
culminated in the publication of a comprehensive national security strategy paper in 2008. 
Entitled The National Security Strategy o f  the United Kingdom: Security in an interdependent
94 SDR, Annex A to Future Military Capabilities Supporting Essay, Paragraph A24.
95 The Strategic Defence Review: A New Chapter, p. 10.
96 See DFID, FCO and MOD, The Global Conflict Prevention Pool: A Joint UK Government Approach to 
Reducing Conflict (FCO, 2003).
97 Delivering Security in a Changing World, p.4.
98 FCO, UK International Priorities: A Strategy fo r the FCO, Cm. 6052 (London: TSO, 2003).
99 Rupert Smith, The Utility o f  Force: The Art o f  War in the Modern World (London: Penguin, 2006) pp. 327- 
331.
100 See Daniel Korski,‘British Civil-Military Integration: The History And Next Steps’, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 
154, No. 6 (2009) for an interesting assessment o f recent British efforts in this area.
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world (hereafter referred to as the NSS) this document was published on behalf of the Cabinet 
office and aimed to create a synthesis of policies from various branches of government, so as 
to reach a consensus on the pressing concerns facing the UK in the future. The paper 
continued to place primacy on the threats of terrorism, proliferation of WMDs, and failed 
states but also gave space to the concerns of energy competition and climate change. 
However, there was no explicit military response provided for the energy security threats. 
Rather, as already enunciated in government energy policy, the remedy was given as the 
encouragement of diversification and competition within international energy markets, as 
well as the development of domestic energy efficient and renewable energy technology.101 
Concerns over competition for resources were reiterated in Security for the Next Generation 
(an update of the NSS) published in 2009.102
Thus, despite the positive call for a more ‘joined-up’ approach to national security 
considerations, there was still no articulation of any aspiration for the armed forces to 
specifically move towards conflict prevention through the adoption of new energy 
technologies and also no deviation from the primacy of the Middle East as a key area of
i minterest for British national security. Certainly, the NSS was criticised by James Gow, who 
believed it displayed weak understanding of the likely future security threats facing the 
United Kingdom and was also lacking in a contemporaneous grasp of the appropriate security 
responses to any challenges posed by these so-called threats.104 Indeed, despite the suggestion 
of apparent advances in inter-departmental cooperation he believed the document bore the 
hallmarks of inter-departmental compromise, rather than a more rational approach to 
perceived threats. This compromise could be identified in the aforementioned failure of the 
NSS to be specific about the nature of the threats and the appropriate responses. Any 
disagreements over either of these issues were obscured by the vagueness of the national 
security concerns outlined.105 These views on the lack of synthesis between separate 
departmental objectives had been echoed a year earlier by Ann FitzGerald and, as such, 
nothing appeared to have changed with the publication of the NSS.106
101 The National Security Strategy o f the United Kingdom: Security in an Interdependent World, pp. 51-52. 
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102National Security Strategy o f  the United Kingdom: Update 2009. Security fo r the Next Generation, p.9.
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104 James Gow, ‘The United Kingdom National Security Strategy: the Need for New Bearings in Security 
Policy’, The Political Quarterly, Vol. 80, No. 1 (2009) p. 128.
105 Ibid. p. 129.
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Consequently, there remained no cogent enunciation of any desire to see a 
transformation in the defence establishment’s attitudes towards energy security 
considerations.107 In this instance, Allison’s Governmental Politics Model (GPM) could be 
ascribed as providing a cogent explanation, with the governmental recognition that a more 
integrated national security approach was required being tempered by the need to ensure 
agreement between the separate government departments affected by its conclusions.
MOD Climate Change Strategy (2008)
As outlined in the introduction to this chapter, the need to reduce carbon emissions within the 
MOD was an issue that began to be addressed more robustly from 2003 onwards. This 
followed the publication of the DTI’s 2003 White Paper on energy Our energy future: 
creating a low carbon economy, which for the first time put environmental concerns at the 
heart of government energy policy, with a call for a 60% reduction in UK C02 emissions by 
2050. With these stated (but not, as yet, legally binding) targets the government had to show 
that it was taking the issue seriously through appropriate departmental action plans to cut 
emissions. Following governmental targets set out in the DEFRA White Paper Securing the 
Future: the UK Government Sustainable Development Strategy the MOD therefore published 
its first sustainable development report in 2005, examining measures to improve 
environmental sustainability and cut greenhouse gas emissions from buildings within the
10Rdefence estate. However, it was not until the MOD Sustainable Development Annual 
Report 2005 was published later in the same year that targets were also set for fuel use and 
travel and planning for climate change.109 Further sustainable development reports were 
published in 2008 and 2009 showing excellent reduction in emissions and improvements in 
sustainability in line with the overall targets that had been set by the government.110 
Similarly, the MOD’s annual Defence Plans also began to outline the importance of
107National Security Strategy o f  the United Kingdom: Update 2009. Security for the Next Generation, p.67 
indicates armed forces could possibly be used if  key energy resources were threatened.
108 MOD, Ministry o f  Defence Sustainable Development Report: October 2003 - October 2004 (MOD, 2005); 
DEFRA, Securing the Future: the UK Government Sustainable Development Strategy, Cm. 6467 (London: 
TSO, 2005) pp. 146-151.
109 MOD, Ministry o f  Defence Sustainable Development: Annual Report 2005 (MOD, 2005) p.6.
110 MOD, Ministry o f  Defence Sustainable Development Report and Action Plan 2008 (MOD, 2008) pp.26-27; 
MOD, Ministry o f  Defence Sustainable Development Report 2009 (MOD, 2009) p.5.
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sustainability and the need to address climate change and prevent conflict through emissions 
reduction targets from 2007 onwards.111
As already seen earlier in this chapter, the SDR had mentioned that energy efficiency 
targets would be pursued as part of ‘wider Government initiatives’. We can see that the
119government had been nothing but consistent in this policy area. But there remained no sole 
focus on the MOD’s contribution to global emissions in any defence policy paper until 2008,
1 1 “3with the publication of the MOD’s Climate Change Strategy.
This document, for the first time, addressed in depth the potential impact of climate 
change on international security and the need for the MOD to adapt its energy requirements 
and procurement strategies in response to this challenge. The MOD’s stated climate vision in 
the document was ‘Effective delivery of defence capability that is robust to climate change 
and does not substantially contribute to its causes.’114 The link with energy security was also 
acknowledged with a section noting that attempts to mitigate climate change through energy 
diversification could also have an associated positive effect on competition for energy 
resources: ‘Commentators have noted the potential benefits that could arise from efforts to 
mitigate climate change. Greater use of a diverse energy mix, particularly renewable energy 
could have beneficial implications for global politics’.115 Finally, there was recognition of the 
importance of cooperation with other government departments in addressing climate change:
‘ [the desired outcome is] to contribute with the FCO, DEFRA, DECC and DFID, to wider 
Government efforts to articulate the risks of climate security.’ We can see from this that the 
term ‘climate security’ had been added to British defence’s lexicon and was seen as an issue 
requiring new methods of thinking within the MOD.
There were further positive developments in the recognition of the issue of climate 
change following the publication of the Climate Change Strategy. The then International 
Defence and Security Minister, Baroness Ann Taylor, outlined the security threat that climate 
change posed to NATO as a whole in a speech made in January 2009: ‘Climate change is not 
a traditional security threat: we cannot deter it, nor can we easily contain its consequences 
and so we must also focus on tackling its causes head on’.116 Indeed, the MOD published no
111 See MOD, Defence Plan 2007 (MOD, 2007); MOD, Defence Plan: Including the Government’s Expenditure 
Plans 2008-2012, Cm. 7385 (London: TSO, 2008); MOD, Defence Plan 2009-2013 (MOD, 2009); Ministry o f  
Defence, Defence Plan 2010-2014 (MOD, 2010).
112 SDR, Chapter 9, Paragraph 192.
113 MOD, Climate Change Strategy (MOD, 2008).
114 Climate Change Strategy, p. 12.
115 Ibid. p.35.
116 Defence Minister Baroness Ann Taylor, Speech delivered at the Joint NATO/Icelandic Government 
conference, Reykjavik (29 January 2009) accessed at
less than three interconnected papers on climate change in April 2010 and these were, in 
effect, real game changers in terms of the Labour government’s appreciation of sustainable 
security notions in relation to energy issues. Defence in a Changing Climate's purpose was to 
set out the context for the possible effect of climate change on national and international 
security and, in turn, pose a number of questions that the papers MOD Climate Change 
Strategy 2010 and the MOD Climate Change Delivery Plan would seek to answer.117 In this 
manner, these papers displayed a real recognition of the potential to enhance the armed forces 
logistical capabilities whilst also mitigating the energy security concerns of the UK. As such, 
this was the first real articulation of the possible advantages of a sustainable security 
approach to energy security as outlined by the ORG. For example, the MOD Climate Change 
Strategy 2010 stated ‘Defence in a Changing Climate recognises the need to reduce the 
amount of fossil fuel consumed by ... vehicles, in order not only to reduce GHG emissions, 
but also to seek the benefits this may bring in terms of a reduction in the cost and logistical 
burden of delivering fuel to point of use and an increase in energy security’.118 There was also 
the comment in the MOD Climate Change Delivery Plan that ‘An Operational Energy 
Roadmap (OER) will be developed that will provide a programme of activity to investigate 
the deployment of alternative and synthetic fuels and clean energy technologies within the 
whole spectrum of Defence platforms and equipments ... [this will] maximise the 
opportunities that arise to reduce energy and fuel use and ultimately how MOD [sic] may 
transition away from hydrocarbon use’.119
In addition to the abovementioned documents, there was also the publication of the 
Sustainable Procurement Strategy in the same month. In a similar manner to the MOD 
Climate Change Strategy it set out the need to develop synthetic and alternative fuels for 
front-line vehicle use, as well as the desire to embed sustainable environmental practices at 
all levels of the procurement process. The paper was keen to point out that these measures 
would not only aid the wider environment but would also offer positive operational benefits 
by cutting ‘the number of supply convoys required in theatre, thereby reducing operational
• « 190vulnerability, improving security, and bringing down through-life costs.’ With these facts
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in mind, it would appear that if the Labour government had been re-elected in the 2010
general election we may have seen a continuation of this articulation of sustainable security
notions and perhaps an adoption of many of the ORG’s sustainable security tenets.
Still, this development in thinking on energy security and climate change was only clearly
stated nearly 12 years after the Labour government was elected to power. Climate change did
not suddenly become a topic of concern from 2008 onwards. This issue was on the
government’s policy radar as early as 1997 and efforts to mitigate climate change were
explicitly articulated in government White Papers from 2003 onwards.121 Why then did the
government address the potential for a sustainable security notion of energy security and its
attendant implications for defence policy as late as 2008 onwards? It cannot be ascribed
solely to the fact that formulation of policy on energy issues had been in the realm of other
government departments as the MOD had produced emissions reductions targets since 2005
and the aforementioned government targets for this outlined in Securing the Future. There
appear to be two main explanations. Firstly, climate change had become an increasingly
salient economic and political issue following the publication of the Stern Review on the
Economics o f Climate Change in 2006 and the subsequent 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) 4th assessment report. The reports had stated respectively that the
evidence for climate change was now ‘overwhelming’ and ‘unequivocal’.122 Certainly,
Andrew Jordan and Irene Lorenzoni saw it as being a very real attempt by Gordon Brown
(who commissioned the Stem Report) to ‘reinforce the message that climate change is a high
economic priority for the UK and the world [and] to establish a political climate for
1significant policy change in the UK ...’ The Climate Change Act of 2008 added additional
credibility to this opinion with its legally-binding targets to cut C02 emissions by 80% by 
2050. In this way, the UK government became the first in the world to enshrine such a long­
term carbon emissions reduction target into law.124 Indeed, the MOD Climate Change
121 The Labour Party, Labour Party Manifesto 1997 (London: Labour Party, 1997). ‘A Labour government will 
strengthen co-operation in the European Union on environmental issues, including climate change and ozone 
depletion. We will lead the fight against global warming, through our target o f a 20 per cent reduction in carbon 
dioxide emissions by the year 2010’, accessed at http://www.labour-party.org.uk/manifestos/1997/1997-labour- 
manifesto.shtml on 3 October 2011. See the Energy White Paper, Our Energy Future: Creating a Low Carbon 
Economy, Cm. 5761 (London: TSO, 2003) for the government’s earliest thoughts on climate change’s effect on 
energy security.
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Strategy 2010 mentioned the fact that, following the Climate Change Act, the MOD (along 
with all departments of government) now had its own Carbon Budget (which took into 
account the emissions from front-line military vehicles) that it had to remain within.125 Thus, 
the government had imposed a strong legal requirement for the MOD and armed forces to 
adopt a sustainable security approach to energy issues, with a greater focus on the 
contribution of the British defence establishment to climate change. These wider 
governmental policies on the mitigation of man-induced climate change demonstrated a real 
commitment from Labour to cut British greenhouse gas emissions. They also had the 
additional benefit of offering the potential for positive cost savings that were likely to result 
from improving energy efficiency standards within the defence estate.
However, the vagaries of party politics in the United Kingdom seem to have had the
most significant role to play in the eventual espousal of sustainable energy security tenets. As
already mentioned in this chapter, David Cameron’s election as leader of the Conservative
Party saw a concerted effort to paint the Conservatives as a more ‘friendly’ party through a
1sharper awareness of environmental issues than in previous years. This attempt at 
‘rebranding’ the Conservatives certainly appears to have borne fruit as early as 2007 with an 
Ipsos Mori poll indicating that the public were broadly in favour of many of the 
environmental and emissions tax proposals suggested at the September party conference.127 
These positive beginnings gained momentum in August 2008 with a further poll showing that 
the Conservative Party were considered to be more appealing to Labour as regards their 
policies on the environment at a time when this issue ranked as the seventh most important 
election issue for voters, ahead of other possible concerns such as Defence, unemployment 
and the continuing Iraq conflict. These results may help to explain the publication of the 
MQD’s Climate Change Strategy of 2008, as Labour attempted to demonstrate that 
environmental issues would be considered in all areas of government policy. Indeed, in the
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months prior to the 2010 General Election, pollution and environmental issues remained of
1OQgreater importance to voters than Defence.
Given these details, a time cycle explanation can be proposed as a key reason for the 
declaratory policy statements within defence proposing sustainable security notions in the 
two years prior to the-election. This was because the Labour government was keen to display 
its green credentials as the general election drew nearer. Although environmental issues were 
unlikely to significantly affect the overall election result they had become of increasing 
salience within the overall election discourse. The prospect of any policy weakness within 
government departmental goals regarding emission reductions was something that could have 
been used by opposition politicians to question Labour’s commitment to environmental 
issues. This questioning would have been particularly embarrassing if political opponents had 
been able to focus on weaknesses within the MOD’s emissions targets, given that it in 2008 it 
was responsible for approximately 70% of all emissions from the Central Government Estate,
1 'lOas well as 1% of UK-wide Carbon Dioxide emissions.
Certainly, the increased importance of environmental issues in the 2010 General
Election was evidenced by such actions as the publication of respective Labourand Liberal
Democrat ‘green’ manifestos, a Conservative ‘quality of life’ manifesto (that included
discussion of their prospective environmental policies), a so-called ‘green election debate’
between the major political parties’ environmental representatives, not to mention significant
air time being devoted to the issue of climate change in the second prime ministerial debate
• 1^1that was broadcast on television in the run up to the election. Indeed, the Green Party 
gained its first Member of Parliament when Caroline Lucas was elected as representative for 
Brighton.
Undoubtedly, .other statements within the declaratory sphere of defence policy did not 
indicate that there* had been any real shift in attitude away-from a control paradigm 
conception of energy security. This lends -further weight to the argument that short-term 
political considerations may have been at work in the apparent promotion of sustainable
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security ideas in defence policy that went further than mere emissions reductions targets. For 
example, in a defence debate in the House of Commons in June 2009, Defence Secretary 
John Hutton put forward the view that the government had five main priorities in combating 
new and emerging threats to UK security. The fifth priority of developing future capabilities 
made no mention of the promotion or research of new fuel and energy, technologies or any 
change in the operational outlook of the armed forces due to potential advances in these 
research areas. Instead, NEC and cyber-security were highlighted as vital focus areas for the
1 39future. In the same session, John Hutton also mentioned the intention to develop a ‘close, 
bilateral defence relationship’ with Iraq as British forces would continue to help protect 
‘Iraq’s oil platforms in the Northern Gulf into the future.133 Thus, ministerial statements 
continued to reflect the control paradigm concerns of control of access to fossil fuels and the 
maintenance of the military advantages of key regional allies. This was despite the 
publication of the Climate Change Strategy in December 2008 and the apparent signification 
that the approach to energy security issues within defence policy may have changed.
In continuance of this theme, we can see that Bob Ainsworth (the last MP to hold the 
position of Defence Secretary during Labour’s time in power) continued to emphasise the 
importance of the armed forces in maintaining British international influence in 2010.134 
Further to this, he also alluded to the fact that the type of equipment that the armed forces 
procured would be, to some degree, dependent on the need to intervene to secure imported
1 • i f
energy supplies. Indeed, the Green Paper Adaptability and Partnership: Issues for the 
Strategic Defence Review (published February 2010) did not see fit to call for any major 
change in the operational outlook of the armed forces towards sustainable security notions 
despite the fact that the three MOD papers addressing climate change were published at the 
same time and the Green Paper was a document apparently seeking to shape the direction of
1 36the new Strategic Defence Review that was due to follow the general election of that year.
132 Hansard, HC Deb Volume 493, Columns 437-438 (4 June 2009): ‘As for our capability, I would mention 
just two emerging priorities. We will need to build and maintain an advantage over our adversaries in 
information and decision making ... We will also need to develop capabilities that protect our information 
networks from increasingly sophisticated attacks. Such non-kinetic attacks on our vital infrastructure frpm 
cyberspace are clearly attractive to our adversaries, and we have got to counter them’.
3 Hansard, HC Deb Volume 493, Column 428 (4 June 2009). John Hutton also outlined plans for the British 
armed forces to aid in the training o f  Iraqi soldiers.
134 House o f Commons Defence Committee, Afghanistan and the Green Paper: Minutes o f  Evidence, HC. 223-1, 
session 2009-2010 (London: TSO, 2010) answer-to question 71: ‘We have to be important players in the 
architecture o f  security that exists in the wider world. If we are not, then we will not have the influence that will 
be necessary to protect our national interests and our national security’.
135 Ibid.
136 MOD, Adaptability and Partnership: Issues fo r  the Strategic Defence Review, Cm. 7794 (London: TSO, 
2010)
Additionally, Kevan Jones commented that during his time as a Defence Minister (from 
October 2008 until May 2010) climate change was recognised as a future conflict driver 
within the MOD but (as already mentioned earlier in this chapter) the main technological 
focus was on developing ballistic protection for soldiers and ensuring that any UORs were 
met in good time. It was certainly his opinion that, in his experience, the development of 
military technology Was increasingly driven by short-term operational considerations and was
137likely to remain so in the future.
This evidence shows us that the apparent implementation of a genuine sustainable 
security outlook within defence declaratory policy that was apparently heralded by the 2008 
Climate Change Strategy and the three MOD climate papers of 2010 was due to wider 
governmental targets that affected defence policy, as well as the desire to demonstrate a 
positive environmental approach to policy shortly before the 2010 General Election. 
Therefore, sustainable security aspects were adopted in the declaratory sphere to a certain 
degree but the underlying defence posture was still that of a control paradigm approach, with 
the attendant desire for Britain to have the continuing ability to influence and foster 
relationships with Middle Eastern countries due to their still important hydrocarbon reserves, 
in addition to the impression of power that these relationships gave the British government on 
the international stage. If Labour had remained in power we may ultimately have seen an 
approach to energy security issues in defence policy that seemed to meld the control and 
sustainable security paradigms of the ORG. This could have entailed a continued 
governmental focus on the ability to intervene and influence regions with large fossil fuel 
reserves, whilst at the same time attempting to reduce emissions and simultaneously improve 
the logistical support capabilities of the armed forces through development of alternative 
powered vehicles. Labour’s so-called ‘Third Way’ may therefore have manifested itself in 
defence policy in this respect.
137 Interview with-Kevan Jones MP, 12 May 2011.
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Conclusion
In sum, we have seen that the Labour government’s conception of the importance of energy 
security certainly had a significant impact on defence declaratory policy from 1997 to 2010. 
This impact was demonstrated in a clear control paradigm approach to energy security within 
defence policy until 2008, with Allison’s RAM providing the most cogent explanatory tool 
for this particular outlook. The RAM could be demonstrated by the fact that throughout the 
examined period there remained no feasible alternatives to fossil-fuels in terms o f  the UK 
economy’s reliance on these (as shown in the previous chapter) and there were no other 
armed forces developing an operational advantage through research and development into 
alternative energy technologies. The overall rational approach of the government to the issue 
of energy security within defence policy was also demonstrated by the fact that the 
government’s defence research programmes were not criticised for their failure to research 
energy alternatives by the Defence Select Committee, either of the main opposition parties or 
any of the Chief Scientific Advisers to the MOD.
Other reasons for the continued use of a control paradigm approach included the 
effect of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the overall security perceptions of the British 
government. The perceived importance of combating terrorism, the prevention of the global 
spread of WMDs and the associated operational deployments to counter these threats in 
Afghanistan and Iraq therefore put paid to any possibility that there would be a reappraisal of 
the default control paradigm model to energy security, at least whilst these long-term 
operations continued. This was because short-term operational equipment needs needed to be 
addressed urgently to deal with the exigencies of these twin conflicts and the focus of the 
government turned to reaching a successful outcome in these operations. In addition, the 
main technological programme of the time was that of NEC, which offered the very real 
potential to deliver military force with greater precision than had been seen before within any 
given battle-space. In contrast to the financial risks of any potential investment into 
alternative energy technologies or preventative approaches to war, this technological and 
doctrinal approach appeared more applicable and relevant to the conflicts that British soldiers 
were engaged in, as well as having the added benefit of being based upon information 
technology systems derived from the civilian sphere.
As regards evidence of a control paradigm approach, this was revealed through 
Defence White papers and Ministerial statements and speeches throughout Labour’s tenure in 
government. The SDR of 1998 saw a real concentration on the importance of the Middle
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East’s oil reserves and the danger that Iraq was deemed to pose to the stability of a region that 
was important due to these reserves of fossil fuels. The significance of fossil fuels to UK 
security, and the possible need to secure their safe passage to Britain through military action, 
was again referenced in The Future Strategic Context for Defence, Delivering Security in a 
Changing World and continued government statements up until 2010.
•Sustainable security notions began to be articulated from 2008 onwards with the 
publication of the NSS, the Climate Change Strategy and further papers that sustained this 
approach, such as Defence in a Changing Climate. However, the sustainable security notions 
outlined within these documents must be viewed within the context of wider governmental 
emissions reduction targets and the desire to not portray any weakness in the increasingly 
important environmental area of policy prior to the 2010 General Election. As such,
Dorman’s time cycle model provides a coherent explanation as to the greater adoption of 
sustainable security principles at the declaratory level of policy from 2008 onwards, with 
Allison’s GPM elucidating the reasons for the positive but ultimately elusive calls for greater 
inter-departmental cooperation that were enshrined in the NSS. Certainly, ministerial 
statements and interviews did not portray any major change in the government’s control 
paradigm approach within the period of these documents’ publication.
With the above evidence in mind, we must now turn our attention to the next ‘circle’ 
in Ian Bellany’s model: the operational sphere of defence policy. The next chapter will 
scrutinize the impact of energy security considerations on the British armed forces 
operational outlook during Labour’s time in government. This will be done by examining the 
doctrine published by and for the separate branches of the armed services during the 
examined period, as well as the statements of senior officers at the time. We can then 
ascertain whether the armed forces saw energy security as being a relevant issue for them 
and, if so, what their subsequent approach to this matter was. We will also analyse the actual 
operations the armed forces were engaged in from 1997 to 2010 and whether these point 
towards a continuity or discontinuity to the approach we have seen demonstrated towards 
energy security at the declaratory level of defence policy. Finally, we will then be able to 
ascertain whether British defence policy remained aligned in terms of its approach to energy 
security issues at the separate constituent levels.
Chapter Four
Operational Policy
As Labour’s time in government progressed, Britain’s armed forces were increasingly called 
upon to perform a variety of tasks by the Blair and Brown administrations. These included 
overseas operations in Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Iraq; the continued 
military presence in Northern Ireland; Royal Navy patrols in the Persian Gulf and off the 
Horn of Africa; as well as helping to deal domestically with what were termed colloquially 
by the armed forces as the ‘four Fs’: flooding, the fuel crisis, the outbreak of foot-and-mouth 
disease and the fire-fighter’s strikes.1 This exacting operational tempo saw allusions to the 
danger of overstretch from senior officers within the armed forces from as early as 2000.2 
Indeed, as the scale of overseas commitments increased with the invasion (and subsequent 
occupation) of Iraq in 2003 and burgeoning deployments in Afghanistan from 2001 onwards, 
serving and retired senior officers of the armed forces were moved to state their opinions on 
the perceived overstretch in a more public and opinionated manner than had been seen 
previously in British politics.3 Certainly, such was the depth of feeling regarding this issue 
amongst many retired servicemen that a new UK-wide defence lobbying group, known as the 
United Kingdom National Defence Association (UKNDA), was founded.in 2007.4 The idea 
of a ‘military covenant’ that the government and wider public had a duty to respect was also
1 General Sir Michael Walker, ‘Delivering Security in a Changing World: Annual Chief o f the Defence Staff 
Lecture’, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 149, No. 1 (2004) p. 36 and Rob Crilly and Michael Evans, ‘Royal Navy in 
firefight with Somali pirates’, The Times (12 November 2008).
2 General Sir Charles Guthrie, ‘Bringing The Armed Forces Into A New Millennium’, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 
145, No. 1 (2000) p. 1: ‘Overstretch is a much used word in the MoD these days, particularly with each o f the 
three Services suffering a degree o f under-manning ... But I am-very hopeful that over the coming weeks and 
months we can continue to draw the numbers down’.
3 Andrew Dorman, ‘Britain and its Armed Forces Today’, The Political Quarterly, Vol. 78, No. 2 (2007) p. 321: 
‘... the armed forces have found themselves stretched to breaking point. In response we have witnessed an 
unprecedented series o f  frank interviews and lectures from both retired and serving officers’. Michael D. 
Hobkirk mentioned in his study o f resource allocation in defence policy that, in contrast to the US, senior 
military officers in the UK were generally discouraged from engaging in overt questioning o f government 
policy. See Michael D. Hobkirk, The Politics o f  Defence Budgeting: A Study o f  Organisation and Resource 
Allocation in the United Kingdom.and the United States (Washington D.C: National Defense University Press, 
1983) pp.58-59. Tony Blair has commented that he was extremely annoyed with General Sir Richard Dannatt’s 
remarks to the media in October 2006 that apparently called for Britain’s involvement in Iraq to be brought to an 
early conclusion. See Tony Blair, A Journey (London: Arrow, 2011) p. 470
4 See the UKNDA Website at http://www.uknda.org/ and for more in-depth opinions on their views on defence 
police see UKNDA, Overcoming the Defence Crisis (UKNDA, 2008).
promoted heavily by Chief of the General Staff (CGS) Sir Richard Dannatt following his 
appointment to the position in 2006 with the Conservative Party setting up a Military 
Covenant Commission to examine the issue.5 All this apparent discontent in the operational 
sphere of defence policy took place within an environment of increasing public opposition to 
the continuing British military deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan.6 Certainly, as we saw 
outlined briefly in the previous chapter, there was a feeling amongst certain sections of the 
public (as well as elected members of the House of Commons) that the former war had been 
embarked upon to ensure Western access to Iraq’s copious oil reserves, with the attendant 
beneficial effect on global crude oil prices that this could potentially bring about.7
Thus, it is within this overall context that we will seek to study the impact of energy 
security considerations on the armed forces between 1997 and 2010. We will examine 
whether the operational circle of defence policy remained in line with the declaratory sphere 
in displaying an appreciation of the importance of energy security issues within wider 
defence policy; this perhaps taking the form (as we saw in the previous chapter) of a control 
paradigm approach, with its-associated stress on the importance of bringing ‘hard power’ 
capabilities to bear to secure access to key fossil fuel reserves or, alternatively, a sustainable 
security approach that highlighted the preventative contribution the military could make in 
providing energy security to the UK through the development of alternative energy 
technologies (thus addressing the conflict drivers of climate change and resource 
competition) and through liaison with other government agencies on this particular issue. 
Still, we may find that ultimately neither of these paradigms is applicable to the operational 
sphere, as energy security considerations failed to have any impact at all. Whatever the
5 See Sarah Sands, ‘Richard Dannatt: A very honest general’, Daily Mail (12 October 2006) and Military 
Covenant Commission, The Leader o f the Opposition’s Military Covenant Commission: Launch Document (The 
Conservative Party, 2008). The idea o f the need for a new ‘civil-military compact’ or ‘Military Covenant’ was 
effectively highlighted in a 2007 report by Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster on behalf o f the think-tank 
Demos. See Timothy Edmunds and Anthony Forster, Out o f  step: the case fo r change in the British armed 
forces (London: Demos, 2007).
6 Julian Glover, Richard Norton-Taylor and Patrick Wintour, ‘Iraq: voters want British troops home by end o f  
the year’, The Guardian (24 October 2006) and ‘Britons believe ‘Afghan war is failing” , Channel 4 News 
Website (24 October 2009) accessed at
http://www.channel4.com/news/articles/uk/britons+believe+aposafghan+war+is+failingapos/3397902.html on 4 
October 2011.
7 Hansard, HC Deb Volume 401, Columns 862-863 (18 March 2003) Ronnie Campbell: ‘I wonder whether we 
would be having this debate if  Iraq had no oil wells ... I know that I am being anti-American, but other Members 
have had a good bash at the French this evening, and I am going to have a go at the Americans. I wonder 
whether it is all for the oil. I am sure that, by this time next year, it will have been proved that oil was the issue. I 
honestly believe that we would not be discussing the motion and the resolutions were there no oil in Iraq’ and 
Richard Younger-Ross: ‘Does the hon. Gentleman accept that the often heard argument that America intends to 
take all the oil for itself is simplistic and wrong? The real argument is that by ensuring a continuous supply from 
a compliant country, America can keep the price o f oil down. That is where its interest lies’.
evidence indicates, Allison’s models of government and Dorman’s time cycle approach will 
be used as explanatory tools to shed light on the reasons for the impact or non-impact of 
energy security issues at this level of defence policy. However, before we embark upon the 
main body of analysis, we must firstly summarise the arguments of the previous chapter so 
that any apparent differences between the operational and declaratory spheres of policy will 
be easily perceptible to the reader as the chapter progresses.
Chapter Three demonstrated that concepts of energy security did have a verifiable 
impact upon the declaratory level of defence policy during Labour’s time in power. This was 
evidenced by the continued mention of the importance of oil from the Middle East, as well as 
the fact that significant security concerns over competition for energy resources were raised 
in Defence White Papers and in statements from key government ministers. The 
governmental attitude displayed towards energy security issues was shown to be consistent 
with a control paradigm approach up until 2008, due to an emphasis on the use of ‘hard 
power’ from the military in order to secure access to these resources. The fact that the UK 
continued to rely upon fossil fuels for the vast majority of its energy needs, that there were no 
viable alternatives to fossil fuels in mass use anywhere in the world and that there was no 
criticism of the lack of innovation in this area from the Defence Select Committee or 
opposition political parties indicated that this governmental stance was a rational attitude to 
the unremitting requirement to ensure British imports of hydrocarbons and maintain a steady 
worldwide oil commodity price. Thus, Graham Allison’s RAM proved to be the best 
explanatory tool for understanding energy security considerations’ impact on UK defence 
policy until 2008. However, from 2008 onwards one could see significant changes in the 
approach from the British government towards this issue. The importance of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions in order to address the conflict driver of climate change was 
highlighted in MOD Defence Plans and the Climate Change Act of 2008 meant that all 
government departments now had a legal requirement to cut their carbon emissions. Indeed, 
the MOD’s first Climate Change Strategy was produced in December 2008, outlining the 
measures that would be needed to mitigate the MOD and the armed forces’ wider 
contribution to climate change. All these measures occurred under the backdrop of an 
increasing saliency of environmental issues within British political discourse and the 
concomitant desire of the Labour government to avoid appearing weak on these issues prior 
to the 2010 General Election. Certainly, even after the publication of the aforementioned 
documents there continued to be statements from Defence Ministers that indicated the 
underlying control paradigm approach to energy security had not been completely
abandoned. Thus, Dorman’s time cycle analysis provided the best explanation as to this 
apparent movement towards sustainable energy security notions within defence policy, with 
short-term political considerations ultimately contributing to the adoption of sustainable 
security tenets prior to the 2010 General Election.
With the above information in mind, this chapter will analyse the operational sphere 
of British defence policy. Operational policy is the area of defence policy ‘which corresponds 
to what the armed services actually think of themselves as being held in readiness to do and
o
being prepared for’. Thus, following this definition, we will need to analyse the doctrine 
produced by and for the armed forces in the examined period, as well as statements made by 
serving officers, so as to see if energy security considerations were an important justification 
for the operational roles and procurement preferences that the military exhibited during 
Labour’s time in government between 1997 and 2010. As outlined in the introduction, the 
prominence of energy security within each circle of defence policy can then be ascertained by 
examining whether it was used as a justification by the armed services for any roles that they 
expected themselves to undertake, as well as the equipment that was to be procured for them. 
This will be done by scrutinising the doctrine produced by the armed forces as well as 
statements of senior officers in each service.9 We must also examine the operations that the 
military were tasked to perform during the examined period so as to determine whether 
energy security considerations informed any of these interventions. This will then aid us in 
identifying whether the dominant control paradigm approach at the declaratory sphere of 
policy translated itself into a concurrent posture at the operational level and whether the two 
circles of defence policy were in line in this particular aspect.
As outlined in Chapter One, we will be using the ORG’s notions of a control 
paradigm and a sustainable security paradigm to measure the impact of energy security issues 
on British defence policy. If there was a control paradigm approach displayed at the 
operational level of policy we would see British armed forces doctrine stating energy security 
and resource issues as relevant factors in overall planning. Similarly, the statements of senior
8 Similarly, defence-industrial policy corresponds to what the defence-contracting industries within.the UK 
economy think o f themselves as being for and holding themselves ready to do. This will be outlined in the next 
chapter. See Ian Bellany, Reviewing Britain’s Defence (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1994) pp. 1-2.
9 It is important to mention at the beginning o f this section that, according to Bellany’s framework for analysis, 
senior officer’s statements whilst still in military service are technically part o f the declaratory sphere o f defence 
policy. However, as Bellany commented himself, we can still acquire their operational beliefs through the use o f  
‘coded’ language (p.45). Thus, we will scrutinize their statements to see any evidence o f divergent views in 
comparison to the declaratory sphere or operational doctrine. Military doctrine can be defined as ‘fundamental 
principles by which military forces guide their actions in support o f objectives. It is authoritative, but requires 
judgement in application’. JDCC, British Defence Doctrine: Second Edition, JWP 0-01 (Shrivenham: JDCC,
2001) p. 1-1.
officers within the armed forces should use energy security factors as justification for the 
structures and procurement programmes they had or were aiming to acquire within the armed 
forces as a whole or for their individual service. For example, the Royal Navy could stress the 
importance of acquiring a particular type of ship due to its perceived effectiveness in 
patrolling and protecting important transit routes for energy resources. Equally, the RAF 
could oppose the abandonment of a particular airbase that could be used to provide air cover 
for British forces operating in a hydrocarbon-rich area and the Army could call for the 
development of a particular type of Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV) due to its enhanced 
capability to operate in desert conditions and thus provide a ‘hard power’ capability in an 
area vital in providing continued energy security for the United Kingdom. Finally, a study of 
the invasion of Iraq in 2003 can shed further light on whether this operation was embarked 
upon primarily to secure access to Iraq’s vast fossil fuel reserves.
In opposition to the control paradigm we may find that there has been a progression 
towards a sustainable security approach to energy considerations.within the military. In 
essence, this is a preventative approach to national security matters that would see the armed 
forces attempting to mitigate the potential for conflict by addressing the ORG’s conflict 
drivers of climate change and global resource competition. If we were to see a movement 
towards this approach we would observe doctrinal and officer statements outlining the 
importance of alleviating these twin drivers of conflict wherever possible (rather than merely 
referencing them and articulating a control paradigm response). This could take the form of 
the enunciation of the desire for greater cooperation in addressing these matters with other 
government departments (such as the FCO, DEFRA or the DECC) or the recommendation of 
the need to develop alternative and green energy technologies for the military so that the 
armed forces were contributing to the assuagement of man-induced .climate change and, in 
the same manner, also making the need to secure overseas energy resources less pressing. 
Certainly, with the armed forces’ focus moving away from the need to secure access to fossil- 
fuel producing regions, another parameter with which to measure a sustainable security 
notion’s effect on British defence policy would be an acknowledgment amongst the military 
that past procurement had been too heavily focussed on hard power capabilities, when a more 
multi-role capability for the armed forces could be developed. Finally, if military 
deployments were made for energy security reasons they would primarily be peace support 
and humanitarian interventions with the aim of returning stability to the area concerned. Of 
course, any flagrant aggression to secure energy resources by another state would be
combated with military action but ideally whilst embracing multilateralism and with the 
backing of international law.
It must be stated that the use of these paradigms does not mean that energy security 
ideas definitely did have an impact on the operational circle of defence policy in the 
examined period. Indeed, we may find that concepts of energy security had no impact on the 
operational level of defence policy between 1997 and 2010. Energy security factors may have 
provided no justification for any of the views espoused in doctrine or by senior officers, thus 
demonstrating a lack of influence on the structural or procurement deliberations of the British 
armed forces. Similarly, the 2003 invasion of Iraq may be proven to have had nothing to do 
with energy security considerations. The aforementioned models of Allison and Dorman will 
aid in providing a sufficient explanation if this does prove to be the case. In addition, it must 
be reiterated that we may see a situation in which the armed forces adopt certain aspects of a 
sustainable security approach (such as calling for the adoption of alternative energy 
technologies) whilst remaining predominantly geared towards securing access to energy 
resources through the use of military force. As outlined in Chapter One, this would be 
classified as a progression towards sustainable security notions as it would ultimately be a  
movement away from the default control paradigm approach towards a possible fossil-fuel 
free military in the future, with the attendant beneficial effect on the conflict drivers of 
climate change and competition for resources through reduced greenhouse gas emissions and 
less need to ensure access to overseas hydrocarbon reserves. Thus, there would be a 
progression along an energy security continuum towards the ideal of a sustainable energy 
security approach.
In light of these parameters, this chapter will demonstrate that, due to different service 
proclivities, concepts-of energy security had a varying impact on the operational level of 
defence policy during Labour’s time in-government and, as such, there were major 
inconsistencies between the declaratory and operational levels of policy in their approach to 
this particular issue. As such Allison’s GPM'proves to be an excellent explanatory tool in 
accounting for the differences in appreciation of energy issues between the different branches 
of the armed forces, who were willing or unwilling to use energy considerations to further 
their individual service goals as the situation demanded. For example, throughout this period 
the Royal Navy saw energy security considerations and their attendant economic implications 
as an important justification for its approach to military operations, as well as its procurement 
preferences. This manifested itself in a control paradigm approach, with a focus on securing 
access to these energy resources through the use of ‘hard power’. In contrast, the Army was
not impacted by energy security considerations to any significant degree, with the structural 
and organisational challenges posed by the operations it embarked upon being the main 
topics of concern as it moved towards what became known as the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ 
to operations.10 There were therefore definite sustainable security tendencies espoused in 
senior officer and doctrinal statements, with an appreciation of the need for greater inter­
agency cooperation in the course of military operations. However, Army officers did not 
show any interest in energy matters, either in terms of the need to secure access to energy 
resources or in a desire to develop alternative energy technologies, so this movement towards 
sustainable security notions cannot be attributed to an appreciation of energy security 
considerations within the Army. As we shall see outlined in the main body of this chapter, the 
Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) (the body that produced strategic and 
operational doctrine for the Army) was responsible for any appreciation of energy issues in 
the period under examination.11
Similarly, the RAF began this time period with a considerable interest in maintaining 
its extant capabilities in the face of possible change and ultimately articulated the importance 
of the ‘Comprehensive Approach’, in line with the Army. Energy considerations were largely 
ignored, perhaps in part due to an understanding of the large consumption of fuel the RAF 
were responsible for on operations. However, the need to secure access to overseas energy 
resources became a pertinent justification for the continued funding of the RAF in the face of 
likely cuts following the 2010 General Election, with Dorman’s time cycle model again 
providing an explanation in the form of a contraction of the armed forces’ time cycles in the 
lead-up to the election. Thus, when the RAF chose to address energy issues, it displayed a 
control paradigm approach.
10 The ‘Comprehensive Approach’ can be defined as an approach to military operations that ‘combines all levers 
o f power -  economic, developmental, diplomatic and military’ to achieve a desired political objective. As such, 
there is the recognition that the ‘armed forces do not work in isolation. We must use effectively all the levers 
available to Government: reconstruction and development, foreign diplomacy and the military. That has become 
known as a “comprehensive approach”. Crucially -  because it is these other efforts that will eventually bring 
lasting peace -  the strategic military effort should be driven by political and economic needs, not the other way 
round’. See Hansard, HC Deb Volume 456, Column 398 (1 February 2007) and Hansard, HC Deb Volume 464, 
Column 709 (16 October 2007) for these statements from Secretary o f State for Defence Des Browne. The 
‘Comprehensive Approach’ was closely connected to the notion o f an Effects-Based Approach to Operations 
(EBAO), which focussed on the precise application o f force to achieve a desired effect rather than an apparently 
more traditional focus on ‘a destruction-centric, attrition-based and linear approach to warfare’. An ‘effects- 
based approach to operations seeks to marry the means with the ends by identifying the outcomes or strategic 
objectives desired in a campaign and then deriving the means required to achieve these outcomes’. Thus, the 
‘breakthrough in thinking comes in recognising that destruction is not an end in itself but a means to an end’.
See Joshua Ho, ‘The Dimensions o f Effects Based Operations’, Defence Studies, Vol. 5, No. 2 (2005) p. 170 and 
for more information on the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ see JDCC, The Comprehensive Approach Joint 
Discussion Note 4/05 (Shrivenham: JDCC 2006).
11 See next page
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The establishment of the DCDC in 1998 also contributed to discrepancies between
approaches to energy security issues at the doctrinal level and in the statements of serving
officers, and in such a way, again emphasises the utility of the GPM and the time cycle model
in understanding developments at this level of defence policy. The DCDC was founded to
produce joint doctrine that could be used by all three services in the course of operations.12
Despite this, each service still had its own specific Warfare Centre responsible for developing
1independent service doctrine. Thus, the DCDC often emphasised the importance of climate 
change and energy resource competition as conflict drivers within the doctrine it produced, in 
contrast to the general lack of emphasis on these from individual service publications. In 
terms of its relationship to declaratory policy, it dismissed the potential of alternative energy 
technologies in the near future in its Strategic Trends papers, contravening the governmental 
line in 2010, which, as we have seen, began to place much more emphasis on this. As we 
shall see, this can be accounted for by the longer term outlook of the DCDC (the particular 
time cycle it operated in), its relative independence and the fact it consisted of mainly 
military personnel who were likely to be inimical to any reduction in combat capability 
hastened'by new energy technologies.
Another point to be taken into consideration was the fact that the DCDC was (and is) 
a constituent part of the MOD and therefore contained civilian as well as military personnel.14 
This was another factor that led to an earlier understanding of the twin conflict drivers of 
climate change and resource competition, as the civilian members of the DCDC had an input 
that was likely to offer a different perspective and appreciation of the security threats facing 
the United Kingdom that drew on information and experiences from other departments of 
government. Thus, the DCDC, in some respects, blurred the distinction between the 
declaratory and operational spheres of policy (certainly in its composition) and this 
accounted, in part, for its earlier appreciation of the twin conflict drivers of climate change
12 The DCDC was originally known as the Joint Doctrine and Concepts Centre (JDCC), which had been created 
following the 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) as the department within the MoD responsible for the 
development o f defence doctrine. The JDCC then became the DCDC in April 2006 with the stated role of  
becoming the ‘Defence authority for doctrinal, conceptual and futures work’. The DCDC is an inter-service, 
Joint establishment headed by a two-star Serviceman with staff drawn from all three Armed Services and the 
Civil Service. For more information see DCDC Website, ‘What We Do’ (2012) accessed at 
http://www.mod.uk/Defencelntemet/MicroSite/DCDC/WhatWeDo on 4 May 2012.
13 The Land Warfare Centre for the Army, the Air Warfare Centre for the RAF and the Maritime Warfare 
Centre for the Royal Navy.
14 ‘My staff numbers just over 50: 32 military, when we reach full strength ... and some 20 civilians ... W e’ve 
also got a number o f civilians: an Assistant Director with a policy background in the MoD who will have 
important links into the policy area and into other government departments across Whitehall: an Assistant 
Director Science and Technology; as well as a number o f specialist civilians ...’. Interview with Major General 
Tony Milton, ‘My Job: Director General Joint Doctrine And Concepts’, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 145, No. 2 
(2000) pp. 15-16.
and resource competition, along with the concomitant military proclivity to address these 
issues through the application or deterrent effect of military force.
Finally, the reasons for Britain’s involvement in the war in Iraq are studied to see 
whether the desire to secure energy resources was the most significant factor in the decision 
to invade Iraq and overthrow Saddam Hussein’s regime. From this analysis we will see that 
access to Iraq’s vast oil reserves was not the main reason for the decision to invade. However, 
it is inconceivable that the access provided to this important strategic resource that would be 
permitted through the ousting of Saddam Hussein was not countenanced in the decision to 
invade.
Operational Policy from 1997 to 2002
As outlined in the introduction to this chapter, we would expect to see energy security factors 
mentioned as justifications for the armed forces doctrinal, structural and procurement choices 
if the operational level of defence policy was effectively in line with declaratory policy. As 
regards the Royal Navy, we will see that its understanding of its likely roles did include the 
need to ensure energy security for the United Kingdom. As such, the Royal Navy remained in 
line with declaratory policy on the issue of energy security. In contrast, between 1997 and 
2002, energy security issues proved to be of little concern to the British Army and the RAF 
and were effectively ignored as an issue for discussion. Why did this prove to be the case? 
Overall, we can see that Allison’s GPM proves to be the best explanatory tool in this 
instance, with each service looking to put forward their own organizational and procurement 
concerns to government, as best they could. As such, energy security issues were of little 
importance to the Army and RAF as they did not provide sufficient justification for their 
desire to retain their hard power capabilities. There was also the assumption that 
expeditionary operations were likely to pose similar challenges wherever they took place 
geographically. In contrast, the Royal Navy was willing to emphasise the importance of 
energy security considerations as these highlighted the efficacy of the Royal Navy in 
upholding British economic interests abroad, and in turn the importance of the Royal Navy 
within defence policy as a whole. There were certainly sustainable security aspects contained 
within Royal Navy statements at this time (such as the Royal Navy’s role in providing 
humanitarian assistance and Peace Support Operations) but these were not directly
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attributable to energy security concerns.15 As such there was a default control paradigm 
approach in line with that espoused at the declaratory level of policy, with no mention of the 
need to address the root causes of conflict drivers through Royal Navy activity.
Looking first at the reasons for the lack of impact of energy security concerns on the 
Army and RAF, we can see that one of the main points of contention for both services during 
the early part of Labour’s time in power was over their likely future role in military 
operations. There appears to have been a fear amongst the British armed forces that Labour’s 
desire for the military to be ‘a force for good in the world’ had the potential to relegate them 
to the status of a ‘gendarmerie’ -  that is, a force ‘designed exclusively for peace support 
operations... crippled through an inability to dominate escalation or to apply military force 
decisively’.16 In the same issue of The RUSI Journal as the above quotation was taken from, 
Brigadier A. C. I. Gadsby was keen to point out the utility of the tank in all the differing types 
of operations that the Army may be tasked with, stating that ‘To use a slogan: Train High 
and you can Fight Low'. The opposite is patently not true’.17 Similarly, in 1999 Air Chief 
Marshal (ACM) Sir John Allison was eager to highlight the need for an offensive war- 
fighting capability that would not be jeopardised by an errant focus on humanitarian and 
peace-keeping operations: ‘Many of today’s operations focus upon humanitarian and peace­
keeping operations, for which air forces have great utility. But we need to continue to expect
• 10the unexpected and ensure our capabilities cover the entire spectrum of conflict’. Writing in 
2001, Air Vice Marshal Glenn Torpy continued this argument. He recognised that peace­
keeping tasks were likely to follow an ‘offensive war fighting posture’ but that ‘The 
importance of possessing an effective offensive capability is obvious in military terms, but it 
also has broader implications. At the end of the day, it is offensive action -  or the threat of it 
-  that ultimately changes the course of events. As a consequence, those nations that 
demonstrate a willingness to participate in offensive operations ... generally have a louder say 
as to how the crisis should be handled, politically and militarily’.19 Finally, Brigadier Mungo 
Melvin drew attention to his belief that tanks would remain an important component of any 
future balanced military force, again signifying the desire to maintain this type of weapon
15 MOD, BR 1806: British Maritime Doctrine -  Second Edition (London: TSO, 1999) pp.67-68.
16 Richard Cobbold, ‘A joint maritime-based expeditionary capability’ The RUSI Journal, Vol. 142, No. 4 
(1997).
17 A. C. I. Gadsby, ‘Do we still need tanks?’, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 142, No. 4 (1997).
18 Air Chief Marshal Sir John Allison, ‘The Royal Air Force In An Era O f Change’, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 
144, No. 1 (1999) p.43.
19 Air Vice-Marshal G. L. Torpy, ‘Future British Operations’, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 146, No. 1 (2001) p.9, 
p .l l .
system as peace support operations became more prevalent: ‘Our armoured forces still 
represent a very powerful and flexible asset in war. They are the principal means of achieving 
overmatch against an adversary in open terrain’.
From this evidence, we can see that the RAF and Army were keen to put forward the 
requirement to retain a high-end war fighting capability in the context of the increasing 
likelihood of humanitarian and stabilisation missions.21 This could be seen as a desire to 
maintain the inherent organizational structure and ethos of the armed services in the face of 
seemingly novel operational challenges. As such, Allison’s GPM can be best used as an 
explanatory tool to account for this particular concern. Both services were interested in 
retaining the essential weapons systems that gave them their individual service identities, as 
has often been the case historically, and this led to a failure to recognise the important role 
that the declaratory level of policy had envisaged the military playing in terms of maintaining 
energy security for the United Kingdom.
Following on from this, the significant overseas military deployments in this period in 
Bosnia, Kosovo and Sierra Leone certainly had little to do with energy security. Therefore, 
there was the apparent assumption that expeditionary operations were likely to pose similar 
challenges no matter where they took place geographically. Certainly, Lord Guthrie (CGS 
from 1994 to 1997 and CDS from 1997 to 2001) commented that the Infantry regiments of 
the British Army were used to operating in many different environments post-1945 with 
operations in such diverse geographical areas as Palestine, Malaya, Borneo, Aden, Korea, the 
Falkland Islands, Kuwait and Iraq. There was therefore an assumption, drawn from previous 
operational experiences, that the Army could adapt to any conditions that it was sent to
99operate in. As such, there was certainly no mention in any statements or publications from 
serving officers from the Army or RAF at the time of the need to ensure that the military had 
, equipment that was geared towards different environments, including the desert conditions 
I that the military would likely be operating in if they were to be used to secure energy 
resources for the UK. Indeed, the 2001 Saif Sareea exercise demonstrated that certain
99 •weapons platforms were ill-suited to desert warfare. In particular, the Challenger 2 tanks
20 Brigadier R. A. M. S. Melvin, ‘Continuity and Change: How British Army Doctrine is Evolving to Match the 
Balanced Force’, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 147, No. 4 (2002) p.43.
21 Major General J. P. Kiszely, ‘Seizing The Advantage, Seizing The Initiative -  New Opportunities, New 
Challenges’ The RUSI Journal, Vol. 145, No. 4 (2000) p.4: ‘An increasing proportion o f these deployments is 
also likely to be for peace support operations rather than warfighting. Each is likely to be unique in character 
and circumstances, and to demand a unique approach to seizing and holding the initiative’.
22 Interview with Lord Guthrie o f Craigiebank, 15 September 2011.
23 Hansard, HC Deb Volume 374, Columns 376-7W (8 November 2001) Defence Minister Adam Ingram: ‘The 
average rate o f helicopter serviceability achieved during the whole period of Exercise Saif Sareea was 54.5 per
deployed in the exercise had reliability problems with the air filters they employed, with 
these having to be replaced every four hours, rather than the fourteen hour replacement rate 
that was originally envisaged.24 Certainly, as late as 2009, CGS Sir Richard Dannatt 
commented that in 2003 ‘the Army had changed little in terms of structure, training focus and 
ethos from that which had stood ready to face the 3rd Shock Army on the plains of
9 <Westphalia during the Cold War’. His explanation for this was the continued importance 
that was placed by the Army on the ability to fight a high-intensity conflict following the end 
of the Cold War, despite the peace support operations they had been deployed on in this
9 fkperiod. As such, we can see again the significance to the Army of maintaining their ‘hard 
power’ capabilities, with apparently little credence attached to which theatres of conflict they 
would be used in.
Another factor in the lack of reference to energy security issues as a justification for 
the Army’s procurement and organizational preferences was the prevalence of Urgent 
Operational Requirements (UORs) to fill any capability gap. The fact that these were used in 
Kosovo showed that the military did not always have the sufficient equipment necessary to 
operate in areas that were identified as key areas of responsibility in the SDR and had no 
relation to energy security concerns.27 Thus, there seemed to be the expectation that any 
operations in desert conditions would lead to the standard equipment being supplemented by 
UORs. Indeed, Lord Guthrie remarked that, whilst there had always been the need for UORs
I cent’. See National Audit Office, Ministry o f  Defence Exercise Saif Sareea II: Report By The Comptroller and 
I Auditor General, HC 1097, Session 2001-2001 (London: TSO, 2002) pp. 15-20.
24 Hansard, HC Deb Volume 374, Columns 25-6W (5 November 2001) Secretary o f State for Defence Geoff 
Hoon: ‘The designed life o f the Challenger 2 Main Battle Tank air filter was 14 hours when used in extreme 
desert conditions’ and Hansard, HC Deb Volume 375, Columns 907-8W (28 November 2001) Defence Minister 
Adam Ingram: ‘During the first phase o f  Exercise Saif Sareea 2, the life o f the Challenger 2 Main Battle Tank 
air filter reported away from theatre was in the region o f four hours’.
25 CGS General Sir Richard Dannatt, Address to the Institute o f  Public Policy Research (19 January 2009) 
accessed at
http://www.mod.uk/Defencelntemet/AboutDefence/People/Speeches/ChiefStaff/20090119AddressToTheInstitu 
teForPublicPolicvResearch.htm on 4 May 2012.
26 Ibid. ‘Our training depots, Staff Colleges, and research and development assets were all focussed on further 
developing the physical, moral and conceptual components that make up what we term as our ’fighting power’, 
and doing so in the context o f  a possible future requirement to fight a large scale battle o f this nature’.
27 Vice Admiral Sir Jeremy Blackham: [obtained through UORs w ere]... temporary field accommodation ... [a] 
tactical navigation target location system for the air reconnaissance combat vehicle; some additional GPS 
handsets; snow and ice clearance equipment; the improved tented camp ... some quarrying equipment... a range 
o f tactical radios ... mobility water vehicles because we envisaged having to have a large number o f people in
[ place for quite a long period o f time and we had to supply that’. House o f Commons Defence Committee,
[ Fourteenth Report — Lessons o f  Kosovo: Minutes o f  Evidence, 12 April 2000, HC. 347-11, session 1999-2000 
I (London: TSO, 2000) answer to question 566.
to cater for unexpected operational requirements, these did certainly become more of a norm 
for the military as Labour’s time in government progressed.28
Given this evidence, we can perceive problems of policy formulation and policy 
implementation in overall British defence policy consistent with Dorman’s time cycle model. 
The declaratory level may have wished to embark upon a more marked expeditionary 
approach but this did not mean that the military would necessarily have the equipment 
necessary to fulfil the roles they had been tasked to perform. Hence, the shorter-term defence 
aspirations outlined by the government did not always match up with the equipment 
capabilities of the armed forces. This also translated into issues regarding the pace of 
overseas deployments for the armed forces. As early as 2000, CDS Sir Charles Guthrie was 
alluding to the possibility of overstretch affecting future military capability.29 This concern 
was again highlighted by his successor, CDS Sir Michael Boyce, in 2002 and First Sea Lord 
(FSL) Admiral Sir Alan West in 2004.30
In contrast to the aforementioned failure to address energy security as an appropriate 
issue for concern, the Royal Navy certainly did see it as a matter of interest in this time 
period. For example, the second edition of the Royal Navy’s British Maritime Doctrine 
outlined the economic importance of overseas oil and gas resources in understanding the 
overall strategic context that the Royal Navy was operating in: ‘Oil is a diminishing resource 
and will continue to be a highly attractive commodity of which states will wish to take full
91advantage’. The Armilla patrol that maintained a constant British naval presence in the 
Persian Gulf was also outlined as ‘an indication of wider British interests’.32 Similarly, in the 
year 2000, Commander Michael Evans highlighted the growing importance of the Caucasus’ 
large hydrocarbon reserves and the concomitant strategic importance of the area for Europe 
as a whole: ‘For reasons of security, coupled with the impact that oil and natural gas will 
have for the future global economy, the Black Sea and the Caucasus will become important
28 Interview with Lord Guthrie o f Craigiebank, 15 September 2011.
29 General Sir Charles Guthrie, ‘Bringing The Armed Forces Into A New Millennium’, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 
145, No. 1 (2000) p. 1.
30 CDS Sir Michael Boyce: ‘[in answer to question whether budgetary, quality o f life and operational pressures 
on military have increased whilst he was CDS] Yes, they have. It has been an extraordinarily busy 18 months. 
We have had a variety o f operations to undertake both outside this country ... as well as domestic pressures ... So 
it has been a very busy time for our people ...’. House o f Commons Defence Committee, Minutes o f  Evidence, 6 
November 2002, HC 1232-ii, session 2001-2002 (London: TSO, 2002) answer to question 135 and FSL Admiral 
Sir Alan West: ‘The pressure we kept putting on the number in our ships I have not been able to maintain ...
Out o f my total trained strength o f 37,370 whatever it is, I have got about 1,290 short, which is still a reasonable 
percentage. It is close enough not to worry too much but it masks some really serious gaps’. House o f Commons 
Defence Committee, Fifth Report -  Defence White Paper 2003: Minutes o f  Evidence, 24 March 2004, HC. 465- 
II, session 2003-2004 (London: TSO, 2004) answer to question 35.
31 BRJ806: British Maritime Doctrine -  Second Edition, p. 16.
32 Ibid. p.49.
concerns. An attendant disregard for the risks which instability poses in this region will have
• • 99 •a negative impact on Europe’. This highlighting of energy security issues can be attributed 
to the fact that the need to secure access to overseas energy resources helped to bolster the 
perceived importance of the Royal Navy to the government. Certainly, despite claims to the 
contrary, the fact that the economic dimension of the maritime environment (with the 
attendant importance of maritime trade) was addressed as the first strategic dimension in the 
second edition of British Maritime Doctrine shows that the Royal Navy was eager to 
underline its importance to Britain in this respect.34 As Ian Bellany commented in Reviewing 
Britain’s Defence, the Navy had been successful in arguing its particular strategic case in the 
1980s and early 1990s due to the fact that it effectively ‘paid its way’ economically.35 Hence, 
we can see a continuation of this Royal Navy approach in the first five years of the Labour 
administration.
In addition, in contrast to the RAF and Army, the Royal Navy appeared to be better 
prepared for the apparent movement towards humanitarian and peace support tasks. For 
example, the second edition of British Maritime Doctrine outlined three main applications of 
maritime power. These were the military, constabulary and benign dimensions of operations, 
with the latter two aspects including peacekeeping, disaster relief and peace-building 
operations within their spheres of activity.36 Indeed, the theoretical demarcation of naval 
operations into these three separate dimensions had previously been outlined in The
97Fundamentals o f  British Maritime Doctrine in 1995, before Labour had come to power.
Thus, it would appear that the Royal Navy was eager to show the full range of capabilities its 
forces could provide in the full spectrum of likely operations. This was likely to be due to the 
consideration that greater involvement in ‘benign’ and ‘constabulary’ operations did not 
necessarily preclude the Royal Navy from procuring the types of ships it desired, as it had 
performed these types of operations with ships designed to possess high-end war-fighting
• 90capabilities in the past. Thus, despite the greater acceptance of the future need to be 
involved in these types of operations there was still no articulation of the need to combat the
33 Commander Michael C. Evans, ‘The Caucasus And The Black Sea: A Strategic Challenge For Europe’, The 
RUSI Journal, Vol. 145, No. 2 (2000) p.60.
34 BR1806: British Maritime Doctrine -  Second Edition, p. 14.
35 Reviewing Britain’s Defence, pp.77-78.
36 BR1806: British Maritime Doctrine -  Second Edition, p.75.
37 MOD, The Fundamentals o f British Maritime Doctrine: BR 1806 (London: HMSO, 1995) p. 105
38 Examples include the evacuation o f British nationals from Yemen in 1986, disaster relief operations in 
response to Hurricane Mitch in Central America in November 1998 and peace support operations during the 
break-up of Yugoslavia in the mid-1990s. See BR1806: British Maritime Doctrine -  Second Edition, p.59, p.66, 
p.69.
drivers of climate change and resources competition through preventative measures such as 
the adoption of more energy-efficient fuels. As such, a control paradigm approach to energy 
security remained the default attitude within the Royal Navy.
Operational Policy from 2003 to 2010
The Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) Strategic Trends Programme
The DCDC (known as the JDCC until 2006) played a vital role in formulating British 
military doctrine following its creation in 1998. As mentioned in the introduction to this 
chapter, it published the myriad of JDPs that aimed to meld the differing concerns of the 
three branches of the armed forces into a coherent body of doctrine for use by military 
commanders when planning for operations. Also, an important point to note was the fact that 
it contained both military and civilian personnel and consequently blurred the lines between 
the declaratory and operational sphere of policy to some degree, despite the fact its stated aim 
was to produce doctrine specifically for the armed forces.
In view of these factors, this section will analyse the DCDC papers that provided the 
overall strategic context for operational defence policy from 2003 onwards. From this 
examination we can then establish the impact that energy security considerations had on the 
long-term operational outlook of the armed forces in this period. We will see that energy 
security considerations in the form of the recognition of the twin drivers of climate change 
and competition for resources became increasingly important topics for the DCDC’s 
Strategic Trends programme between 2003 and 2010. This was due to the fact that this 
programme was given the scope to be able to look from twenty to thirty years ahead at the 
likely future global security challenges and, in the process, liaise with key independent 
strategic thinkers from the civilian sphere (as well as already having input from civil servants
9 0who made up a significant proportion of its complement of staff). Thus, it operated with 
different concerns to those demonstrated at other levels of doctrine produced by the DCDC, 
with a degree of independence to the contemporaneous concerns of the government and 
armed forces at the time and in an ultimately different time cycle for the government of the 
day, being free from the need to address immediate political concerns (at least in comparison
39 DCDC, The DCDC Global Strategic Trends Programme 2007-2036 (Shrivenham: DCDC, 2007) p.i and 
JDCC, Strategic Trends -  Methodology, Key Findings and Shocks (Shrivenham: JDCC, 2003) p. 1-4.
to party politics in the United Kingdom).40 However, the preferred response to these drivers 
was not preventative, instead reflecting the default control paradigm approach in all versions 
of the document. This was consistent with declaratory policy until 2010 when the lack of 
weight attached to preventative responses to the challenges posed by climate change and 
energy resource competition in the 2010 document highlighted the fact that the declaratory 
and operational levels of defence policy were beginning to diverge in their appreciation of 
energy security issues. As outlined in Chapter Three, the contraction of the declaratory 
sphere’s time cycle in the run-up to the 2010 general election appears to have led it to 
highlight the ways in which it would cut carbon emissions in defence. In opposition to this, 
the DCDC’s Strategic Trends -  Out to 2040 and Future Character o f Conflict did not see an 
alternative technology or energy efficient response to these drivers as being feasible in the 
near future and noted that the prevention of future conflicts would remain difficult to measure 
in any meaningful way.41 Thus, Dorman’s time cycle model accounts firstly for the 
appreciation of longer-term strategic trends amongst the DCDC in comparison to the armed 
forces in general as well as the ultimate differences between the 2010 DCDC papers and the 
trinity of Climate Change Strategy papers published at the declaratory level of policy.42
The first key document to mention is Strategic Trends -  Methodology, Key Findings 
and Shocks, published by the then JDCC in 2003 43 This was a pivotal paper in the 
formulation of British operational defence doctrine in many ways, outlining the ‘long-term 
conceptual underpinning’ for doctrine by analysing the potential long-term trends and drivers 
in the international security environment. The overall analysis was consistent with some of 
the theoretical tenets of the ORG’s sustainable security paradigm with climate change and 
energy resource competition seen as important physical conflict drivers in the period from
A0The DCDC Global Strategic Trends Programme 2007-2036, p.x. Of course, military doctrine can never be 
totally understood without a degree o f insight into the political context in which it has been formulated. Andrew 
Dorman has pointed this out, as referenced in Oliver J. Daddow, ‘British Military Doctrine in the 1980s and 
1990s’, Defence Studies, Vol. 3, Issue 3 (2003) p.108.
41 ‘Energy efficient technologies will become available, although a breakthrough in alternative forms o f energy 
that reduces dependency on hydrocarbons is unlikely’ and ‘Technology will provide partial solutions for both 
adapting to, and mitigating the effects of, climate change. However, it is unlikely that, by 2040, technology will 
have produced low emission energy sources capable o f providing the majority o f the energy demanded’. DCDC, 
Global Strategic Trends -  Out to 2040 (Shrivenham: DCDC, 2010) p.13, p.33 and ‘... prevention has practical 
limits. It is also difficult to quantify and investment here does not guarantee that we will be able to avoid 
conflict altogether. Indeed, soft power is at its most convincing when underpinned by hard power. Prevention 
requires timely, informed decision making (optimised through frequent practice) and the ability to act and react 
faster than the situation is unfolding. However, experience indicates that none o f these can be assumed’. DCDC, 
Future Character o f  Conflict (Shrivenham: DCDC, 2010) p.36.
42 MOD, Defence in a Changing Climate (MOD, 2010); MOD, MOD Climate Change Strategy 20JO (MOD, 
2010); MOD, MOD Climate Change Delivery Plan (MOD, 2010).
43JDCC, Strategic Trends -  Methodology, Key Findings and Shocks (Shrivenham: JDCC, 2003).
publication up until 2030. Still, the response to these drivers was not preventative, but rather 
alluded to a control paradigm response whereby access to these resources would need to be 
secured through military action. For example, the document stated that: ‘... it is probable that 
global warming will increase the vulnerability of those fragile states that are not able to 
manage the consequences of the change. This is likely to increase the demands for UK 
military participation in humanitarian assistance and humanitarian disaster relief operations’ 
and ‘Global demand for energy resources will increase significantly due primarily to 
development and industrialisation in South and East Asia. There is little prospect of 
revolutionary breakthroughs in alternative supplies. Renewable and nuclear energy sources 
will remain of moderate importance but fossil fuels, and particularly oil and gas, will remain 
dominant. These will stay the key strategic resources as the main areas of supply and demand 
are separate. Their location and transport routes will therefore be security drivers for the 
developed and developing nations alike’.44
It is appropriate to mention here the Strategic Trends publication date of 2003 and the 
fact that it took 5 years for the JDCC to publish a document of this kind. The reasons for the 
time lag between the JDCC’s creation in 1998 and this publication may be ascribed to the fact 
that work of this kind was classified up until 2003 as the paper states ‘Strategic Trends is 
the first publicly available product of the Strategic Analysis Programme’.45 The document 
was meant to have informed the MOD in a follow-up to the 2001 paper The Future Strategic 
Context for Defence and explained why the doctrinal appreciation of the underlying roots of 
international conflict in Strategic Trends mirrors much of that displayed in that document.46 
This is likely to be due, in large part, to the fact that the JDCC and larger MOD (of which the 
DCDC is a part) were able to liaise whilst in the process of formulating each document as 
both contain civilian and military personnel. Thus, we can see that the declaratory and 
operational levels of policy had remained in line with one another up until this point, at least 
in regard to the articulation of likely causes of global insecurity and the potential response to 
these threats.47
The next document to be published under the strategic trends moniker was The DCDC 
Global Strategic Trends Programme 2007-2036. This examined in greater depth the future 
strategic environment outlined in the previous document and was referenced by Paul Rogers
44 Ibid. p.1-11.
45 Ibid. ‘Conditions of release’ section.
46 Strategic Trends -  Methodology, Key Findings and Shocks, p. 1-1.
47 See Chapter Three.
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as a possible indication of changes in the military approach to security issues. Climate 
change was given even greater prominence in this document, in response to the increased 
attention from 2003 devoted to this issue in the overall governmental literature on energy 
policy as well as the effect of the 2006 Stem Review on the prominence of climate change 
within British political discourse.49 Indeed, climate change was defined as a ‘ring road’ issue 
(along with globalisation and global economic inequality).50 This meant this issue was 
considered to have the capability to engender pervasive problems in the global strategic 
environment for approximately the next thirty years. Similarly, competition for energy 
resources such as oil and gas was given a great deal of attention and was consistently outlined 
as a likely cause of tension in the future: ‘Economic growth and increased consumption will 
result in greater demand and competition for essential resources. Demand for energy is likely 
to grow by more than half again by 2035 and fossil fuels will have to meet more than 80% of 
this increase’.51 As in the declaratory sphere, the Middle East was given a great deal of 
emphasis due to its large fossil fuel reserves, with the proviso that ‘substantial operational 
commitments’ would be probable so as to bolster access to key reserves and contain 
instability. This suggested a control paradigm approach to energy security in the military 
and echoed the words of the ORG’s James Kemp when he stated that the UK has recently 
been greatly influenced by the US policy of maintaining US economic, military and political 
dominance through controlling access to key fossil fuel resources.53
Interestingly, it was expected that alternative sources of energy would need to be 
exploited in the civilian sphere so as to alleviate the increased energy competition of the 
future: ‘At some stage, choices will need to be made in developed societies about the 
economic viability of vehicles and systems that are reliant on oil at a time when other sources 
of energy, such as liquefied coal or generated electricity, may be more cost effective and 
environmentally acceptable. This consideration would have significant implications across 
Defence, although some platforms and systems may have to be specifically designated as 
prioritized oil users until technology allows a practical alternative’.54 We can see from this
48 Paul Rogers, Why We ’re Losing the War on Terror (London: Polity Press, 2008) p. 150.
49 See DTI, Our Energy Future: Creating a Low Carbon Economy, Cm. 5761 (London: TSO, 2003) p.3; DTI, 
The Energy Challenge: Energy Review Report 2006, Cm. 6887 (London: TSO, 2006) p.4 and DTI, Meeting the 
Energy Challenge: a White Paper on Energy, Cm. 7124 (London: TSO, 2007) p.4 and Nicholas Stem, The Stern 
Review Report on the Economics o f Climate Change (HM Treasury, 2006)
50 The DCDC Global Strategic Trends Programme 2007-2036, p.xiii.
51 Ibid. p.7.
52 Ibid. p.53.
53 James Kemp, ‘Sustainable Peace and Security’, Compass Thinkpiece 18 (November 2006) p.2.
54 The DCDC Global Strategic Trends Programme 2007-2036, p.30.
comment that the DCDC did not expect the military to have to gravitate towards greater use 
of alternative energy sources in the near future, particularly in regard to vehicles, mainly 
because of the lack of viable options for that course of action at the time. This was consistent 
with government policy at the time of publication, with a recognition that departmental 
hydrocarbon usage would need to be reduced over time but still no major emphasis placed on 
any desire for the armed forces in the course of operations to adopt preventative responses to 
the drivers of climate change and competition for energy resources.55
The last two Strategic Trends papers from the DCDC were published in 2010. These 
were Global Strategic Trends -  Out to 2040 and Future Character o f Conflict. Both 
documents continued to give prominence to climate change and competition for energy 
resources and outlined the belief that both issues would potentially lead to conflict in hitherto 
unexplored areas: ‘The search for alternative sources of energy ... will become more urgent... 
Consequently the exploration of extreme environments such as: space; the Polar regions; the 
deep ocean; and deep underground regions is likely to increase’. The likelihood that the move 
towards alternative energy sources could lead to conflict in new areas, as well as presaging 
the economic collapse of certain fossil-fuel exporting states, was also outlined in depth in 
Global Strategic Trends -  Out to 2040.56 Also, it was surmised that developments in 
alternative energy technologies would not be enough to replace reliance on fossil fuels.57
Similarly, the Middle East continued to be referenced as being of central importance 
to global energy security and Iran was outlined as an emerging threat to security in the 
region. The 2010 DCDC paper commented that Iran was likely to ‘use economic levers to
CO
achieve geopolitical ends more frequently’ as energy resources became more scarce. In this 
situation, economic pressure was considered unlikely to have the same utility as in previous 
years, indicating that other measures, such as military force, may need to be used in response 
to this particular situation.59 This line of thought was continued in Future Character o f  
Conflict when it stated that by 2029 ‘The UK will be critically dependent upon energy 
imports and securing them will be non-discretionary’.60 Still, a preventative approach to 
conflict was examined in detail in this document and outlined as being an important tool in
55 See MOD, Defence Plan 2007 (MOD, 2007) p. 17: ‘reduce non-operational carbon 
(C 02) emissions by 9% by April 2007’.
56 Global Strategic Trends -  Out to 2040, p.92.
57 Ibid. P. 13 and p.33.
58 Ibid. p. 123.
59 Ibid.
60 Future Character o f  Conflict, p. 6 .
achieving the UK’s strategic ends.61 Nevertheless, deterrence (not a sustainable security 
tenet) was seen as being a key sub-set of conflict prevention, there was no mention of the 
development of alternative energy technologies to alleviate climate change or resource 
competition issues and a balance of power approach was highlighted as a means of 
maintaining energy security goals. Therefore, one can ascertain from this that the DCDC 
perceived that the United Kingdom would adopt a control paradigm approach in order to 
ensure energy security in the future.
In sum, we can see that the recognition of energy security and climate change as key 
issues for the military remained constant in the Strategic Trends documentation from 2003 
onwards, with more detail being outlined to the potential effects of these conflict drivers in 
the latter two DCDC papers. Also, as already mentioned in the introduction to this section, 
the differences between the declaratory and DCDC Strategic Trends line in the relevant 2010 
papers can be attributed to the increasing importance of environmental issues to the Labour 
government as opposed to the DCDC’s alternate opinion that climate change and resource 
competition were important drivers but not issues that could ultimately be prevented through 
the application of new energy technologies, at least in the near future. Thus, Allison’s GPM 
explains the evidence of the previous chapter that saw the declaratory level of policy wishing 
to emphasise its environmental credentials close to an election, whilst the operational level 
wished to put forward an approach that was more akin to the types of (military) responses the 
British armed forces could provide.
Views of the Chiefs of the Defence Staff (CDS) from 2003 to 2010
Regarding the published views of the two Chiefs of the Defence Staff (the professional heads 
of the UK armed forces and senior military advisers to the government) from 2003 onwards, 
we can see that the need to maintain access to key energy resources became an increasingly 
important aspect of discussion for each incumbent CDS. For example, in 2003 General Sir 
Michael Walker commented on the continued importance of the Middle East for the UK due 
to its energy resources.64 However, (the now) Lord Walker has emphasised that energy
61 Ibid. p.27.
62 Ibid. pp.27-28 and p.A-2.
63 2003’s ‘Strategic Trends’ is only 32 pages in length, in comparison to the 106 pages o f the 2007 Strategic 
Trends paper and the 169 pages o f  the 2010 paper.
64 General Sir Michael Walker, ‘Delivering Security in a Changing World: Annual Chief o f the Defence Staff 
Lecture’, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 149, No. 1 (2004) p.37: ‘The Gulf will remain a region o f considerable 
strategic importance, with its energy supplies being crucial to the world economy’.
security considerations were not seen as an important issue for the military during his time as 
CDS. Energy issues were always of some interest due to logistical considerations but the 
armed forces were never put under pressure from the government to address the issue of the 
development of alternative energy technologies or indeed pay any great attention to planning 
operations to secure energy resources. Certainly, the issue of climate change was not an issue 
of concern or a ‘driving force’ and was only addressed as legislation was passed by the 
government.65 This detail aids us in elucidating why ACM Sir Jock Stirrup increasingly 
referred to these issues following his appointment as CDS in 2006. The publication of the 
Stem Report, the attendant creation of the Office of Climate Change (OCC) and the increased 
discussion of climate change in British political discourse in 2006 had made energy issues 
generally more prominent. As such, the government would have been eager for its senior 
military adviser to show an appreciation of this. Therefore, in the annual CDS lecture given 
to the Royal United Service Institute (RUSI) in 2006 he outlined the dangers of competition 
for ever scarcer energy resources and the likely security effects of climate change: ‘Climate 
change and growing competition for scarce resources are together likely to increase the 
incidence of humanitarian crises ... The areas most at risk -  the Middle East, South Asia and 
the Sahara belt -  are already prone to instability; and they are strategically important to the 
UK ... we must also consider our response should prevention fail’.66 Indeed, Jock Stirrup 
became the first officer of seniority within the British military establishment to address the 
issue of climate change in depth in 2007 when he addressed its potential as a conflict driver 
in a speech at Chatham House. He envisaged that energy security concerns could be 
alleviated by the development of a new generation of nuclear power plants in the UK: ‘We 
can promote energy independence while at the same time reducing carbon footprint by 
increasing the reliance on civil nuclear power generation. The non-proliferation treaty 
enshrines the right to the necessary technology. But current experience shows us how 
difficult it can be to separate civil nuclear programmes unequivocally from the pursuit of 
nuclear weapons so one of the responses to climate change may itself add to the security risks
f\1that we face’ In contrast to the approach in the operational doctrine (as we shall see later in
65 Interview with Lord Walker o f  Aldringham, 17 March 2011. The interview was conducted via telephone. He 
was CGS between 2000 and 2003 and CDS between 2003 and 2006.
66 Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, ‘British Defence In A Changing World’, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 152, No. 
1 (2007) p.22.
67 Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup, ‘Climate Change -  Politics Vs Economics’, Speech made at Chatham 
House (25 June 2007) accessed at
http://w ebarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20081120170436/http://www.m od.uk/DefenceIntem et/AboutDefence 
/People/Speeches/ChiefStaff/20070625C1 im ateChangePoliticsVsEconom ics.htm  on 4 May 2012.
this chapter), he also foresaw that the development of renewable sources of energy to combat 
climate change and the reliance on fossil fuels would also be in the military’s interest as it 
had the potential to alleviate supply issues: 4 And let me take one other example, finding 
alternative and renewable sources of power for the armed forces is clearly attractive from an 
environmental standpoint but it could also significantly reduce our reliance on vulnerable
/■o
supply chains’. Thus, there was a recognition from the last incumbent CDS under Labour of 
the potential efficacy of alternative energy technology in combating climate change, as well 
as in improving military logistics. This tallied with the increased emphasis on emissions 
reduction targets within the MOD’s Defence Plans at this time and presaged the Climate 
Change Strategy of 2008. However, this policy line was not to be translated into the 
individual outlooks of each of the three services, again showing the efficacy of Allison’s 
GPM in the analysis of energy security’s impact at this level of defence policy.
The Effect of Energy Security Considerations on the Royal N aw from 2003 to 2010
When analysing the doctrine produced by and for the Royal Navy between 2003 and 2010, as 
well as statements from senior serving officers, we can see that energy security continued to 
act as an important justification for the Royal Navy’s preferred procurement options. As 
already mentioned in this chapter, the use of energy security examples helped the Royal Navy 
demonstrate its importance to the British economy in general and this factor became of even 
more significance as energy and climate change issues began to grow in political importance 
following the 2003 White Paper on energy, the 2006 Stem Review on climate change and the 
creation of the DECC in 2008. For example, the third edition of British Maritime Doctrine 
(published in 2004) continued in the vein of the second edition of the same document by 
again alluding to the importance of the Royal Navy in ensuring Britain’s continued access to 
overseas oil supplies.69 Similarly, 2005’s The importance o f  maritime trade alluded to the 
role the Royal Navy continued to play in "Keeping the sea lanes open’ and in particular
7 noutlined the increasing importance of imported oil and gas to the United Kingdom.
The Future Maritime Operational Concept (FMOC) of 2007 displayed the fact that 
the issue of energy security received greater prominence in Royal Navy doctrine at this time, 
in comparison to the British Army or the Royal Air Force. Competition for energy resources
68Ibid.
69 MOD, BR1806: British Maritime Doctrine -  Third Edition (London: TSO, 2004) p.20.
70 MOD, The importance o f  maritime trade (Royal Navy, 2005).
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was mentioned as a potential key determinant of conflict in the future, with reference to other 
potential conflict drivers: ‘The intensifying competition for resources, particularly energy, 
raw materials and possibly food, as well as rapid population growth and demographic 
imbalances, especially in littoral areas, have the capacity to threaten prosperity, stability and~
71security at global, regional and national levels’. Similarly, there was a recognition of the 
likely impact of climate change on the global security situation: ‘Owing to climate change 
and the increasing exploitation of marginal areas for human settlement and exploitation, the 
impact of natural events will be progressively magnified’.72 Thus, in line with DCDC’s 
strategic trends analysis, there was the increasing recognition that these drivers of conflict 
(climate change and competition for resources) would create new challenges for the military.
However, the responses to these security challenges adhered primarily to control 
paradigm tenets. The FMOC outlined the belief that there would be greater oceanic 
competition as offshore oil and gas reserves are exploited, which could potentially lead to 
greater incidence of conflict: ‘The high seas, the deep ocean and the Polar regions are likely 
to become areas of increased competition as advanced technology, increased accessibility and 
resource pressure encourage more intensive exploitation by states and commercial interests. 
Competition will centre on fishing, deep sea mining and the extraction of oil and gas’. The 
deduction from this was that the UK could potentially be involved in state-on-state warfare 
and therefore required significant power projection capabilities to deter and defeat potential 
enemies: ‘The risk of state-on-state confrontation and conflict from 2015-18 will require UK 
maritime forces to remain benchmarked at the war-fighting level, with a readiness profile and 
balanced force structure that can deter, counter and defeat a substantial enemy at sea, 
probably as part of an alliance or coalition’.74
The need for continued protection of important maritime transit routes was also noted: 
‘Increased perceived and actual threats to Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) will require 
constant vigilance and dedicated protection for essential infrastructure, ports and anchorages 
and shipping cargoes. Most of the world’s trade, by bulk (particularly energy), will continue 
to transit sea areas adjacent to unstable countries and through choke points such as the Suez 
and Panama Canals and the Straits of Hormuz and the Malacca straits’. Hence, as we have 
seen throughout this chapter, the naval level of operational policy remained predisposed to a 
control paradigm approach to securing access to key fossil fuel resources through purely
71 MOD, Future Maritime Operational Concept 2007 (Shrivenham: DCDC, 2007) p. 1-3.
72 Ibid. p. 1-5.
73 Ibid. p. 1-4.
74 Ibid.
military means. This would require ships primed for hard power projection, such as the two 
new Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers that (at the time) were due to enter service in 2014 
and 2016 respectively. Indeed, much emphasis was placed on the importance of what were 
termed ‘Carrier Strike Task Groups’ (CSTGs) and it was considered that these would be 
important for ‘controlling and exploiting every dimension of the Maritime environment and
H C
for projecting power against the Land’. Therefore, it seemed the arguments outlined above 
helped to justify the Carriers continued development despite the then rising costs and 
continued delays in construction. Indeed, their development was considered by Paul Rogers 
to be an important indicator of the fact that the Navy was still wedded to notions of a control 
paradigm.77
Despite the dominant control paradigm approach to energy security concerns, there 
was a movement towards sustainable security tenets in terms of the recognition of the 
importance of what were termed Other Government Departments (OGD), as well as 
international cooperation in maintaining Maritime Security: ‘the principal objectives of 
Maritime Security Operations (MSO), coordinated with OGD and international partners, are 
to deter and prevent illegal acts, contribute to the provision of a safe maritime environment, 
and hence reduce the threat of harm to the UK by dealing with risks at range from the UK’. 
Thus, this was a positive step that was also to be outlined by the two other branches of the
no
armed forces and in this particular instance was related to energy security considerations. Its 
adoption indicated the emerging importance of the idea of the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ to 
military operations, garnered from British operational experiences in a variety of conflicts 
since 1997.79
Still, despite this, the response to climate change outlined in the FMOC did not 
mention any desire to move towards energy efficient or renewable energy solutions within 
the navy. It merely highlighted the possibilities that climate change could create for action in
75 Ibid.p.1-18.
76 ‘MoD halts production o f aircraft carriers in new blow for Royal Navy’, Times Online (December 11 2008) 
accessed at http://www.timeson1ine.co.uk/tol/news/uk/article5324649.ece on 4 October 2011. The Secretary of  
State for Defence John Hutton announced that after a delay o f two years in construction of the aircraft carriers, 
there would be a further two year postponement.
77 See Paul Rogers, ‘Big boats and bigger skimmers: determining Britain’s role in the Long War’, International 
Affairs, Vol. 82, Iss. 4 (2006).
78Future Maritime Operational Concept 2007, page 1-7: ‘Comprehensive and Effects-Based Approaches.
The interdependence of the global economy and community, the emergence o f serious trans-national issues 
(including terrorism, migration, climate change and resource competition)... will continue to make it impossible 
to ignore a wide range o f challenging, interrelated problems and contingencies’.
79 Ibid. page 1-8: '‘Maritime forces require the means to inter-operate with OGDs, Non-Governmental 
Organisations (NGOs) and other civilian agencies, as well as with potential multi-national partners and ad-hoc 
coalitions, including those that have not adopted an EBA
Polar regions: ‘The progressive thawing of the North polar ice-cap, the opening of the North- 
East and North-West Passages and increased accessibility across the top of the world will
on
introduce new sources of risk and opportunity, as the topography of the region alters’. Thus, 
the twin energy security drivers were recognised but military solutions were the primary 
actions proposed, notwithstanding the adoption of the sustainable security principle of 
increased engagement with OGDs and NGOs so as to ‘exploit a harmonised coordination of 
effort’.81
In addition to the impact of energy security issues at the doctrinal level, we can also 
see its impact in statements made by senior officers within this period. For instance, FSL Sir 
Jonathon Band highlighted his appreciation of the continued supply of energy resources to 
the UK in a speech made in 2006, and mentioned the future need to protect the UK’s offshore
OH
wind farms from attack. The speech made no real attempt to call for sustainable security 
solutions to these issues and was, in essence, a justification of the continued need to have a 
Royal Navy with the ability to project power to secure British interests. This slant was 
continued in 2008 with an article published in the ‘Defence Studies’ journal. In ‘Naval Ethos 
-  the Challenge in the New World’, Admiral Band demonstrated an appreciation of the 
conflict drivers of climate change and resource competition. However, he envisaged the main 
focus for the Royal Navy to remain ‘the delivery of maximum violence in the battle-space 
and the killing of the Queen’s enemies’. This control paradigm approach to issues of energy 
security was continued by the new FSL , Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, in a speech made in 
January of 2010, as he put much weight upon the need to have forces that could respond to 
‘strategic shocks’.84 The Middle East’s importance to UK energy interests was a prominent 
feature of the speech and the Falklands conflict was iterated as an example of how the UK
Of
still needed ‘flexible’ capability. Indeed, the whole perspective of the speech could be seen
80 Ibid. p. 1-5.
81 Ibid. p. 1-8.
82 FSL Admiral Sir Jonathon Band, ‘UK Maritime Power in a Global Context’, Edinburgh University -  Annual 
Mountbatten Lecture (23 February 2006) accessed at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/training-and-people/the-m- 
today/whv-do-we-need-the-royal-navy/strategic-plan/uk-maritime-power-in-a-global/ on 4 May 2012.
83 Ibid.
84 Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, ‘Defence in a Changing World: Flexible Thinking, Flexible Forces’, Speech 
made at the Berwin, Leighton and Paisner Defence Breakfast (19 January 2010) accessed at
http://wwvv.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/People/Speeches/ChiefStaff/20100119DefencelnAChanged 
WorldFlexibleThinkingFlexibleForces.htm on 4 October 2011.
85 Ibid.
as putting forward this viewpoint and the continued need for ‘hard power’. In this manner, 
we can see senior officers continuing the approach seen in the FMOC, with a clear 
manifestation of a desire to highlight the continued importance to the navy of weapons 
platforms such as the mooted aircraft carriers by using energy security considerations.
Still, we can see that the issue of climate change was prominent enough within British 
defence discourse to merit detailed analysis from one senior officer in the Royal Navy, 
Commander J.J. Bailey. In his 2009 article ‘Is it Practical for Defence to Reduce its Carbon 
Emissions Without Affecting its Effectiveness?’ he scrutinized whether any major steps 
could be made to address this issue without compromising operational capabilities. Although 
in the short term it was concluded that this could prove to be difficult Bailey believed in 
general that ‘not only is it practical for Defence to pursue lower carbon emissions, it is 
impractical for it not to do so if it wishes to remain effective in the face of the future threat 
environment’. Thus, this document demonstrated that there was a knowledge of the growing 
importance of this issue within the Royal Navy. To be sure, this was to be expected given the 
rising prominence of climate change at the declaratory level of defence policy at the time.
Yet, it offered the prospect of greater attention being given to the subject in future years and a 
possible further movement towards sustainable security notions as carbon emissions targets 
became more ingrained in defence policy.
The Effect of Energy Security Considerations on the British Army from 2003 to 2010
In scrutinizing the effect of energy security considerations on the Army’s approach to 
operations from 2003 onwards, we can perceive a clear difference between the views 
espoused in written doctrine and the statements made by senior Army officers. This can be 
credited to the fact that the operational and strategic doctrine for the Army in this period was 
produced by the DCDC, which (as we have seen) had a greater interest in the long-term
DO
conflict drivers of climate change and energy resource competition than the Army alone. 
Overall, the armed forces experiences in the operations it had been tasked to perform by the 
Labour government in this period saw a noticeable shift (evidenced in doctrine and senior
86 Ibid. ‘But, and I hope it goes without saying, these soft power activities and the benefits that accrue from 
them, depend on the underpinning credibility o f our Armed Forces through success on operations and their 
ability to fight and wage and win wars. This is measured in our ability to deliver ‘hard power” .
87 Commander J J. Bailey, ‘Is it Practical for Defence to Reduce its Carbon Emissions Without 
Affecting its Effectiveness?’, Defence Studies, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 (2009) p.50.
88 Army, Army Doctrine Publication: ‘Land Operations ’ (Army Doctrine Publication, 2005) p.i: ‘It concentrates 
on land tactical operations, since strategic and operational doctrine are described in Joint publications’.
officer’s statements) towards the sustainable security tenets of increased inter-governmental, 
inter-state and NGO cooperation in military operations. This was an adoption of what came
OQ
to be termed the ‘Comprehensive approach’ to military operations. When evaluating the 
Joint Doctrine Publications (JDPs) produced by the DCDC for the Army in this period we 
can observe evidence that an evaluation of energy security was considered as a reason for this 
approach.90 Also, there were allusions to the possible adoption of alternative energy 
technologies in the future and (as outlined in the introduction to this chapter) this did 
represent a degree of movement towards sustainable security notions in relation to energy. 
However, these references were never particularly strident and merely noted the operational 
possibilities of these technologies, rather than the preventative effect they could have on 
climate change. In contrast, senior Army officers were not concerned with energy security 
justifications when putting forward their opinions on the Army’s role in any of the operations 
it would be tasked with. Instead, the need for the Army to adapt its structures and approach to 
warfare in response to its experiences in Kosovo, Iraq and Afghanistan was the key topic of 
concern. Energy security justifications were evidently not seen as providing a good case for 
their particular procurement proclivities.
This difference in focus on energy security issues can be best explained using 
Allison’s GPM, as well as Dorman’s time cycle model. For instance, in addition to inter­
service differences within the British armed forces, there are also ever-present differences 
between the separate units that make up each individual service.91 The DCDC, as an 
apparently independent department of the MOD, consisted of personnel from all three
« « • « « 09branches of the armed services, in addition to civilian personnel. This allowed a degree of 
cross-fertilisation of ideas between the individual members of the separate services, as well as
09between separate programme strands within the DCDC. Thus, the JDPs published in the
89 See introduction to this chapter. Also, see House o f Commons Defence Committee, Seventh Report -  The 
Comprehensive Approach: the point o f  war is not ju st to win but to make a better peace, HC. 224, session 2009- 
2010 (London: TSO, 2010).
90 JDPs were termed Joint Warfare Publications (JWPs) until 2007. For purposes of clarity all JWPs will be 
termed JDPs in this main body o f this thesis. See Ministry o f Defence, Joint Doctrine Development Handbook, 
JDP 0-00 (Shrivenham: DCDC, 2007) p.iii, p.v.
91 See Hew Strachan, The Politics o f  the British Army (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) for a more detailed 
exposition o f this factor. Also, John Keegan has commented that ‘The British Army is tribal to an extreme 
degree’. See John Keegan, A History o f  Warfare (London: Pimlico, 1994) p.xvi.
92 See Interview with Major General Tony Milton, ‘My Job: Director General Joint Doctrine And Concepts’,
The RUSI Journal, Vol. 145, No. 2 (2000).
93 ‘[The DCDC] is a truly Joint establishment, with staff drawn from all three Armed Services and the Civil 
Service. Desk officers come from a wide variety o f specialised backgrounds and combine their skills in project 
teams allocated through a system o f matrix management - a collegiate approach designed to ensure a wide input 
into all projects’. DCDC Website, ‘What We D o’ (2012) accessed at 
http^/www.mod.uk'Defencelntemet/MicroSite/DCDC/WhatWeDo/ on 4 May 2012.
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examined period were likely to be influenced to a greater degree by the DCDC’s Strategic 
Trends documents (with their sustained recognition of the increasing importance of energy 
security issues) than senior Army officers, who were more concerned with the immediate 
operational obstacles that faced them in a situation of potential overstretch. Indeed, the 
Army’s ‘time cycle’ (normally more extended than that at the declaratory level) contracted in 
this period as it looked to acquire the equipment that would allow it to effectively conduct 
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.94 Hence, the difference in appreciation of energy security 
factors can be partly ascribed to the difference in the appreciation of time between those 
formulating the doctrine that would guide the Army and the more immediate operational 
concerns of senior officers.
; If we firstly examine the JDPs applicable to Army operations in this period we can
see that the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ was underpinned in the 2004 JDP Joint Operations. 
This was a document that attempted to ‘explain the principles that underpin the planning and 
conduct of campaigns and operations by the UK’s Armed Forces’ and certainly saw the 
potential for conflict over key energy resources in the future: ‘Competition for scarcer 
resources is likely to continue, and global demand for energy resources, in particular, will 
increase significantly. Although oil and gas reserves will still be plentiful in the near future, 
the location of these reserves, and transport routes from them, will be major security factors 
for developed and developing nations alike’.95 It approached these security considerations
i with a recognition that military force would need to be part of an integrated approach to
I security, embracing cooperation with other departments and in coalitions with a significant 
civilian component, as well as recognizing that security and stabilisation operations were 
likely to be as important as strike operations in the future: ‘Solutions to threats to
94 Francis Elliott and Raymond Whitaker, ‘MoD forced to hire civilian helicopters in Afghanistan’, The 
Independent (15 October 2006) and Thomas Harding, ‘Army denied ‘vital equipment’ in Iraq and Afghanistan 
claims former SAS head’, The Daily Telegraph (4 March 2010). The Iraq Inquiry website provides good 
information on the pressing need o f commanders to address operational difficulties (particularly IEDs) with 
UORs. For example, see Iraq Inquiry Website, ‘Memo from CJO to PS Min (DP) Protected Patrol Vehicles -  7 
July 2006’ (2010) accessed at http://www.iraqinquirv.org.uk/transcripts/oralevidence-bvdate/100727.aspx on 4 
May 2012. Secretary o f State for Defence John Hutton’s written statement to Parliament on 11 December 2008 
provides some indication of the equipment requirements occasioned by the British involvement in Afghanistan 
and Iraq: ‘Among the top priorities o f our operational commanders are the provision o f the right mix of  
protected patrol vehicles and additional helicopter capability. The recent announcement of nearly 700 more 
protected patrol vehicles for Afghanistan, at a cost o f over £700 million, is evidence o f our commitment to meet 
their requirements. In addition to our core budget, the Government will continue to fund the net additional costs 
o f  operations from the Treasury reserve. Since 2001, we have received nearly £10 billion, over and above the 
core defence budget. As well as the protected mobility package, we have agreed with the Treasury, a budget o f  a 
further £635 million in 2009-10 for other urgent operational requirements, with any expenditure over and above 
that being met initially by the reserve, but repaid by the defence budget after two years’. Hansard, HC Deb 
Volume 485, Columns 65-6WS (11 December 2008).
95 JDCC, Joint Operations, JDP-01 (Shrivenham: JDCC) 2004, p. 1-2.
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international security will not be exclusively, or even primarily, military and this underscores 
the need for a properly integrated political/military response at all levels. Success will be 
achieved through a close partnership of both civil and military actors’ and ‘Stabilisation 
operations will seek to prevent further instability and to provide security for local security 
forces, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) or civilian contractors. They will be as 
complex as strike operations, but in a different way, and will require close co-operation with 
organisations outside the normal military domain’.96 Thus, we can see that energy security 
had become a key issue for discussion by 2004 and the responses outlined in the 
‘Comprehensive Approach’ were in accord with sustainable security tenets of civil-military 
cooperation and an emphasis on peace support missions, rather than any control paradigm 
approach that sought to ensure energy security through seizure of key assets: ‘It is clear that 
there are better ways for nations to enrich their own economy than by conquest. Although a 
credible and usable military capability remains a strong political card, diplomatic and 
economic power is a more powerful influence on the international system’.97 Given that Joint 
Operations was published in 2004, we can fathom that these conclusions were made in the 
light of operational experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. The responses outlined were also in 
accord with the experiences on the ground in both conflicts, where purely military solutions 
had proven to be ineffective in imparting long-term stability and security.
There was also the recognition in the Future Land Operational Concept (FLOC) of 
2008 that the existing force structure was not well-calibrated to meet the demands of these 
types of operations and would need to be changed: ‘Stabilisation will be no less demanding in 
its own way, and the Land forces response will see military personnel employed across a
QO
range of tasks which they are not currently structured to deliver’. Again, there was also the 
understanding that land forces would need to cooperate more often with other government 
agencies and NGOs and that there was likely to be more multi-national cooperation between 
different nation’s ground forces in the course of operations. This understanding had led to the 
creation of what was termed the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ (CA) to security operations.99 
The adoption of new energy technologies was mentioned but these were not seen as a key
96 Ibid. p. 1-8.
97 Ibid. p.1-10.
98 MOD, Future Land Operational Concept 2008 (Shrivenham: DCDC, 2008) pt. 2-19.
99 The ‘Comprehensive Approach’ is outlined thus: ‘Success in complex stabilisation tasks, 
humanitarian and disaster relief operations will require a coordinated interagency approach, coordinating the 3 
critical instruments o f power: diplomatic, economic and military. Integrated approaches are further complicated 
in multinational responses, where national agendas and caveats, and the absence o f a single overall authority for 
a CA impacts on delivering the campaign plan and objectives’ Ibid. pt. 1-4.
way to combat climate change, rather being perceived as an effective way to increase 
operational effectiveness: ‘Power and energy will be an area of significant technological 
advance with reduced volume and weight. Major advances in battery systems, hybrid fuels 
and energy management techniques, will increase mobility, aid concealment and power 
tomorrow’s battlefield’.100 Still, this represented an appreciation of their potential usefulness 
and therefore under the parameters set in Chapter One did represent a movement towards a 
sustainable security approach within the Army’s doctrinal assumptions.
Finally, Support Network aimed to outline the methods that would be used to sustain 
and supply British forces engaged on expeditionary operations. As well as recognising the 
operational benefits that alternative fuels would possibly bestow in future it also referred to 
the fact that their successful adoption could also have important environmental effects: ‘The 
SN will need to minimise wastage, recycle/reuse where appropriate, including reducing water 
and energy consumption. Reduction in the use of fossil fuels would not simply be beneficial 
to the environment, but has the potential to reduce the overheads on the SN. With the 
implications of climate change, it will be necessary to adopt sustainable development 
technologies to reduce the dependence on fossil fuels; this will include pursuing more 
effective power and water generation facilities to reduce reliance on transportation, which is 
both vulnerable to enemy interference and burdensome on the SN’.101 Thus, we can infer 
from this a recognition of the role that renewable and energy-efficient solutions could play 
within the support networks of the British military. Interestingly, the perceived advantages of 
these technologies was not applied to fuels for vehicles. Instead it was considered that uses of 
these ‘sustainable development technologies’ within the military infrastructure would lead to 
less requirement for supply of fossil fuels from military vehicles. At this time the military had 
no vehicles that ran on non-hydrocarbon based fuels. This factor, along with the potentially 
lengthy development period required to create military capable vehicles that could run on 
alternative or renewable energy sources, as well as the lack of alternatively fuelled vehicles to 
buy ‘off-the-shelf, went some way to explaining this particular approach to the use of 
energy within the military.
Hence, the JDP doctrine applicable to the Army articulated a response more attuned to 
the ORG’s idea of a sustainable security paradigm, which contrasted starkly with that of the 
Royal Navy. As already alluded to previously, this contrast can be attributed to the formative 
experiences of deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan, the relatively high number of casualties
100 Ibid. pt.1-2.
101 MOD, Support Network (Shrivenham: DCDC, 2010) p.7-2.
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the Army took in comparison to other conflicts it was involved in in the past 50 years, and the 
recognition that the military could not act alone whilst attempting to achieve successful 
outcomes in the stabilisation operations that followed conventional military action.102 As 
regards the impact of energy security considerations, we can see that the potential of 
alternative energy technologies for future military operations was certainly recognised, 
although their value in reducing carbon emissions and the concomitant impact on climate 
change was not something that was considered. Thus, this estimation remained much in line 
with that displayed in the DCDC’s Strategic Trends papers.
When examining the views of senior officers we can see a continuation of the 
importance placed upon stabilisation operations seen in the JDPs, but no attendant 
appreciation of energy security concerns or the potential advantages afforded by new and 
emerging energy technologies. As summarised in the introduction to this section, the 
asymmetric operations that the Army was engaged in and the appropriate structural and 
procurement responses to these were the paramount concern of Army officers at this time.
For example, beginning in 2003, we can see that it was the perception of E.J.R. Chamberlain 
! that the Army was the only service that had accepted the view that the conflicts that the UK 
were likely to be involved in would tend to involve asymmetric warfare rather than 
conventional operations: ‘The majority of scenarios driving MoD policy appear to be based 
on View 1, and current guidance is that Defence Planning Scenarios should focus on 
asymmetric threats exceptionally, as they are seen as 'abnormalities — a severe distortion 
rather than the norm. This is at variance with the Army's opinion that asymmetry is 
fundamental to most forms of warfighting [sic]’. This approach was echoed by the then CDS 
General Sir Michael Walker in 2004 when he proposed the concept of strategic first aid. That 
is, that the military’s job upon deployment would be to pave the way for other agencies to 
rebuild broken states and societies. As he commented: ‘Treatment, convalescence and cure 
lie in the gift of politicians, civil servants, humanitarians, policemen, judges, businessmen 
and the people themselves. Our operations are increasingly conducted in a multifunctional 
environment and cannot be disconnected from it. Integration with the efforts of others is
102 There were 179 fatalities o f British armed forces personnel in the conflict in Iraq. Also, as o f 4 May 2012, 
there had been 412 British fatalities in Afghanistan since operations began there in November 2001. Figures 
taken from MOD Website, ‘Operations in Iraq: British Fatalities’ (2012) accessed at
http://www.mod.uk/Defencelnternet/FactSheets/OperationsFactsheets/OperationsInIraqBritishFatalities.htm and 
MOD Website, ‘Operations in Afghanistan: British Fatalities’ (6 May 2012) accessed at
http://www.mod.uk/Defencelntemet/FactSheets/OperationsFactsheets/OperationsInAfghanistanBritishFatalities. 
htm on 6 May 2012.
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key.’103 Indeed, upon interviewing Lord Walker it was made clear that energy security 
considerations were not of any real importance to the Army (or indeed any of the armed 
services) whilst he was the incumbent CDS. Any initiatives in this area were expected to 
originate from the declaratory level of policy.104 Thus, the observed discrepancy between the 
views of senior officers and the views espoused in the JDPs on energy security considerations 
can be credited to the fact that the DCDC was allowed a degree of independent thinking on 
security matters, as it indeed claimed.105
Continuing the theme of senior officer’s desire to embrace a ‘Comprehensive 
Approach’ to security, the Army’s experiences in Iraq were defined by the then CGS General 
Sir Richard Dannatt in 2009 as a key factor in the movement towards a change in structure 
and approach for the Army. He also stated that the difficulties of changing from high- 
intensity operations to aiding the administration of Iraq often proved too much for the 
military: ‘Once the Major Combat Operation element was complete, the campaign entered 
what we now term a Stabilisation Operation, which involved several different lines of 
operation -  ensuring security, rebuilding essential services, promoting good governance and 
facilitating economic regeneration. These have been, at times, a difficult six years.’ But this 
was finally balanced with the fact that in Richard Dannatt’s eyes ‘we learned many important 
lessons during this period which themselves have been a catalyst for the transformation of our 
Army.’106 Here again we can see the formative experience operations in Iraq proved to be for 
the Army in this period.
Finally, Richard Dannatt’s successor as CGS, General Sir David Richards, continued 
these arguments in his speech to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in 
January of 2010. In this lecture he called for the restructuring of the armed forces to better 
fight the types of operations they have been involved in Afghanistan and Iraq and to actually 
prevent conflict in a sustainable security manner: ‘If one equips more for this type of conflict 
while significantly reducing investment in higher-end war-fighting capability, suddenly one 
can buy an impressive amount of ‘kit ‘ and ‘We must put much more emphasis on preventing 
conflict, on ensuring fragile states do not become the Afghanistan of tomorrow. Whilst this is
103 General Sir Michael Walker, ‘Transforming UK Armed Forces’, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 150, No. 1 (2005) 
p.47.
104 Interview with Lord Walker o f Aldringham, 17 March 2011.
105 The DCDC Global Strategic Trends Programme 2007-2036, p.x: ‘One o f the strengths o f the Strategic 
Trends assessment is its independence from routine staffing and wider Defence decision-making’.
106 CGS General Sir Richard Dannatt, Address to the Institute fo r Public Policy Research (19 January 2009) 
accessed at
http://w w w.m od.uk/D efencelntem et/A boutD efence/People/Speeches/C hiefStaff/20090119AddressToThelnstitu 
teForPublicPolicyResearch.htm  on 4 October 2011.
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much more than a military role, we must be structured and resourced to play what can often 
be a key part’.107 As we have already seen, this approach contrasted with that of the Royal 
Navy that continued to emphasise the need to invest in ‘higher-end war-fighting capability’ 
(i.e. Destroyers, Aircraft Carriers and Jet Fighters) and did not articulate a broadening of its 
personnel’s roles to address the demand of stabilisation operations in the same way that the 
Army did. Again, there was no mention of the importance of energy security as a key driver 
of future conflict in this speech. Consequently, we can see demonstrated again the fact that 
the Army command was adopting sustainable security tenets of inter-agency cooperation and 
the need to focus less on traditional weapons systems as a result of its operational experiences 
post-2003 rather than due to any acceptance of the overall importance of climate change or 
resource competition as conflict drivers. Thus, we can see that the GPM acts as an effectual 
analytical tool in this instance, as it helps to account for the differences within and between 
services based on their individual experiences of conflict, as well as their specific concerns. 
Similarly, the time cycle model helps to explain the fact that the more pressing concerns of 
changing the Army’s structure following experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan made any 
glimpse into the future utility of energy unlikely despite the declaratory level’s increased 
attention to these issues post-2006.
The Effect of Energy Security Considerations on the RAF from 2003 to 2010
The effect of energy security considerations on the RAF in this period contained certain 
similarities to the approaches seen within the Army and Royal Navy. As such, there began to 
be references to energy security issues in statements from senior officers, who, in accordance 
with the time cycle model, were intent on justifying continued investment in the RAF’s 
procurement programmes by indicating their service’s ability to address such issues as energy 
security prior to the general election of 2010. For example, in 2010 ACM Sir Stephen Dalton 
used the spectre of conflict over energy resources in the Falkland Islands as a means of 
emphasising the continued importance of maintaining British air superiority, thereby
1 ORemploying a similar tactic to senior Royal Navy officers. However, there was no indication
107 CGS General Sir David Richards, Future Conflict and Its Prevention: People and the Information Age, 
Speech made to the International Institute fo r  Strategic Studies (IISS) (18 January 2010) accessed at 
http://www.iiss.org/recent-lvev-addresses/general-sir-david-richards-address/ on 4 October 2011.
1 CAS Air Chief Marshal Sir Stephen Dalton, Dominant Air Power in the Information Page (15 February 
2010) accessed at
http://w w w .m od.uk/D efencelnternet/AboutDefence/People/Speeches/ChiefStaff/20100215Dom inantAirPowerln 
TheInformationAge.htm on 4 May 2012.
of any desire to move towards alternative or energy-efficient technologies, with energy 
security issues being addressed through the application of military force. Conversely, the 
RAF’s doctrinal publications ignored energy issues and emphasised instead the importance of 
the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ in a manner akin to the Army, representing an RAF 
movement towards sustainable security ideas of inter-agency cooperation in military 
operations. However, the DCDC’s Future Air and Space Operational Concept (FA&SOC) of 
2009 gave appropriate reference to energy issues due to the influence of conclusions drawn 
from the Strategic Trends programme.109 This was in contrast to documentation produced 
solely by the RAF, which did not discuss the possible applicability of alternative energy 
technology to air operations or the need to cut carbon emissions in order to effectively 
address its contribution to climate change. This can be ascribed to the fact that the RAF was 
the branch of the armed services with the highest operational fuel use within this time period 
and this was not to be easily reduced given the nature of the weapons platforms it had 
procured in this period.110 Thus, as seen previously with the Army, there was a difference in 
the appreciation of energy issues between DCDC doctrine and that produced solely by the 
RAF, as DCDC papers post-2007 used Strategic Trends papers as key contextual documents 
to inform their conclusions.111
If we firstly examine doctrinal publications from this period we can observe that the 
key documents Royal Air Force Strategy and the fourth edition of AP3000: British Air and 
Space Power Doctrine were focussed on the RAF’s role within the ‘Comprehensive 
Approach’: ‘... attention must be given to ... the Comprehensive Approach that coherently 
applies diplomatic, economic and military power in pursuit of policy objectives’ and 
‘Doctrinally, a new edition of AP3000 is required to set air and space power in the context of 
the Comprehensive Approach, which aims to achieve militarily and politically favourable 
outcomes in complex crises by using all available levers of power in a cross-governmental
119 •and inter-agency approach’. Fuel was only mentioned in the latter document in relation to
109 MOD, Future Air and Space Operational Concept 2009 (Shrivenham: DCDC, 2009) p. Vi.
110 The RAF was responsible for 59% o f the MOD’s overall fuel use in the 2007/2008 financial year. See Paul 
Stein, Alternative Energy for the Military, RUSI Defence Systems, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2009, p.82. Each Eurofighter 
Typhoon is believed (the information is classified) to have an internal fuel capacity o f 5,700 litres, with the 
capability to add external fuel tanks, see Scramble Website, ‘Eurofighter Typhoon’ (2012) accessed at 
http://wiki.scramble.nl/index.php/Eurofighter Typhoon on 6 May 2012.
111 MOD, Future Air and Space Operational Concept (RAF, 2006). There was no mention o f  energy issues in 
this document.
112 MOD, Royal Air Force Strategy (RAF Publication, 2006) p.3 and MOD, AP3000: British Air and Space 
Power Doctrine — Fourth Edition (RAF, 2009).
its operational use and the limitations it could impose on certain weapons systems.113 
Similarly, the first edition of the Future Air and Space Operational Concept (FASOC), 
produced by the RAF’s Air Warfare Centre, did not draw any attention to the possible 
development of alternative energy technologies or the future security challenges posed by the 
ORG’s twin drivers of conflict.114
In contrast, the DCDC-produced FA&SOC of 2009 emphasised resource competition 
and climate change as likely causes of conflict in the future, in line with the DCDC’s 
Strategic Context papers. The FA&SOC embraced this approach and, as with the 
accompanying maritime and land documents, accepted the fact that these would be key 
determinants of conflict in the years to come.115 The FA&SOC also reiterated the points 
made in the FLOC regarding the increasing importance of stabilisation operations and the 
likelihood that these would be more important in future than conventional war-fighting: ‘The 
increasing proportion of military operations devoted to security and stabilisation with their 
high demand for mobility and lift suggest a re-balancing of the air forces’ structure’.116 Thus, 
the DCDC recognised the need for the RAF to restructure its forces in future to better 
approach the challenges of stabilisation and peace support operations.
The impact of climate change on operations was also scrutinized. FA&SOC 
recognised that environmental issues had increased in prominence in general political 
discourse and, as a result, the armed forces may be required to take steps to reduce emissions: 
‘Technologies to reduce the carbon footprint by producing cleaner or alternative energy 
solutions are available and the rising cost of fuel and increasing opposition to noise pollution 
may increase pressure for reduced performance military aircraft and increased use of
117simulation’. However, there was no detailed description of how the RAF’s operational 
policies should change to address this particular issue. This is consistent with the approach of 
the 2007 and 2010 Strategic Trends publications that did not see alternative energy 
technologies as being viable in the coming thirty years.
There began to be a recognition of the issue of energy security within the statements 
of senior RAF officers from 2009 onwards. This appears to have been due to the increased 
political saliency of energy issues at the time (as we saw at the declaratory sphere), influence 
from the FA&SOC and the fact that the RAF wanted to find suitable reasons for continued
113 ‘... the amount of fuel carried for changing or maintaining orbit and attitude ... is limited’. Ibid. pp.20-21.
114 MOD, Future Air and Space Operational Concept (RAF, 2006).
115 Future A ir and Space Operational Concept 2009, p. 1 -1.
116 Ibid. p.2-4.
investment in the RAF in the face of likely cuts following the forthcoming general 
election.118 For example, in 2007, the then Chief of the Air Staff (CAS) Sir Glenn Torpy 
spoke about the important role the RAF had played in recent operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan and called for continued investment in advanced weapons platforms such as the 
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), the Eurofighter Typhoon and the Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft. 
He also outlined the continued importance of air power in modem operations. There was no 
mention of energy issues or climate change’s possible future effect on procurement issues or 
operational procedures.119 However, in 2009 ACM Sir Christopher Moran outlined in two 
separate speeches the fact that energy security threats were seen as being key issues that air 
power could address in future conflict.120 Similarly, in 2010 CAS Sir Stephen Dalton made a 
speech emphasising the continued importance of control of the air and the need to invest in 
technologies that maintained the UK’s military advantage over potential adversaries in an 
‘age of austerity’. Alternative and renewable solutions to the issues of energy security or 
climate change were not outlined, although the threat of conflict in the Falkland Islands due 
to competition over the energy resources believed to be there was mooted.122 In another 
speech, the same question of energy resource competition having the potential to precipitate 
inter-state conflict was used as one of the arguments for the retention of the Tornado and 
Typhoon.123
Thus, we can see a control paradigm approach that focused on the ‘comparative 
advantage’ given by air power over the UK’s rivals and the need to invest in new 
technologies that enhanced combat capability. This did not envisage development of new fuel
1,8 See Malcolm Chalmers ‘Capability Cost Trends: Implications for the Defence Review’, RUSI Working 
Paper No.5 (January 2010) and Richard Norton-Taylor, ‘UK military chiefs clash over future defence strategy’, 
The Guardian (19 February 2010).
119 ACM Sir Glenn Torpy, Speech to Guild o f  Air pilots and Navigators (2007) accessed at 
http://www.raf.mod.uk/role/gapanspeechtranscriptcas.cfrn on 4 May 2012.
120 ACM Sir Christopher Moran, Speech to the Royal Aeronautical Society (2009) and ACM Sir Christopher 
Moran, ‘Progress, Vision and Co-Operation: AF Building in the 21st Century -  The Royal Air Force 
Perspective’, Speech to People’s Republic o f  China and People’s Liberation Army Air Force (November 2009) 
accessed at http://www.raf.mod.uk/history/airpowerspeechesarchived.cfrn on 4 May 2012.
12,ACM Sir Stephen Dalton, ‘Dominant Air Power in the Information Age: The Comparative Advantage o f Air 
and Space Power in Future Conflict’, Speech to International Institute fo r Strategic Studies (IISS) (15 February
2010) accessed at
http://www.mod.uk/DefenceInternet/AboutDefence/People/Speeches/ChiefStaff/20100215DominantAirPowerIn 
ThelnformationAge.htm on 4 October 2011.
122 Ibid.
123 ‘Many o f  the likely future sources o f  conflict, such as competition for water and energy resources and 
the impact o f  climate change, can only be resolved at the level o f sovereign states ... This demonstrates the 
essential uncertainty o f the strategic environment... the key is adaptability... Importantly, in this debate, the 
Typhoon is providing huge and adaptable capability today’. ACM Sir Stephen Dalton, ‘Combat Operations: The 
Asymmetric Advantage o f Air Power’, RUSI Lord Trenchard Memorial Lecture 2009 (2009) accessed at 
http://www.raf.mod.uk/history/airpowerspeechesarchived.cfm on 4 May 2012.
technologies or the articulation of sustainable security ideas such as greater inter­
departmental or multi-national cooperation. Of course, given the new Strategic Defence 
Review that was to be conducted after the May 2010 general election, this approach, along 
with those of the other services, was understandable as each service jostled for its ‘fair share’ 
of funding.124
The War in Iraq: A War for Energy Security?
Perhaps the most important area to scrutinize when analysing energy security’s effect on 
British defence policy since 1997 is where British forces were actually deployed and what 
actions they took once they were deployed in a particular country. The crux of this analysis 
will focus on the war in Iraq as there is no clear evidence pointing towards any energy 
security considerations in any other major deployments of British forces under the 
Labour government (although of course there are still some commentators that propose that 
Kosovo and Afghanistan were invaded due to their potential importance as oil and gas transit 
routes). It would also be true to say that the choice to join the United States in toppling 
Saddam Hussein’s regime was the most contentious of Tony Blair’s tenure as Prime Minister 
and is likely to be the decision that he will be most remembered for in his political career. 
However, as has already been mentioned in preceding chapters, the Iraq war generated a lot 
of controversy with many claiming it had been fought for the express purpose of securing key 
Middle Eastern fossil fuel reserves and maintaining Western dominance in the region. Indeed, 
many of the mass demonstrations against the war focussed on this hypothesis as their reason 
for their opposition. In order to determine whether energy security was a factor for the United 
Kingdom in the invasion and subsequent security operation we will first inspect the evidence 
in favour of this interpretation and then go on to scrutinize the counter-evidence that points 
towards other motives for the conflict. Of course, the US decision to go to war must be 
outlined as there are data that point towards a US decision to go to war for reasons of energy 
security. We can then frame British actions and decisions within this context and ascertain on 
the balance of evidence, and in light of the preceding analysis in this thesis, which argument 
appears most prescient.
124 BBC News Online, ‘UK military chiefs fight for future of their services’ (19 January 2010) accessed at 
http://news.bbc.co.nk/1/hi/uk/8466970.stm on 7 May 2012.
125 William Engdahl sees the Kosovo conflict as being motivated by energy considerations as much as Iraq. See 
William Engdahl, A Century o f  War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order (London; New  
York: Pluto, 2004).
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Iraq: a War for Oil?
From a US political perspective, the initial decision to take action against Iraq is believed to 
have been made soon after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Rather than this indicating a speedy 
response to the threat of Islamic terrorism and the danger of WMD proliferation it is 
considered by William Engdahl that this course of action was being pushed before the attacks 
on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon by Vice-President Dick Cheney and other members 
of the Bush Cabinet.126 Indeed, Cheney, Bush and a myriad of other members of the Bush 
cabinet have been shown to have had close relationships with US energy companies prior to 
entering government. These companies potentially stood to benefit massively from any 
invasion of Iraq and subsequent exploitation of its large oil reserves.127 This fact, combined 
with statements in papers written by Bush government members emphasising the desire to 
maintain access to key fossil fuel reserves and in this manner maintain American global 
economic, military and political pre-eminence, seems to point towards a war conducted in 
favour of these interests whilst the political capital of the September 11 attacks could be 
exploited. There are also considered to be key historical precedents of US intervention in 
the Middle East to secure continued access to the oil reserves there. For example, James A. 
Paul comments that in 1959, Saddam Hussein was aided by the CIA in an unsuccessful plot
to assassinate the incumbent Prime Minister as it was feared he may alter the favourable
I 12Qterms that US oil companies operated under in Iraq at the time. The Iran-Iraq war and the
1990-91 Gulf War are also cited in this explanation. Indeed, as Paul Rogers has noted, the
creation of CENTCOM in 1979 and a continuous US military presence in the area since this
date demonstrated the US wish to control access to the large fossil fuel reserves in the area.130
Finally, notable realist academics John Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt stated in a
well-known journal article prior to the war entitled ‘An Unnecessary War’ that, given proper
analysis of his previous actions, there was no reason to believe that Saddam Hussein was an
126 Ibid. Chapter 13 gives an excellent overview o f Engdahl’s claims regarding this.
127 See Greg Palast, ‘Secret US Plans for Iraq’s oil’ Newsnight Website (17 March 2005) accessed at 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/prograrnrnes/newsnight/4354269.strn on 7 May 2012 and Greg Muttit, ‘Crude 
designs: the rip-off o f Iraq’s oil wealth’, Platform paper (2005).
128 Thomas Donnelly (Principal Author), ‘Rebuilding America’s Defenses: Strategy, Forces and Resources for a 
New Century’ (Washington D.C: The Project for the New American Century, 2000) and Edward L. Morse 
(Chair), Amy Myers Jaffe (Project Director) ‘Strategic Energy Policy: Challenges for the 21st Century’, Report 
o f  an Independent Task Force CoSponsored [sic] by the James A. Baker III Institute fo r  Public Policy o f  Rice 
University and the Council on Foreign Relations (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 2001).
129 James A. Paul, ‘Oil Companies in Iraq: A Century o f Rivalry and War’, Global Policy Forum (November 
2003).
130 See Paul Rogers, Global Security and the War on Terror: Elite Power and the Illusion o f  Control (Abingdon; 
New York: Routledge, 2008) p.68.
irrational actor who would allow any WMDs to fall into terrorist hands. Hence, the reasons 
given for the war were unconvincing: ‘If the United States is, or soon will be, at war with 
Iraq, Americans should understand that a compelling strategic rationale is absent. This war 
would be one the Bush administration chose to fight but did not have to fight’.131
Given that there are clear arguments that indicate the US went to war to secure Iraq’s
energy reserves and maintain US dominance within the Middle East, what is the evidence
that the UK may have followed the same control paradigm approach in its decision to go to
war alongside the United States? There is evidence that the UK government was prepared for
the eventuality of another war with Iraq from 1998 and that the factor of energy resources
was a key dynamic in this posture. As already seen in the declaratory chapter, Iraq was
mentioned as a regional threat in the SDR in relation to ‘economic interests’: ‘There are still
dangerous regimes in the world ... As Iraq has amply demonstrated, such regimes threaten not
only their neighbours but vital economic interests and even international stability’.132 This
followed a focus on the key importance of the fossil fuel reserves in the Persian Gulf: ‘We
have particularly important national interests and close friendships in the Gulf. Oil supplies
from the Gulf are crucial to the world economy. Confrontation in the Middle East carries the
risk of escalation and since the region borders on NATO, in some circumstances crises could
1
involve the Alliance directly’. Indeed, there has been a continual British Naval presence in 
the Persian Gulf since 1979, mirroring the US posture in the region.134
As with the Bush administration, there is also the fact that Tony Blair’s government 
had many links with members and former members of BP and Shell, and these companies’
• • t q cwere likely to gain access to Iraq’s large exploitable reserves if an invasion was successful. 
Indeed, Platform, an environmental action group, has stated that Production Sharing 
Agreements (PSAs) were the proposed oil agreements planned for Iraq following the
131 John Mearsheimer and Stephen Walt, ‘An Unnecessary War’, Foreign Policy, No. 134 (2003) p.4 and p.l 1.
132 SDR, Chapter 1, Paragraph 8.
133 SDR, Chapter 2, Paragraph 40.
134 Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope, ‘Defence in a Changing World: Flexible Thinking, Flexible Forces’, Speech 
made at the Berwin, Leighton and Paisner Defence Breakfast (19 January 2010). Admiral Stanhope commented 
in this speech that there had been a continuous British naval presence in the Persian Gulf since 1979.
135 James A. Paul, ‘Oil Companies in Iraq: A Century o f Rivalry and War’, Global Policy Forum (November 
2003). ‘In recent years, a number o f personal ties stand out, especially the close friendship between Prime 
Minister Tony Blair and BP CEO John Browne (Lord Browne o f Maddingley). The Blair-Browne relationship 
was so close that wags in the press called the company "Blair Petroleum," though it would have been more 
accurate to say that Blair was the BP Prime Minister. At least a dozen BP executives held government posts or 
sat on official advisory committees, including Browne's immediate predecessor David Simon (Lord Simon o f  
Highbury). Simon had stepped down as BP CEO to serve as Blair's unelected Minister for European Trade and 
Competitiveness from May 1997 to July 1999. Later on, Tony Blair's longtime friend and personal assistant Anji 
Hunter, director o f government relations and known as "the gatekeeper" in Downing Street, joined BP as head 
of public relations in the summer o f 2002, just as the war was actively brewing’.
invasion. These were considered by some to be punitive economic contracts that would
benefit the western oil companies more than the Iraqi treasury, depriving the Iraqi people of 
1their rightful revenue. They were not in use anywhere in the Middle East at the time.
Ultimately, these contracts were not signed but British oil companies were the prime
investors in the Iraqi oilfields since oil contracts were first put out to tender in 2009.137
The Saif Sareea exercise of 2001 also pointed towards a British desire to maintain a
control paradigm posture in the Middle East. This major military exercise saw 22,500
military personnel, 6,500 vehicles and trailers, 21 Navy vessels and just under a 100 aircraft
deployed to the sultanate of Oman in order to ‘demonstrate key elements of the United
1Kingdom's ability to conduct expeditionary warfare ‘. Another stated aim of the expedition 
was that it had ‘clear foreign-policy objectives to demonstrate the United Kingdom's 
commitment to the Gulf region and to advance British interests in Oman’.139 There was also 
the comment that ‘While there were no explicit objectives to promote defence or civil 
exports, the potential for enhancing the United Kingdom's position as a trading partner with 
Oman was recognised’. We can gamer from this operation that, whilst being important in 
ascertaining whether Britain still had the capability to conduct medium-scale expeditionary 
operations alone, there were other objectives such as the demonstration of British military 
capabilities to the wider Middle East and the chance to foster ties with a nation in a key 
strategic location as regards energy security. Oman itself has dwindling oil reserves but it 
border’s Saudi Arabia and the exclave of Musandam fulfils the same role as Gibraltar does in 
the Mediterranean, guarding the Straits of Hormuz that lead into the Persian Gulf. Thus, 
British influence here would possibly help maintain access to the Persian Gulf and perhaps 
have an effect on Saudi Arabia’s policy decisions, both key areas in terms of world oil and 
gas supply.
Finally, if we analyse the course of operations during the Iraq war itself, we can see 
that one of the key missions given to British soldiers on the opening day was the capture of 
Iraqi oil installations on the Al-Faw Peninsula.140 This Royal Marine operation was
136 See Greg Muttit, ‘Crude designs: the rip-off o f Iraq’s oil wealth’, PLATFORM paper (2005).
137 Carola Hoyos, ‘US oil companies lose out in Iraq oil auction’, The Financial Times (13 December 2009).
138 NAO, Ministry o f  Defence Exercise SaifSareea II: Report By The Comptroller and Auditor General, HC. 
1097, Session 2001-2001 (London: TSO, 2002) p .l.
139 Ibid. p.5
140 See MOD, Operations in Iraq: Lessons fo r  the Future (MOD , 2003) p.l 1.
Major Tim Collins, commander o f the 1st Royal Irish during the invasion, mentions in his autobiography that he 
and his soldiers were briefed heavily on the importance o f taking the oil installations in Southern Iraq intact 
before the operation to invade began. See Tim Collins, Rules o f  Engagement: A Life in Conflict (London: 
Headline, 2005) pp.141-142.
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conducted with the support of a US Marine brigade, perhaps indicating the US’s desire to 
ensure that these important resources and their accompanying infrastructure were not 
irreparably damaged. Also, following the official withdrawal of British soldiers from Iraq in 
April 2009, Royal Navy personnel continued to aid the Iraq authorities in protecting offshore 
oil installations.141 Thus, the British maintained a presence in relation to Iraqi oil installations 
despite the official withdrawal of ground forces.
Alternative Reasons for the Iraq War
Despite the above evidence there are still reasons to doubt the war for oil hypothesis. Hakan 
Tunc has argued that the war was fought for separate military, psychological and ideological 
reasons by the US administration. Firstly, the military rationale was the desire to prevent the 
proliferation of WMDs in the Middle East and their potential leakage to terrorist groups. 
Secondly, the psychological rationale involved a demonstration of US power following the 
9/11 attacks that would have more effect on Middle Eastern perceptions than the bombing of 
a militarily weak Afghanistan. Thirdly, the ideological rationale was the view that the 
implantation of democracy in Iraq could be the first step in a wider democratic and cultural 
transformation of the Middle East.142 Hakan Tunc surmised that the key factors in the 
decision to go to war with Iraq were the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the fact they engendered a 
change in opinion in President Bush. Prior to these events, as we have seen already, he had 
been pressed to go to war with Iraq by members of his cabinet but had resisted these calls as 
he was content on a realist policy of containment. Iraq did not seem to pose a threat to 
regional security as long as the appropriate sanctions remained in place. With the mass 
casualties and panic caused by the attacks on the World Trade Centre and Pentagon the 
assessment of Iraq changed and focussed on Saddam Hussein’s supposed irrationality and 
continued actions that indicated previous gross miscalculations of power politics.143 In light 
of this, the Bush administration believed the risk of leaving such a potentially dangerous 
regime in power could not be taken and decided to remove it by force. Indeed, the decision 
was believed to have been made in the months immediately following 9/11.144
141 See Claire Taylor, ‘Iraq: Multinational Forces after the Drawdown’, House o f  Commons Library Standard 
Note SN/IA/5247 (12 May 2010) p.3.
142 Hakan Tunc, ‘What was it all about after all? The causes o f the Iraq war’, Contemporary Security Policy, 
Vol. 26, Iss. 2 (2005) p.335.
143 Ibid. p.342-343.
144 Ibid.
Similar arguments were used by Robert Mabro, the Director of the Oxford Institute 
for Energy Studies (OIES): ‘The main reasons [for the war] are that Iraq is militarily an easier 
target than North Korea or Iran; its regime, and for good cause, is universally detested; has 
invaded neighbours, then flouted UN resolutions. And as the 9/11 hijackers were Arab it 
makes more sense to attack an Arab country than North Korea or Iran’.145 Similarly, Robert 
Mabro also explained that the war could be seen as a demonstration by America that it 
remained the only true global superpower. This sent an important geo-political message to 
rising and re-emerging powers such as Russia and China.146
As regards the UK decision to enter the conflict, there seems to be a consensus 
amongst his political allies that this was a result of a misplaced belief by Tony Blair that 
Saddam Hussein had developed WMDs and that, in any case, his regime needed to be 
removed due to its ‘evil’ nature. Blair’s Chief-of-Staff at the time recently told the Chilcot 
Inquiry that Blair was certain that Saddam Hussein had significant stockpiles of WMDs due 
to his obstructive nature in his dealings with the UN weapons inspectors leading up to the 
invasion of Iraq.147 Similarly, Tony Blair’s political agent in his Sedgefield constituency,
John Burton, maintained that Blair saw the war as primarily a fight between good and evil.148 
The vast majority of the members of the British Cabinet at the time also continue to maintain 
that the war was fought on the assumption that Iraq had WMDs and that the UN approach 
had failed to work.149
Other commentator’s believed that involvement in Iraq was due to Britain’s desire to 
maintain the supposed ‘special relationship’ with the US and to stand side by side with the 
US following the 9/11 attacks. John Kampfner, in his excellent book ‘Blair’s Wars’, certainly 
postulates this as the main reason following extensive research and interviews with many 
civil servants in prominent positions at the time.150 Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and Rhiannon 
Vickers argue that, in a similar way to the Bush administration, the 9/11 attacks 
fundamentally changed the British government’s view of the nature of the threat from 
international terrorism. The Hussein regime in Iraq was considered to be a potential
145 Robert Mabro, ‘Is the widely expected war on Iraq an oil war?’, Oxford Institute fo r  Energy Studies 
(February 2003).
146 Ibid.
147 Gordon Rayner, ‘Iraq war: Tony Blair got it wrong, says top aide’, The Daily Telegraph (19 January 2010).
148 Jonathan Wynne-Jones, ‘Tony Blair believed God wanted him to go to war to fight evil, claims his mentor’, 
The Daily Telegraph (23 May 2009).
149 See Iraq Inquiry evidence from David Miliband, Alastair Campbell, Geoff Hoon and John Reid at
http://w w w.iraqinquiry.org.uk/.
150 John Kampfiier, B lair’s Wars (London: Free Press, 2004).
contributor to this threat and thus needed to be removed.151 Similarly, it was considered that 
not backing the US would portray the Labour government as being weak on security issues, a 
return to the perception of Labour when Blair began his tenure as an MP under Michael
1 m
Foot’s leadership. This could not be countenanced by a Labour party that had fought hard 
to dominate the centre ground of British politics in the 1990s and early 2000s.
Following on from this, if we look at the British Army’s preparedness for the conflict, 
the statements of senior Army officers would seem to point away from a British expectation 
that major conflict would be fought in Iraq. Retired CGS Sir Michael Jackson, in service at 
the time of the war, has said that the MoD’s defence planning assumptions at that time only 
saw the possibility of a small-scale intervention in the Persian Gulf in the foreseeable
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future. Also, he considered that the MoD procurement strategy had not prepared the Army 
adequately for desert combat despite the Saif Sareea operation in 2001.154 This seems to 
contradict the assertion that that particular operation was embarked upon to prepare for an 
Iraq-type war in the Middle East. As we have already seen in this chapter, the then CGS Sir 
Richard Dannatt also made similar points in 2007 when he commented in a speech that the 
Army, in terms of equipment, was still only prepared for a European war in 2003 and it had 
taken the difficult experience in Iraq for it to change significantly. In terms of opinions on the 
war, Sir Michael Jackson has stated that he believed the WMD threat from Iraq was real and 
had seen no evidence that the war was in fact fought for oil.155 He also believed that the Iraq 
war was justified and continues to maintain this view.156
Finally, if we look at the operational experiences in Iraq we can see that the original
•  1 ^ 7planning assumptions were for the British to invade Iraq from Turkey. These were changed 
shortly before the invasion as Turkey refused to grant the right of passage to British and 
American forces. This evidence points away from a seeming British military desire to 
safeguard oil installations in the south for future exploitation. Also, the British did not focus 
their security efforts on the oil infrastructure in Southern Iraq once the incumbent regime had 
been overthrown in Baghdad. Instead, responsibility for safeguarding production was
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1transferred to a locally staffed Oil Protection Force as quickly as possible. The British 
instead concentrated on ensuring the urban areas of Basra were under control before 
withdrawing to an ‘overwatch’ role.159 Indeed, another pertinent point to make here is that the 
Southern region of Iraq that the British were granted control of contained the vast bulk of 
Iraq’s proven oil reserves. If the US had fought the war for oil why would they grant such a 
significant economic asset to British operational control?
Taking all the evidence into account, it does appear that the most important factors in 
the British government’s reasoning in going to war were to remove what was considered a 
dangerous regime and also demonstrate solidarity with the United States following the epoch 
defining events of September 11 2001. However, given the evidence, it is also inconceivable 
that the strategic benefits of Iraq’s vast oil reserves were not considered in the decision to join 
the US. Indeed, to say that this was in no way a consideration would be disingenuous. We 
have seen that Iraq’s oil wealth and regional threat to the oil reserves in the Middle East was 
outlined in the SDR and that the British armed forces were deployed on a major operation to 
test their expeditionary capabilities in the region in 2001. Indeed, the National Audit Office’s 
(NAO) report on the Saif Sareea operation saw it as a demonstration of Britain’s military 
capability to the wider Middle East as much as a training exercise and hoped to forge links 
with Oman as a result. In fact, the subsequent failure to update equipment for the 2003 
invasion of Iraq is unsurprising given the fact the NAO’s report on Saif Sareea noted that 
important lessons from operations in the Gulf War had not been learned or had been 
forgotten.160 Thus, it should not be interpreted as a lack of commitment to the area but more 
as a continued military tendency to forget the experiences of the past.
Ultimately, if the US were going to invade Iraq no matter what, it seems the British 
government and military establishment believed that they should support them and reap the 
possible benefits of the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime, whatever they may be. This is 
certainly John Kampfner’s interpretation.161 Indeed, the former Foreign Secretary David 
Miliband stated to the Chilcot inquiry that the invasion of Iraq had reinforced perceptions of
♦ 1 fOBritain’s power in the Middle East and had been beneficial m this respect. Certainly, one
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of the lessons garnered from this conflict may be that the UK may need to conduct similar 
operations in the future, perhaps explaining the increased prominence of energy security in 
the DCDC’s stated doctrine and the Royal Navy’s desire to use the issue of competition over 
energy resources to back its claims for an increased hard power capability.
Conclusion
In sum, this chapter has shown that when it came to the views of the individual services, it 
can be said that concepts of energy security at the operational level of policy had an impact 
when they were seen to offer a degree of benefit in putting forward an individual service’s 
case for its efficacy in achieving Britain’s national security goals (in the process putting 
forward the case for continued levels of funding) or for the continued development of a 
particular weapons platform. In the former case, we saw the Royal Navy outlining its ability 
to maintain secure access to oil and gas imports and the RAF following the same tack in the 
last year of the Labour administration. In the latter case, the continued delays in the 
construction of the mooted aircraft carriers saw their efficacy in securing energy supplies 
being outlined. Thus, the interaction between the declaratory and operational time cycles led 
to the use of energy security justifications when the RAF and Royal Navy perceived that 
particular aspects of their service were threatened. Otherwise, the declaratory level’s stated 
view on energy security was only incorporated if it fitted in with the military’s own policy 
inclinations. Accordingly, whenever concepts of energy security did have an impact on 
individual services these manifested themselves in a control paradigm manner, with the 
attendant concentration on the use of military force to secure energy resources.
As regards DCDC publications, these were more cognisant of the increasing dangers 
to global security of climate change and energy resource competition due to the DCDC’s 
longer term outlook and relative independence from other organizations. This was most 
prominently displayed in the DCDC’s Strategic Trends papers. The requirement to develop 
alternative energy technologies was not considered viable within the next twenty to thirty 
years but the potential on the battlefield was still propounded in JDPs published for the Army 
and RAF in this time period. As such, there was a small movement towards the sustainable 
energy security tenets with the recognition that alternative power sources could be used on
has-boosted-Britains-reputation-in-Arab-world.htm l on 7 May 2012. Miliband commented: ‘In the Arab world 
today, I don’t believe that the Iraq decisions have undermined our relationships or our ability to business. Some 
o f our ambassadors say we are in stronger position’.
the battlefield in the future, although this was not motivated by energy security concerns. In 
addition, the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ signified another movement towards sustainable 
security tenets, but, again, this had little to do with the issue of energy security in the armed 
forces’ (and in particular, the Army’s) consciousness.
Finally, we have seen that the decision by the British government to join the US in the 
invasion of Iraq was not motivated primarily by the desire to secure the vast energy resources 
that the country contained. Instead, the most significant reasons for British involvement in the 
conflict were a belief that the Iraqi regime was developing a WMD capability that it had 
previously shown it was willing to use, as well as the desire to show solidarity with the 
United States administration following the events of 9/11. Still, it would appear that the 
political, economic and energy security benefits of the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime 
were subsidiary considerations that certainly made the decision to involve British armed 
forces in this operation more enticing.
The next chapter will now scrutinise the impact of energy security issues on the 
Defence Industrial Base (DIB). This will be done by examining the research and development 
of alternative energy technologies within the British defence industry from 1997 and 2010, 
and also by studying any arms deals made with countries considered important to UK energy 
security. We can then ascertain whether the DIB remained in line with the declaratory circle 
of policy, in contrast to what we have seen at the operational circle in this chapter.
Chapter Five
Defence-Industrial Policy
Controversy over procurement for the armed forces became a major issue in the British media 
following the Labour Government’s decision to deploy soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 
media perception was that the types of vehicle and equipment provided for the armed forces 
(particularly in regard to the Army) were often sub-standard and not properly attuned to the 
combat environments that soldiers found themselves fighting in. The focal points for 
criticism were the seeming lack of vehicular protection from Improvised Explosive Devices 
(IEDs), resulting in high British casualty figures in the Afghanistan and Iraqi deployments, as 
well as the apparent dearth of helicopter lift capability to deploy and extricate soldiers from 
the combat zone.1 As regards the Royal Navy, the main procurement decisions taken by the 
government soon after election were to construct two large Queen Elizabeth class aircraft 
carriers and equip these with a new Joint Combat Aircraft (JCA) to replace the Navy’s ageing 
Sea Harriers (as well as the RAF’s Harrier force). This subsequently morphed into the 
decision to acquire the Lockheed Martin Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) F-35 Lightning II from the 
United States. These decisions attracted similar controversy from the media as the expected 
in-service dates of these systems were delayed and their likely high cost was expected to 
hamper the further procurement of other equipment for the future armed forces. Similarly, 
there remained much debate over the long-running development and acquisition of the 
Eurofighter Typhoon for the RAF. The air superiority supersonic fighter was first approved 
for development by the British government in 1987 and had still not fully entered service 23
1 For an in-depth analysis o f the former issue, read Richard North, Ministry o f  Defeat: The British War in Iraq 
2003-2009 (London; New York: Continuum, 2009). Also, see BBC News Online, ‘SAS commander quits ‘over 
kit” (1 November 2008) accessed at http://new s.bbc.co.U k/l/h i/7703419.stm  on 7 May 2012; Mark Townsend, 
‘Lack o f helicopters 'puts injured troops at risk”, The Observer (26 July 2009); Andrew Porter and Mary 
Riddell, ‘Minister Lord Malloch-Brown admits to Afghanistan helicopter shortage’, The Daily Telegraph (21 
July 2009).
2 For good background information on the British involvement in the development o f the JSF see House o f  
Commons Defence Committee, Second Report -  Future Carrier and Joint Combat Aircraft Programmes, HC. 
554, session 2005-2006 (London: TSO, 2005) paragraph 84.
3 BBC News Online, ‘Carriers victim o f cash crisis’ (11 December 2008) accessed at 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/uk/7777723.stm on 7 May 2012 and BBC News Online, ‘Navy carriers ‘lbn over 
budget’ (29 June 2009) accessed at http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/uk/8125449.stm on 7 May 2012.
years later.4 The large cost overruns meant that the 160 planes that would finally be acquired 
were likely to have cost in the region of £23 billion, a unit cost of approximately £143 million 
per aircraft.5
Given this context, this chapter will establish what impact energy security 
considerations had on British defence-industrial policy between 1997 and 2010, and, if there 
was an impact, whether this manifested itself as a control paradigm or sustainable security 
approach to energy considerations. The chapter will then seek to explain the basis for 
eventual policy outcomes through the use of Allison’s and Dorman’s models of government. 
However, before we embark on the main body of analysis, we will need to reacquaint 
ourselves with the findings of the previous chapter, which will help us to recognise any 
familiar themes that connect the different levels of defence policy in relation to the topic of 
energy security.
In Chapter Four, we saw that energy security considerations had a variable effect on 
the operational level of defence policy and this was not ultimately in line with the declaratory 
sphere of policy. As such Allison’s GPM and Dorman’s time cycle model provided the most 
cogent explanations as to this eventuality. Overall, there was generally a control paradigm 
approach to this issue in the armed forces, with the Royal Navy and RAF outlining or 
alluding to the possible use of military power to secure energy resources. For example, 
throughout the examined period, the Royal Navy utilised the issue of energy security as a 
justification for the Royal Navy’s efficacy as a service and, concomitantly, as a validation of 
its procurement preferences (most notably the mooted Queen Elizabeth class aircraft 
carriers). Similarly, the RAF began to use energy security justifications for its chosen 
equipment programmes from 2009 onwards, as the general election drew nearer and energy 
security issues had risen in prominence in British political discourse. In contrast, the Army’s 
senior officers did not appear to view energy security issues as offering a viable argument for 
their own organisational and equipment preferences and therefore remained quiescent on the 
issue. Indeed, from 2003 onwards there was a notable movement towards sustainable security 
tenets (enshrined in the ‘Comprehensive Approach’) due to the Army’s experiences in Iraq 
and Afghanistan rather than any appreciation of energy issues. This juxtaposed with the
4 Some 53 tranche 1 aircraft entered service and another 91 tranche 2 aircraft are currently being modified so as 
to provide ground-attack capabilities. See RAF Website, ‘Typhoon FGR4’, accessed at 
http://www.raf.mod.uk/equipment/tvphooneurofighter.cfm on 7 May 2012. 40 tranche 3 aircraft were ordered 
by the British government in September 2009. See Hansard, HC Deb Volume 496, Column 135-6WS (9 
September 2009) for confirmation o f this from Defence Minister Quentin Davies.
5See NAO, Ministry o f  Defence -  Management o f  the Typhoon Project -  Report by the Comptroller and Auditor 
General, HC. 755, session 2010-2011 (London: TSO, 2011) p. 15, p.26.
doctrine produced by the DCDC for the Army, which did see competition for energy 
resources as a future driver of conflict and one that could be addressed through the adoption 
of a ‘Comprehensive Approach’ to military operations. Still, future development of 
alternative energy technologies was mooted but not seen as a way for the military to aid in 
the prevention of conflict through reduced greenhouse gas emissions. Finally, the reasons for 
the British decision to go to war in Iraq were examined for any evidence of energy security 
considerations. This found that although energy issues were not the deciding factor, they 
certainly made the decision to go to war more enticing, given the positive economic benefits 
to British companies that would likely result.
This chapter will scrutinize defence-industrial policy. As outlined in Chapter One, this 
refers to the third ‘circle’ of British defence policy in Ian Bellany’s framework for analysis. It 
denotes ‘what the defence-contracting sector of the British economy regards itself being for, 
and holds itself ready to do’.6 Thus, we will need to analyse the statements made by 
important figures within the defence industry, the actual products developed and produced for 
the British armed forces and also the export strategies for the equipment that was developed. 
Given that the British defence industry continued to rely on the UK government to be the 
main purchaser of defence equipment, we will also need to analyse the government’s 
procurement strategy from 1997 until 2010. However, before we do this it would first be 
prudent to outline how control paradigm and sustainable security concepts will be used to 
measure the effect of energy security considerations at the defence-industrial level of policy.
As we saw from John Mearsheimer’s comments in Chapter One, senior figures within 
the British defence industry would be unlikely to emphasise the importance to British 
security of arms sales to energy-rich states, due to the negative effect this would have on the 
public’s attitudes to the British defence industry.7 As such, it would be difficult to ascertain 
the impact of energy security considerations on defence-industrial policy by looking purely at 
justifications from senior figures for the Industry’s arms sales to particular regions as these 
are unlikely to be candid, if mentioned at all. A better method of seeing if there was a control 
paradigm approach to energy security amongst senior figures within the DIB would be to 
observe the defence industry emphasising the development of military equipment that would 
be capable of providing ‘global reach’ for Britain’s armed forces and the ability to use ‘hard
6Reviewing Britain’s Defence, p.2.
7 See Chapter One.
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power’ to enforce stated British ‘global interests’. In terms of British defence procurement, 
we would expect to see the purchase of equipment and weapons platforms that provided these 
aforementioned capabilities, so as to allow intervention in areas key to Britian’s continued 
energy security. In parallel with this, there would be a desire to maintain ‘the military 
advantages enjoyed by key regional allies’.9 As such, the defence industry would seek to 
provide advanced military equipment to certain regimes perceived as important to 
maintaining stability in regions with large oil and gas reserves.
In contrast, if a sustainable security approach to energy security had an impact at the 
defence-industrial level of policy we would see the defence industry stating the importance of 
reducing carbon emissions and improving energy efficiency so as to address climate change. 
We would also see the issues of climate change and energy resource competition touted as 
reasons for the development of more energy-efficient vehicles, as well as alternative and 
renewable sources of power, thus reducing the reliance on foreign imports of oil and the need 
to secure access to these sources of fuel through the threat and actual use of military force.10 
Finally, arms sales to key fossil fuel producing regions would be discouraged as these were 
likely to have the effect of causing greater instability (and attendant energy insecurity) 
through the support provided to repressive regimes.
This chapter will demonstrate that concepts of energy security had a variable effect at 
the defence-industrial level of defence policy between 1997 and 2010. Firstly, when 
examining the impact of energy security considerations on statements made by senior figures 
within the British defence industry, we will see that throughout this period there was little or 
no mention of the importance of developing weapons that had ‘global reach’ and the ability 
to protect British overseas trade, thereby ensuring energy security. This was despite the 
importance of energy security considerations at the declaratory sphere of policy. Instead, the 
main issues for defence industry figures for much of the period included the desire to 
maintain or increase funding for the British defence industry at a time when research and 
development funds were decreasing and weapons programmes were being delayed in order to 
make short-term savings within the defence budget, the desire to see increased US-UK 
cooperation in defence technology matters, as well as the question of the form the
8 Delivering security in a changing world, p.4: ‘the UK has a range o f global interests including economic well­
being based around trade, overseas and foreign investment, and the continuing free flow o f natural resources’.
9 James Kemp, ‘Sustainable Peace and Security’, Compass Thinkpiece 18 (November 2006) p.2.
10 As outlined in Chapter One, the adoption o f alternative energy technologies can be seen as contributing 
towards a sustainable energy security approach but may ultimately not be motivated by the desire to address the 
conflict drivers of climate change and energy resource competition. Thus, their development would not be as a 
result o f energy security considerations.
relationship between the MOD and the defence industry should take.11 Thus, senior figures in 
the DIB tended to be focussed on ensuring the continued funding and survival of the British 
defence industry, rather than on emphasising the benefits they provided to the aims of British 
defence and security policy; in this case, the positive contribution their equipment could 
make to ensuring Britain’s continued energy security. Still, from 2006 onwards the issue of 
energy use within the military began to be addressed by certain sections of the DIB as they 
responded to increased focus on this issue within government. Thus, there was a movement 
towards sustainable security notions, with a discussion of the development of renewable 
energy technologies, reflecting the increasing saliency of energy issues within British 
political discourse.
In terms of equipment development and production, we can see that the DIB was, to a 
large extent, beholden to the Labour Government’s procurement policy in this period as the 
declaratory level and operational levels of policy determined what equipment was researched 
and produced. Hence, the development of the new aircraft carriers and the new Type 45 
destroyers could be correlated with Labour’s aspirations for an increased expeditionary
stance and the concomitant stated desire to continue British military influence in the Persian
12Gulf region. Thus, energy security considerations can be said to have had an impact in this 
procurement decision, despite the fact it could not be considered directly attributable to the 
influence of the DIB. Still, despite the control paradigm approach to energy security implied 
by these procurement decision, there were developments in energy and propulsion technology 
that demonstrated positive movements towards energy sustainability, although these could 
not be attributed to any real appreciation of sustainable security notions, having been 
instituted before the need to combat climate change and energy resource competition was 
identified within British defence policy. These positive developments included the Integrated 
Electrical Propulsion System (IEPS) that was to be used to power the Royal Navy’s new 
Type 45 Destroyers, lithium battery cells used to power equipment designed for the Army’s 
Future Infantry Soldier Technology (FIST) programme and proposals to install hybrid 
electric drive systems on the much delayed Future Rapid Effects System (FRES).
Indeed, by 2008 there was a definite discourse on the need for the defence industry to 
develop engine technology that helped to combat the effects of climate change through lower 
emissions of greenhouse gases. Thus, there was ultimately an appreciation of sustainable
11 These points will be outlined in greater depth as the chapter progresses.
12 Defence Minister Adam Ingram: ’Power projection is a fundamental part o f [the future aircraft carrier] 
capability requirement’. Hansard, HC Deb Volume 410, Column 701W (16 September 2003).
energy security notions at the defence-industrial level which mirrored that seen at the
declaratory circle of policy. As at the declaratory level of policy, movements towards
emissions reductions from British defence companies can be seen as a response to the
increased political saliency of the issue within the United Kingdom in the last few years of 
• 1 ^the Labour administration. Thus, Dorman’s time cycle model can be used as an explanatory 
tool in this instance.
Similarly, it appears that the declaratory and operational spheres of defence policy did 
not believe that the UK had the resources to devote to the research and development of all 
aspects of emerging technology. This was due to the fact that there was a lack of funding 
allocated to defence research in this period.14 As such, there was a stated desire from the 
government, the armed forces and the DIB to cooperate more with the United States on 
technology, so as to possibly benefit from their expertise, not least in alternative energy 
matters.15 This also provides an additional explanation as to the lack of interest in developing 
new energy technologies prior to 2008.
In terms of arms exports during this period, energy security considerations can be said 
to have had a clear impact. The Labour government’s control paradigm approach to energy 
security and concomitant desire to influence regimes in the Middle East saw the government 
willing to facilitate significant arms sales to this region throughout its time in government. 
The defence industry (in particular, BAE Systems) was unlikely to reject this support, 
especially as, on past experience, sales to the Middle East offered the chance to make 
significant profits.16 In this way, the Labour government sustained the approach of the 
previous Conservative administration in allowing (and propagating) arms exports to the Gulf, 
despite the notion of an ‘ethical foreign policy’ that had been espoused by Foreign Secretary
13 ‘Nearly half UK’s [sic] biggest companies failing to act on carbon emissions law’, guardian.co.uk, (14 June
2011) accessed at http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/201 l/iun/14/uk-biggest-companies-carbon-emissions 
on 5 October 2011.
14 See House of Commons Defence Committee, Third Report -  Defence Equipment 2009, HC. 107, session 
2007-2008 (London: TSO, 2009) paragraph 159. MOD research spending was £676 million in 1995-96 and 
£632 million in 2006-07.
15 See Chairman o f BAE Systems, Dick Olver, Speech made to the Woodrow Wilson International Center fo r  
Scholars (12 July 2005) accessed at
http://www.baesystems.com/Newsroom/SpeechesandPresentations/autoGen 10712810261 .html on 1 October 
2011 on 4 May 2012. Much of the speech was devoted to calling for greater technology cooperation between the 
UK and the US. Also, see House o f Commons Defence Committee, Seventh Report -  Aspects o f  Defence 
Procurement and Industrial Policy, HC. 675, session 1997-1998 (London: TSO, 1998) summary of  
recommendations, paragraph f: ‘It is vital that the UK builds on the excellent basis o f mutual trust and continues 
to give close attention to bilateral collaborations with the US, especially where the US offer the technologies 
essential to our future operational capability’.
16 The Al-Yamamah arms contracts in the 1980s and 1990s are believed to have yielded £43 billion for BAE 
Systems and ‘provided the profits that allowed it to keep staggering on when just about everything else it 
touched turned to dross’. See The Economist, ‘Defender o f the realm’ (18 October 2007).
1 7Robin Cook upon Labour’s election to power. This policy approach can best be ascribed to 
the continued British governmental desire to extend its influence in a key energy-producing 
region through arms sales. As Mark Phythian commented: ‘[Arms sales since 1945 have] 
played a key role in cementing influence and securing the continuation of the existing 
order’.18
Additionally, arms sales to the Middle East had other political benefits. The 
government policy of facilitating arms sales to the Middle East on behalf of the DIB 
presented the opportunity of further employment at this level of defence policy for the MPs 
involved upon leaving the government. This has been popularly termed the ‘revolving door’, 
with many MPs and senior officers within the armed forces attaining senior positions within 
defence companies upon leaving their original positions at the declaratory or operational 
spheres of policy.19 In addition, senior figures within BAE Systems are believed to have had 
a significant influence on Tony Blair during his time in government, not to mention its 
influence on previous Prime Ministers.20
Taking all this evidence into account, Allison’s GPM and Dorman’s time cycle model 
provide the best explanations as to the specific nature of the impact of energy security 
considerations at this level of defence policy. Ultimately, the defence companies of the DIB 
were uninterested in energy security matters per se. This was demonstrated by the failure of 
senior figures within the defence industry to state the importance of the DIB in providing 
military capability that could potentially intervene to secure energy supplies for the UK. 
Rather, they were interested, as Allison’s model indicates, in securing funding for the UK
defence industry so as to ensure the British DIB’s continued survival and, as private
7 1companies, profitability. Thus, the movement towards sustainable security tenets in the last
17 Robin Cook commented ‘The Labour Government does not accept that political values can be left behind 
when we check in our passports to travel on diplomatic business. Our foreign policy must have an ethical 
dimension and must support the demands o f other peoples for the democratic rights on which we insist for 
ourselves. The Labour Government will put human rights at the heart o f our foreign policy and will publish an 
annual report on our work in promoting human rights abroad’. Robin Cook, ‘Robin Cook’s speech on the 
government’s ethical foreign policy’, guardian.co.uk (12 May 1997) accessed at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/1997/may/12/indonesia.ethicalforeignpolicv on 2 October 2011.
18 Mark Phythian, The Politics o f British Arms Sales Since 1964 (Manchester; New York: Manchester 
University Press, 2000) p.2.
19 See CAAT Website, ‘Revolving door -  log’ (2012) accessed at 
http://www.caat.org.uk/issues/influence/revolving-door.php on 4 May 2012.
20 See Mick Lambert, Judith Rattenbury and Ian Prichard, ‘The Political Influence o f Arms Companies’, 
Campaign Against the Arms Trade Paper (April 2003) accessed at
http://www.caat.org.uk/resources/publications/govemment/politica1-influence-0403.pdf on 4 May 2012.
21 Graham Allison noted that players in the political arena represent their particular organisation or department 
and their own particular areas of expertise and concern. See Essence o f  Decision, p. 156. The then Chairman o f  
BAE Systems, Sir Richard Evans commented to the House o f Commons Defence Committee in 2004 that ‘If in 
fact we are not able to deploy shareholders' funds in this country in support o f the current investments that we
few years of the Labour government can be understood in the context of the growing political 
importance of climate change within the UK. Thus, various defence companies within the 
DIB began to outline their need to cut overall carbon emissions from their day-to-day 
operations, so as to boost their corporate ethical profile and avoid environmental criticism.
The DIB remained obliged to develop the types of equipment the government and 
armed forces had asked for and the development of certain weapons platforms could be 
ascribed to some degree to energy security considerations. Despite this fact, there was still 
development of energy technology for military use. However, this was primarily for its 
perceived operational rather than any notion of its potential beneficial effect on climate 
change or energy resource competition issues. Finally, British arms exports to the Middle 
East in this period demonstrated a clear control paradigm approach to energy security from 
the British government, which facilitated sales to Middle Eastern countries as best it could so 
as to enhance British influence in this key strategic area. As regards the DIB, there was no 
indication that it saw its role in these exports as helping to enhance British energy security 
concerns. Still, there were other reasons for the sanctioning of these sales, such as the fact 
that the profits that these sales provided for the defence industry were often a significant
77proportion of their overall income.
Defence Industry Statements from 1997 to 2010
If we firstly examine the views of senior figures within the British defence industry during 
this period, we can see that the British DIB’s potential contribution to UK energy security 
considerations was not considered to be of sufficient importance to be utilised as a 
justification for continued investment in the British defence industry. Instead, defence 
industry figures were keen to point out that they thought it essential to maintain an 
independent British defence industry so as to ensure adequate supply of the British armed 
forces logistical requirements. Thus, defence-industrial policy was not in line with
have here and they are not producing a satisfactory return, the existing management o f BAE Systems will have 
to take that money to somewhere else where it can get that return and, if  the management does not do it, the 
shareholders will put a new bunch o f managers in who will do it’. House o f Commons Defence Committee, 
Sixth Report -  Defence Procurement: Volume II: Oral and Written Evidence, HC. 572-11, session 2003-2004 
(London: TSO, 2004) answer to question 6.
22 ‘The conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and lucrative fighter jet work in Saudi Arabia helped lift profits at BAE 
Systems by 15% in the first six months o f the year’ in James Boxell, ‘Conflicts buoy BAE’s results’, The 
Financial Times (September 13 2009); Sylvia Pfeifer, ‘New naval outfit taps Mideast market’, The Financial 
Times (21 July 2008): ‘Britain’s new naval shipbuilding champion is tapping into the prosperous Middle East 
market, teaming up with a company in the United Arab Emirates to provide support services’.
declaratory policy in its appreciation of energy security issues. For example, in oral evidence 
given to the Defence Select Committee in 1998, the head of the Defence Manufacturers 
Association (DMA) David Wright indicated that he was against foreign ownership of British 
defence companies such as (the then) British Aerospace as he saw this posing possible future 
problems as regards the supply of British soldiers: ‘[British ownership] is a security and 
supply [issue], it is a national interest in terms of the defence national interest... This is the 
distinguishing feature of the defence industry from other industries. If you have not actually 
got it embedded there and securely able to supply you ... then your defence of the realm is at 
stake’.23 This desire to defend the British DIB against the perceived danger of foreign 
ownership was again evident in 2003, when Sir Richard Evans (Chairman of the Defence 
Industries Council (DIC) and Chairman of BAE Systems) commented: ‘The playing field is 
absolutely not level. It varies from country to country but certainly in the context of the US 
the Buy American Act provides certain protections. It is extremely difficult to compete on 
equal terms ... The fact of the matter is here in the UK - this is a point we have made 
repeatedly to government - we are probably the only country, certainly in terms of the 
western world, that has a pretty much open (although there may be one or two highly 
restrictive areas probably relating to nuclear capabilities) position in the context of bidding 
and tendering, and that absolutely and definitely is not reciprocated by any of the other 
markets that we go into’.24 Similar views were again propagated in 2004 with Sir Richard 
Evans noting the importance of maintaining an independent British DIB for reasons of 
sovereignty, with the danger to BAE System’s profits and defence jobs in the UK highlighted 
if this sovereignty was not sufficiently protected. Indeed, in 2009 the defence industry was 
moved to setup the website Defence Matters and publish the paper Securing Britain’s Future 
and Prosperity with the aim of highlighting the employment the British DIB provided in the 
UK, as well as the equipment the arms industry supplied to British armed forces to ensure the 
continued security of the UK. Thus, the perennial issue for senior figures within the
23 House o f Commons Joint Defence and Trade and Industry Committee, Eighth Report -  Aspects o f  Defence 
Procurement and Industrial Policy: Minutes o f  Evidence, 1 April 1998, HC. 675, session 1997-1998 (London: 
TSO, 1998) answer to question 93.
24 House o f Commons Defence Committee, Eighth Report -  Defence Procurement: Minutes o f  Evidence, 13 
May 2003, HC. 694, session 2002-2003 (London: TSO, 2003) answer to question 17.
25‘What I really want to point out at the start o f this hearing is that the Defence Industrial Policy is not a policy 
for industry’s sake but it is actually, we believe, very much in the national interest. It is about the sovereignty o f  
the UK and it is about our economic future’. House o f Commons Defence Committee, Sixth Report -  Defence 
Procurement: Volume II: Oral and Written Evidence, HC. 572-11, session 2003-2004 (London: TSO, 2004) 
answer to question 1. Also, see the answers to question 6 and 7.
26 See Defence Matters Website, ‘The defence industry in the UK today officially launches a new website to 
showcase its importance to the UK economy’ (7 May 2009) accessed at
defence-industrial sphere in this period was the desire to maintain levels of funding from the
7 7government and so sustain an independent British defence industry. Energy security 
justifications were evidently not seen as holding sufficient weight to carry the DIB’s 
argument and were therefore not used.
Still, by 2008 there was evidence that the impact of climate change considerations at 
the declaratory level of policy had filtered through to the DIB and created a greater alignment 
between the two levels of defence policy. Thus, there was a move towards acceptance of 
sustainable security notions such as the need to cut greenhouse gas emissions to address 
climate change, as well as the imposition of energy efficient measures. For example, in 2008 
Qinetiq produced a report for the Office of Climate Change (OCC) examining the potential 
for the abatement of carbon dioxide emissions through the introduction of new energy
7Rtechnologies. Similarly, in 2009 Chris Courtaux of BAE Systems co-authored a paper 
outlining a model for efficient energy usage within the military. This referred to the MOD’s 
Climate Change Strategy as a ‘key driver for change in the use of energy in defence’.29 
Therefore, we can see that movements towards sustainable security tenets in this area were as 
a result of direction from the government. Indeed, despite not being a major issue for British 
defence companies, the desire to address the effects of climate change through greater energy 
efficiency could be seen from 2006, with BAE Systems’ Annual Corporate Responsibility 
Report noting that ‘climate change is now a serious issue for all companies’.30 Subsequent 
reports noted that BAE Systems was looking to develop a coherent climate change strategy,
71as well as to analyse its own ‘carbon footprint’. This approach was also taken by companies 
such as Thales, which began producing an annual Environment Report in 2009.32 Ultimately, 
the reasons for the adoption of this increasingly sustainable approach could be ascribed to 
government expectations for its defence suppliers to reduce their emissions following the
http://www.defencematters.co.uk/news/%E2%80%9CVital%E2%80%9D-UK-industrv-launches-Defence- 
Matters.aspx on 4 May 2012. Also see Ian Godden, ‘Is England Asleep? The State o f UK Defence Industrial 
Policy’, RUSI Defence Systems, Vol. 12, No. 1 (2009). Ian Godden was Chief Executive o f the Society o f  
British Aerospace Companies (SBAC) and used this article to put forward the need for government investment 
and protection o f the British defence industry.
27 Tim Webb, ‘Defence firms make plea for more spending’, guardian.co.uk (1 September 2009) accessed at 
http://w w w .guardian.co.uk/w orld/2009/sep/01/aim s-industrv-plea on 7 May 2012 and BBC News Online, 
‘Defence industry ‘vital for UK” (1 September 2009) accessed at http://new s.bbc.co.U k/l/h i/uk/8230910.stm  on 
7 May 2012.
28 Pamela Farries and Chris Eyers, ‘Aviation C 02 Emissions Abatement Potential From Technology 
Innovation’, QINETIQ/CON/AP/CR0801 111 (OCC, 2008).
29 Zoe Banfield, Chris Courtaux and John Golightly, ‘The Fully Burdened Cost o f Energy, RUSI Defence 
Systems, Vol. 12, No. 2 (2009) p.90.
30 BAE Systems, Corporate Responsibility Report 2006 (BAE Systems, 2007) p. 10.
31 BAE Systems, Corporate Responsibility Report 2008 (BAE Systems, 2009) p.20.
32 Thales Group, Environment Report 2009 (TTiales Group, 2010).
Stem Review, as well as the desire of companies to appear ‘ environmentally-friendly ’ as this 
issue became more important with investors. Indeed, in keeping with the increased 
importance of environmental issues for the government at the time, the MOD introduced a 
Sustainable Procurement Charter in 2008 that companies would sign in order to demonstrate 
their commitment to mitigating their industry’s effect on the environment.34 This illustrated 
the increased pressure from the declaratory sphere of policy for the DIB to demonstrate its 
green credentials, as the issue became more important in British political debate. Thus, the 
declaratory level of policy was exerting pressure on the DIB to adopt environmentally- 
friendly policies so as to demonstrate its own adherence to environmental principles. Hence, 
Allison’s GPM helps to explain the increasing adoption of sustainable energy ideas within 
defence policy at this time, with the time cycle model explaining increased saliency of 
environmental issues in defence policy as the 2010 General Election drew closer.
British Defence Procurement Strategy from 1997 to 2010
Manifestations of a Control Paradigm Approach
If we try and determine the impact of energy security considerations on British defence 
procurement strategy between 1997 and 2010, we can observe that the decision at the 
declaratory level of policy to develop and acquire Astute class nuclear-powered submarines, 
the new Type 45 destroyers and the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers was influenced to 
a large degree by the desire to have a power projection capability that could be utilised in 
areas of British interest. As we saw explained in Chapter Three, energy supplies from the 
Middle East were outlined as an important strategic interest in the SDR of 1998 and remained 
so throughout Labour’s time in government. Thus, the procurement of these particular naval 
weapons platforms could be ascribed to a control paradigm approach to energy security and 
the desire to secure access to important energy resources (if need be) through their ‘hard 
power’ attributes. For example, the SDR commented: ‘...we plan to buy two new larger 
aircraft carriers to project power more flexibly around the world ... Aircraft carriers will have 
a wide utility, including for deterrence and coercion ... They can also offer a coercive
33 ‘The UK government has placed climate change high on its agenda following the Stem Review ... The UK 
Ministry o f Defence aims for its office estate to achieve carbon neutrality by 2012 and will expect suppliers to 
help them reduce their carbon footprint’. BAE Systems, Corporate Responsibility Report 2006 (BAE Systems,
2007) p.l 1.
34 David Robertson, ‘MoD to require tally o f environmental impact’, The Times (August 18 2008)
presence which may forestall the need for warfighting, as recently in the Gulf [sic]’.35 The 
coercion and deterrence capabilities of the new Astute class submarines were similarly 
outlined. Similarly, in 2003 Defence Minister Adam Ingram commented that Tower 
projection is a fundamental part of [the] capability requirement’ for the future aircraft carrier 
project.37 The Type 45 destroyer programme (initiated in July 2000) was an important part of 
this projection capability, providing an improved maritime air defence capability to protect 
the aircraft carriers, as well as enhanced anti-submarine ability.38 Indeed, these three weapons 
platforms were envisaged as the key constituents of the 21st Century Royal Navy, thereby 
demonstrating the continued importance of using force as a means of securing British 
interests abroad.39
Certainly, senior officers at the operational level of policy also stated the importance 
of the aircraft carrier programme in ensuring a viable British expeditionary and power 
projection capability.40 As already seen in Chapter Four, the Royal Navy in particular were 
keen to acquire new aircraft carriers as these would help maintain the prestige and 
independence of the Royal Navy and avoid the perceived threat of it becoming merely a 
support arm for the Army.41 There was also the fact that each service had particular historical 
inclinations towards certain types of equipment and the three core weapons platforms in the 
naval construction programme fitted in neatly with these organisational tendencies.42 
Consequently, the Royal Navy’s desire for these weapons platforms was also a key reason for 
their development.
35 SDR, paragraph 6, paragraph 115 and supporting essay 6, paragraph 26.
36 SDR, paragraph 141.
37 Hansard, HC Deb Volume 410, Column 701W (16 September 2003).
38 NAO, Ministry o f Defence - Providing Anti-Air Warfare Capability: the Type 45 Destroyer -  Report by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General, HC. 295, session 2008-2009 (London: TSO, 2009) p.4, p. 12.
39 See Lee Willett, ‘The Astute-Class Submarine -  Capabilities and Challenges’, RUSI Defence Systems, Vol. 7, 
No. 1 (2004) and Hansard, HC Deb Volume 429, Column 1(10 January 2005) Defence Minister Adam Ingram: 
‘We are adapting and modernising the Royal Navy into a versatile maritime force that is structured to meet the 
challenges o f the changing strategic environment o f the 21st Century. Our investment will see the Navy’s 
capability enhanced through the procurement o f new aircraft carriers, Type 45 destroyers, Astute class 
submarines and amphibious support vessels’.
40 FSL Admiral Sir Alan West: ‘I think as far as my top priority in terms o f procurement, it is the CVF[future 
aircraft carrier]’. House o f Commons Defence Committee, Fifth Report -  Defence White Paper 2003: Minutes 
o f Evidence, 24 March 2004, HC. 465-11, session 2003-2004 (London: TSO, 2004) answer to question 73.
41 See Paul Cornish and Andrew Dorman, ‘Blair’s wars and Brown’s budgets: from Strategic Defence Review to 
strategic decay in less than a decade’, International Affairs, Vol. 85, Iss, 2 (2009) pp.255-256.
42 Lions, Donkeys and Dinosaurs: Waste and Blundering in the Military, p.216.
Direction from the Declaratory Level of Policy
As the above evidence indicates, decisions on equipment procurement were made primarily 
at the declaratory level, with attendant input from the armed forces at the operational level. 
The obvious point to make here is that the equipment and systems that the defence industry in 
the UK produced, as with any other country, was chiefly determined by the requirements of 
the British government and the British armed forces. This point was made in the National 
Defence Industry and Technology Strategy (NDITS) of 2004, (a report commissioned by the 
National Defence Industries Council (NDIC) and the National Defence and Aerospace 
Systems Panel (NDASP)) that commented ‘Industry’s technology strategy is driven by 
MoD’s equipment procurement strategy in terms of both the equipment requirement and how 
it is procured and maintained’.43 Indeed, the declaratory level of defence policy confirmed 
this interpretation when it observed in 2007’s Innovation Strategy ‘For innovation to flourish, 
we must identify our needs early and articulate our future capability aspirations in a form all 
potential suppliers can understand’.44
Due to this reliance on direction from the declaratory level of defence policy, the 
approaches to energy security manifested in procurement at the defence-industrial level of 
policy remained generally in line with that at the declaratory level. As such, there was a 
failure to emphasise research into alternative energy technologies until the last few years of 
the Labour government as the control paradigm approach to energy security meant this was 
not a priority. Where there was research and development into alternative energy 
technologies prior to 2006, this could be attributed to the specific nature of the programme 
(such as the Army’s FIST programme) or the further development of technology that had 
already been utilised (the Type 45 destroyer’s Integrated Electric Propulsion System (IEPS)) 
rather than any real appreciation of energy security issues. Then, as sustainable energy 
security ideas became more ingrained at the declaratory level of defence policy from 2006 
onwards, there were increased calls by the MOD for ideas on how new energy technologies 
could be utilised by the military.
Firstly, if we examine the government’s stated procurement strategy, we can see that 
there was little attention devoted to energy issues until the Defence Industrial Strategy of 
2005. For example, the SDR of 1998 introduced the new procurement policy o f ‘Smart
43 NDIC and NDASP, National Defence Industry Technology Strategy 2004: Executive Summary (DTI, 2004)
p.2.
44 MOD, Innovation Strategy: Creating a new environment for innovation within the defence supply chain 
(MOD, 2007) p.5.
Procurement’ in British defence policy. This aimed to improve the defence acquisition 
process through setting less ambitious targets for the initial capability of new equipment but 
meeting any emerging requirements with pre-planned upgrades.45 There were also other 
measures to improve the cost-efficiency of defence procurement through the creation of 
Integrated Project Teams (IPTs) that would ensure a coherent ‘through-life’ approach to any 
procurement throughout the process of development46 Despite this recalibration of the 
procurement process, there was no mention here of the importance of the development of 
alternative energy technologies. This omission was continued in the ‘Defence Support’ 
chapter o f the SDR that outlined the changes in the logistical framework of the armed forces 
for the 21st century.47 Hence, the potential for development of alternative sources of power 
and fuel were not considered to be important enough to merit discussion within the 
declaratory level of policy at the beginning of the Labour government’s time in office.
This approach continued with the publication of the government’s Defence Industrial 
Policy (DIP) paper in 2002.48 This update to the Smart Procurement programme (which had 
been renamed Smart Acquisition in 2000) was welcomed by the defence industry as a good 
demonstration of support.49 Still, there was no mention of any desire to invest in alternative 
energy technologies for the military. For instance, the DIP stated that the global strategic 
environment had changed but there was no mention of what these changes were or how they 
should affect research and development strategies.50 In the research and technology section of 
the paper there was also a lack of specificity on what areas the government’s research budget 
should be invested in. Thus, the British DIB continued to receive little guidance from the 
declaratory level of defence policy on what emerging technologies should be research 
priorities. Indeed, this lack of direction from the government attracted a significant degree of 
criticism from figures within the defence industry at the time.51
The Defence Industrial Strategy (DIS) of 2005 provided the first statement of a desire 
to develop new energy technologies. Indeed, the DIS proved to be the most comprehensive 
statement of the Labour government’s procurement strategy since it came to power in 1997.
45 SDR, paragraph 156.
46 SDR, paragraph 157.
47 SDR, chapter 9.
48 MOD, Ministry o f  Defence Policy Paper -  Paper No. 5: Defence Industrial Policy (MOD, 2002).
49 See Claire Taylor and Tom Waldman, ‘British defence policy since 1997’, House o f  Commons Library 
Research Paper 08/57 (27 June 2008) p.35.
50Ministry o f  Defence Policy Paper - Paper No. 5: Defence-Industrial Policy, p.3, p.5, p.7.
51 ‘A common concern identified by industry was the need for clarification on what UK industrial capabilities 
and defence industry would be required in the future’. House of Commons Defence Committee, Sixth Report -  
Defence Procurement: Volume I, HC. 572-1, session 2003-2004 (London: TSO, 2004) paragraph 108.
In contrast to previous statements on procurement, it provided greater detail on where it 
believed research and development within the defence industry should be concentrated in the 
future. As such, the requirement for development of alternative fuel and power sources was 
outlined in the section entitled ‘Technologies for Future Capability Solutions’: ‘Key 
technologies that we will need to understand and exploit, or modify to meet military 
applications, are: efficient motive power for vehicles and power supply for systems; personal 
power sources; fuel cells ... We also recognise that integrated propulsion and power plant in 
UCAVs could become a critical defence capability as demand for power is driven by 
increasingly complex embedded electronics; and that UK excellence in propulsion provides 
the opportunity to gain a competitive advantage in this area of technology’. However, this 
particular area for development, whilst being recognised, was not given major prominence 
within the DIS. Similarly, there was no mention of the need to develop these technologies to 
address the twin drivers of climate change and competition for energy resources. Instead, 
emerging energy technologies were part of a number of technologies outlined as important, 
including data and information technologies, sensor technologies and remote and autonomous 
operation technologies. Consequently, alternative energy solutions were viewed as being 
one constituent part of an overall trend towards development of newer technologies, and were 
not considered an essential focus for development in their own right.
This articulation of the need for energy technology research was continued in the 
Defence Technology Strategy (DTS) of 2006, which expressed clearly for the first time the 
government’s priorities in military research and development.54 As such, fuel cells were 
articulated as a ‘priority’ technology for research and as important for future military 
capability: ‘The availability of both electrical and motive power is of the highest importance 
to modem military operations, requiring a systems approach across the military logistics 
supply chain’.55 This change in approach to energy technology reflected the overall 
governmental recognition of the importance of energy security considerations from 2006 
onwards, which (as we saw in Chapter Three) led to a gradual appraisal of the importance of 
new energy technologies within the MOD. Indeed, for the first time the DTS outlined energy 
security and climate changes as ‘key challenges’ in future technology research and 
innovation. As such, we can see here the first correlation between developments in energy 
technology and the desire to address these twin drivers of insecurity.
52 Defence Industrial Strategy: Defence White Paper, Cm. 6697 (London: TSO, 2005) p. 123.
53 Ibid. pp. 122-123.
54 MOD, Defence Technology Strategy for the demands o f  the 21st Century (MOD, 2006).
55 Ibid. p.52.
In addition, a number of programmes for research into energy solutions to particular 
problems were outlined by the MOD in the last year of the Labour administration. These 
included a ‘Future Tank’ that would need to have a ‘reduced logistic footprint’ and ‘Electric
I
drive systems to realise the potential for such a fighting vehicle system’, as well as a ‘Self 
Sustaining Forward Operating Base’ that would need to rely on alternative and renewable 
fuel technologies.56 Thus, these initiatives indicated that the MOD was starting to take the 
need to develop new energy sources more seriously in the last two years of the Labour 
government, as evidenced by the Climate Change Strategy and trinity of Climate Change 
Strategy Papers (as well as the Sustainable Procurement Strategy) that were published in this
en
period. Accordingly (as was to be expected given the importance of direction from the 
declaratory level of policy) there was an adoption of sustainable security notions in defence 
procurement
In sum, we can see that the lack of any clear enunciation of the need for research into 
alternative energy and power generation technologies at the declaratory level of defence 
policy led to delayed research into this particular area. As explained, the British DIB still 
relied heavily on direction as to what research areas to focus on from the government, due to 
the fact that the British government remained the key buyer of British military equipment. 
With this important factor in mind, we will now turn our attention to other reasons for the 
failure to invest in sustainable energy technologies since 1997.
The Cost of Major Procurement Projects and Budgetary Constraints
Defence Procurement under the Labour government was dominated by large equipment 
projects, which continued to incur large costs on the overall defence budget and restricted the 
development of alternative energy solutions through the lack of focus on other procurement 
options. The Labour government inherited a number of equipment projects that, along with 
budgetary constraints due to the economic downturn, contributed to an almost 50% real terms
56 See MOD, ‘Future Protected Vehicle Capability Vision (FPVCV): Call for proposals & expressions of  
interest in Innovative and Novel Military Vehicle Technologies Sub Systems’, Centre fo r Defence Enterprise 
call fo r  proposals & expressions o f  interest in Innovative and Novel Military Technologies Sub Systems (MOD, 
June 2009) accessed at http://www.science.m od.uk/getpfd.pdf? 158 on 4 May 2012 and Ministry o f Defence, 
‘Reducing Operational dependency on Fossil Fuels Capability Vision: ‘The Self Sustaining Forward Operating 
Base” , Centre fo r Defence Enterprise call fo r proposals (MOD, June 2009) accessed at
http://w w w.science.m od.uk/search.aspx?client=default frontend& filter=Q&output=xrnl no dtd& q=sustaining&  
site=default collection on 4 May 2012.
57 See Chapter Four.
cut in the MOD’s research and development budget from 1997 to 2010.58 These projects 
included the Eurofighter (with a projected cost of £13.3 billion in 1993 that subsequently rose 
to around £20.6 billion), Nimrod (an initial projected cost of £2.4 billion that rose to the 
figure of £3.6 billion) and the Astute class attack submarines (initial projected cost of £2.1 
billion; eventual estimated cost of £3.9 billion).59 However, the blame for these procurement 
overruns could not be laid solely on the previous Conservative government as the Labour 
government’s procurement decisions continued to result in large overspends, as well as 
continued delays in weapons systems entering service with the armed forces. The examples 
included the Army’s much delayed Future Rapid Effects System (FRES) (which aimed to 
provide medium-weight armoured vehicles that could be deployed quickly via airlift), the 
new Type 45 Destroyers, the JCA being designed to replace the Harrier Vertical Take Off 
and Landing (VTOL) Jet and the Royal Navy’s Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers.60
In addition, the high operational tempo of the armed forces during this period saw 
UORs being increasingly used to fill any capability gaps on specific operations. This had the 
effect of reducing the money that could be assigned to future equipment programmes, 
resulting in continued delays in those equipment programmes and less money allocated to 
research and development in defence.61 Hence, research spending had to be focussed on 
specific areas, these being counter terrorism and support for operations, which paralleled with
58 House o f Commons Defence Select Committee, Sixth Report - Defence Equipment 2010, HC. 99, session 
2009-2010 (London: TSO, 2010) p.38.
59 Eurofighter Typhoon and Nimrod figures taken from: NAO, Ministry o f  Defence - Major Projects Report 
1999 - Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, HC. 613, session 1999-2000 (London: TSO, 2000) p.2 
and NAO, Ministry o f  Defence -  The Major Projects Report 2010 - Report by the Comptroller and Auditor 
General, HC. 489-1, session 2010-2011 (London: TSO, 2010) date from figure 3; Astute figures taken from 
NAO, Ministry o f  Defence - Major Projects Report 1999 - Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, HC. 
613, session 1999-2000 (London: TSO, 2000) p.2 and House o f Commons Defence Committee, Third R eport-  
Defence Equipment 2009: Memorandum from the Ministry o f  Defence, HC. 107, session 2008-2009 (London: 
TSO, 2009) Ev. 84.
60 For a detailed outline o f the significant delays in the FRES programme since its inception see: NAO, Ministry 
o f  Defence - The cost-effective delivery o f  an armoured vehicle capability - Report by the Comptroller and 
Auditor General, HC. 1029, session 2010-2012 (London: TSO, 2011) p.5; for information on the Type 45 
destroyer see: NAO, Ministry o f  Defence - Providing Anti-Air Warfare Capability: the Type 45 Destroyer - 
Report by the Comptroller and Auditor General, HC. 295, session 2008-2009 (London: TSO, 2009) p. 17; for 
information on the delays in the Future Carrier and JCA programmes see: House o f Commons Defence 
Committee, Second Report -  Future Carrier and Joint Combat Aircraft Programmes, HC. 554, session 2005- 
2006 (London: TSO, 2005) and NAO, Ministry o f  Defence -  The Major Projects Report 2010 - Report by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General, HC. 489-1, session 2010-2011 (London: TSO, 2010) date from figure 3.
61 ‘It can be clearly predicted that [the FRES] programmes are at risk from further delay or dilution due to the 
volume o f UOR vehicles procured over the past two years’. Chris Maughan, ‘The Impact o f UORs on the UK 
Defence Industry’, RUSIDefence Systems, Vol. 11, No. 3 (2009); Ian Godden: ‘We have an incompatibility 
today between George Robertson’s SDR and the money available for the Future Equipment Programme, so one 
of these two things has to give’. House o f  Commons Defence Committee, Third Report -  Defence Equipment 
2009: Minutes o f  Evidence, HC. 107, session 2008-2009 (London: TSO, 2009) answer to question 79; also, see 
David Kirkpatrick, ‘Lessons from the Report on MoD Major Projects’, RUSI Defence Systems, Vol. 12, No. 1 
(2009).
the declaratory focus on expeditionary operations and defeating international terrorism. This 
was to the detriment of innovation in alternative areas, such as energy and power generation
fOtechnology. Similarly, the delay in the delivery of the various aforementioned weapons 
systems also contributed to a lack of focus on the perceived urgency of the development of 
alternative fuels and motive power systems. This is because, once fully operational, weapons 
systems such as the Eurofighter Typhoon and the JCA were expected to have a service life of 
around 25 years, if not longer. Given this fact, as well as seeing that the UK’s full 
complement of Typhoon’s was not fully delivered during Labour’s time in government and 
the JCA would not enter service during Labour’s time in power, it was understandable that 
military planners were not heavily focussed on developing renewable or alternative energy 
technologies to be used in systems such as these. It would seem these considerations were 
more likely to be important in the next major round of procurement decisions that would be 
taken in the 10 to 15 years after 2010. It must also be noted here that the government’s 
defence procurement strategy emphasised a ‘through-life approach’ that intended to upgrade 
basic weapons platforms with more advanced technology throughout their service life.64 This 
presented the possibility that more advanced fuels could be utilised and alternative engine 
types installed by the armed forces as these became available. Accordingly, this provides 
another explanation as to the failure to address this issue in the early years of the Labour 
administration.
62 House o f Commons Defence Select Committee, Sixth Report - Defence Equipment 2010, HC. 99, session 
2009-2010 (London: TSO, 2010) pp.38-39
63 See Keith Hartley, ‘The Industrial and Economic Benefits o f Eurofighter Typhoon: Updated Report’, Paper 
commissioned by Eurofighter PR & Communications Office (2008) p. 12, accessed at
http://www.eurofighter.com/fileadmin/web data/down loads/extpub/03 Typhoon Updated Report Feb 2008.p 
df on 4 May 2012 and Jeremiah Gertler, ‘F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background and Issues for 
Congress’, CRS Report fo r Congress (2009) p. 12, accessed at 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/crs/rl30563.pdf on 4 May 2012.
64 SDR, paragraph 156 and paragraph 157; also, see Innovation Strategy: Creating a new environment for  
innovation within the defence supply chain, p.6; Chief Executive o f defence company MBDA, Guy Griffiths: 
‘Today the UK MoD has 27 complex weapons either in service or under procurement, and one can envisage 
over the course of the next 10-20 years that through a policy of technology insertion (not massive new 
programmes but small investments in particular enhancements to those systems) one could both increase 
military capability at a relative modest expense but also, through introducing modularity, thin down and reduce 
the number o f systems that need to be retained in service by making them more versatile to particular varieties 
o f applications’. House of Commons Defence Committee, Seventh Report -  The Defence Industrial Strategy: 
Minutes o f  Evidence, 31 January 2006, HC. 824, session 2005-2006 (London: TSO, 2006) answer to question
An Increased Reliance on the Civilian Sector and Other Nations to Develop 
Transferable Energy Technology
Another reason for the lack of movement towards alternative and renewable energy 
technologies within the DIB was that, in the light of reduced research budgets, the UK 
government believed that the civilian sector and other states such as the US would be able to 
develop transferable technologies that the UK armed forces could then utilise.65 For example, 
Elizabeth Quintana of RUSI stated that there was little perceived benefit within the RAF for 
the development of its own synthetic or bio-fuels, due to the aforementioned limited research 
budget. As such, they hoped that the US military or the civilian sector would develop a viable 
alternative fuel that could then be used within the British armed forces.66 Similarly, Lord 
Walker commented that during his time as CDS (2003-2006) there was a degree of interest in 
the possibilities of alternative fuel technologies amongst the British armed forces but this was 
essentially seen as something that needed to be developed in the civilian sector.67 Indeed, the 
need to collaborate more with civilian industries to develop transferable technology was 
outlined in the SDR,6*
Additionally, although energy issues were not paramount in the MOD’s thinking at 
the time, an emphasis on technology transfer with the Americans was outlined in the DIP in 
the comment ‘The Government is pressing for a freer flow of technology created on both 
sides of the Atlantic. The UK has signed a Declaration of Principles with the US which 
commits both governments to improve the operation of transatlantic defence business. As 
part of these efforts we are seeking the easier transfer of defence information not just between 
the two governments but at the industry level’.69 This desire to rely on the United States to 
develop technologies that could then be used by British forces was further illustrated by the 
signing of the US-UK Defence Trade Co-operation Treaty in 2007, which sought to reduce 
export controls and facilitate the transfer of classified technological data between the US and
65 ‘As the SDR recognises, the growth o f new and sophisticated technologies presents another significant 
challenge for MoD procurement. The solutions proposed in the new smart procurement initiative must address 
not only the lessons o f history, but a range o f new and emerging technological challenges. An increasing 
proportion o f civilian technology can be adapted to military purposes or integrated into military systems’. House 
o f Commons Defence Committee, Eighth Report -  The Strategic Defence Review, HC. 138-1, session 1997- 
1998 (London: TSO, 1998) paragraph 320.
66 See Department o f  Defense Energy Blog, ‘Ministry o f Defense [sic] Implementing Sustainability’ (28 
January 2010) accessed at http://dodenergv.blogspot.com/2010/01/uk-ministry-of-defense-role-in.html on 4 
May 2012.
67 Interview with Lord Walker of Aldringham, 17 March 2011.
68 See SDR, supporting essay number three.
69 Ministry o f  Defence Policy Paper -  Paper No. 5: Defence Industrial Policy, p. 16.
70UK so as to enhance cooperation between the two states. Indeed, senior figures within BAE 
Systems outlined the desire for greater technological cooperation between the two countries 
in 2006 and 2008.71
This indicated that there was the recognition within the British defence establishment 
that the United States was likely to make greater headway in the development of emerging 
technologies, and particularly in the field of alternative energy. This assumption was with 
good reason as there was a whole raft of publications by the different branches of the US 
armed forces in this period outlining potential responses to this issue.72 Indeed, the interest in 
new energy technologies far outweighed that that was demonstrated by officers serving with
I'Xthe British armed forces. Essentially, it appeared that the UK, due to reduced research 
investment, was more and more willing to buck-pass in terms of the research and 
development of sustainable energy technologies and sought to rely on technology transfer 
from the US in this area, as much as possible.
The Development of Alternative Energy Solutions within the British Defence Industry
As alluded to earlier in the chapter, there were advances made by British industry in terms of 
alternative energy technology for military use in this period. However, this progress was not 
directly related to any consideration of wider energy security issues. Rather it was due to the 
particular requirements of the systems that needed to be developed. For example, the Army’s
70 Claire Taylor, ‘UK-US Defence Trade Co-operations Treaty’, House o f  Commons Library Standard Note 
SN/IA/4381 (17 February 2009).
71 ‘If the US cannot find a way to share US systems technology for the Brits to do those things, then, speaking 
more as an individual British citizen, rather than CEO of BAE Systems, I am concerned about the 
consequences’. BAE Systems Chief Executive Mike Turner, Speech to the Washington Economic Club (10 May 
2006) accessed at
http://www.baesystems.com/Newsroom/SpeechesandPresentations/autoGen 107128111230.html on 4 May 
2012 and Chairman o f the DMA, Guy Griffiths, ‘Meeting the Global Challenge Market’, Speech made to SBAC 
Conference (27 March 2008) accessed at
http://www.baesvstems.com/Newsroom/SpeechesandPresentations/autoGen 1083110145.html on 4 May 2012.
72 As early as 2001, the US Department o f Defense [DOD] produced a document looking at ways to increase 
fuel efficiency in the US armed forces. See Department o f Defense, ‘More Capable Warfighting Through 
Reduced Fuel Burden’, Report o f the Defense Science Board (DOD, 2001) accessed at 
www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/ADA392666.pdf on 4 May 2012. Publications include: Lt. Colonel Michael J. 
Hornitschek, ‘War Without Oil: A Catalyst fo r True Transformation’, Occasional Paper No. 56: Center for  
Strategy and Technology (2006); Scott C. Buchanan [a strategist in the US DOD], ‘Energy and Force 
Transformation ’, Joint Force Quarterly, Iss. 42, No. 3 (2006); also, see Department o f  Defense Energy Blog, 
Ministry o f Defense [sic] Implementing Sustainability’ (28 January 2010) accessed at 
http://dodenergv.b1ogspot.com/2010/01/uk-ministry-of-defense-role-in.htm1 on 4 May 2012.
73 US General James Mattis, former military commander in Iraq, commented in 2003 ‘Release us from the tether 
o f fuel’. There has been no similar statement by a British senior officer in the past decade or so despite the 
increased prominence of military views in the media recently. For further information on US energy technology 
developments in this period see The Economist, ‘Technology Quarterly: Greenery on the march’ (12 December 
2009).
FIST programme sought to provide ‘dismounted soldiers with an integrated suite of 
equipment that [optimised] their effectiveness on the battlefield’.74 Essentially, this meant 
linking all of the soldier’s future equipment (radios, computers, Global Positioning Systems 
(GPS), weapon sights and cameras) into an integrated system that would see each individual 
soldier able to transmit real-time information to their commanders so as to give a better
• 7cimpression of what was occurring on the battlefield. Thus, this was essentially an NEC 
concept diffused to front-line soldiers at squad-level.76 The power demands of the equipment 
to be used required the development of novel power generation technology and, as a result, in 
2007 the MOD commissioned the British defence company Qinetiq and the American firm 
ABSL Power Solutions to develop personal power sources utilising fuel cell technology for
77this particular programme. Similar investment was also put into research for naval and air
♦ • 751 • •force fuel cell technologies in 2008. Similarly, the potential utilisation of hybrid electric 
drive technology in the Army’s FRES programme was mooted as early as 1997 (although it 
must be noted here that this technology has been available in various forms for over a
7 0hundred years). Still, this proposal was not due to energy security considerations per se. 
Rather, the operational advantages of such technology were of prime importance.
The Royal Navy had a particularly good history of innovation in motive technology 
for its ships, which seemed to give it a greater appreciation of energy issues and the potential
OA
application of new motive technologies. Accordingly, in the examined period, Integrated 
Electrical Propulsion Systems (IEPSs) were planned for the new Type 45 Destroyers,
74 NAO, Ministry o f  Defence -  Major Projects Report 2007 Project Summary Sheets -  Report by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General, HC. 98-11, session 2007-2008 (London: TSO, 2007) p. 176.
75 Derek Barnes, ‘A Vision o f the Infantry Soldier in 2020’, RUSI Defence Systems, Vol. 7, No. 3 (2005) p.77 
and Paul Wathen, ‘Trialling the Future Integrated Soldier Technology’, RUSI Defence Systems, Vol. 7, No. 3 
(2005) p.85.
76 Refer to Chapter Three for further information on NEC.
77 Nicholas Huleatt-James & Joseph McCamey, ‘Outlook: Delivering fuel cell technology to the military’, Low 
Carbon and Fuel Cell Technology Knowledge Transfer Network Paper (June 2008).
78 Ibid.
79 NAO, Ministry o f Defence - The cost-effective delivery o f  an armoured vehicle capability - Report by the 
Comptroller and Auditor General, HC. 1029, session 2010-2012 (London: TSO, 2011) p.14 and Sandy Wilson, 
‘Hybrid Electric Drive’, RUSI Defence Systems, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2008).
80 The Royal Navy was the first service to use oil power for its ship; it was the first service to use nuclear power 
with the launch o f the Resolution class nuclear-powered submarines in the 1960s; it was the first service to use 
electric propulsion with the Type 23 Frigates (entering service in the 1990s) being the first surface ships to 
utilise this motive technology. See C. G. Hodge and D. J. Mattick, ‘The Electric Warship: Then, Now and 
Later’, Paper on electric propulsion and the advances over the last 30 years presented at INEC 2008 in 
Hamburg, Germany (2008) accessed at http://m edia.bm t.org/bm t m edia/resources/33/E lectricPropulsion.pdf on 
4 May 2012.
Landing Platform Docks (LPDs) and Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers.81 Electrical 
propulsion differs from the more traditional mechanical propulsion systems in that the ships 
engines produce a common pool of electricity which is then used to power the ship’s engines 
and the ship’s other onboard electricity needs (computer systems, general electric power etc). 
In contrast, traditional mechanical propulsion systems have two sets of engines; one set to 
propel the ship and the other set to provide the onboard electricity.82 Because of this, 
electrical propulsion systems save space, are more energy-efficient and result in an increased 
range of operations. Thus, the Royal Navy’s most modem ships were employing novel 
energy technologies at this time but there is no evidence to suggest that this was due to the 
impact of energy security considerations. Instead, the operational advantages imparted by the 
IEPS were the main consideration.
As regards aerial vehicles during this period there was little investment in alternative 
sources of energy for manned aircraft within the British defence sector for the reasons 
previously outlined in this chapter. The picture in terms of unmanned vehicles became more 
promising from 2008 with the development of the solar-powered Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(UAV) Zephyr by Qinetiq in collaboration with a US company. Indeed, it was believed that 
Zephyr could have the capability to stay airborne for indefinite periods of time.84 However, 
there was no specific in-service date for this and other UAVs in development by the MOD at 
this time (Watchkeeper and Taranis) were not planned to utilise alternative power sources, 
instead continuing to rely on traditional internal combustion engine propulsion.85 Again, there 
is no evidence to indicate that the Zephyr’s development was influenced to any significant 
degree by the desire to address climate change or any energy security considerations. Hence,
81See Rosamond, Jon, ‘All systems go as electric solutions power future ships’, Jane’s Navy International (May
2008) accessed at http://niedia.bmt.org/bmt media/resources/33/ArticlefromJanesCJanesInformationGroup.pdf 
on 7 May 2012.
82 See Captain S. S. Chitale, ‘Integrated Full Electric Propulsion (IFEP)’, Paper presented at Twenty-third 
National Convention o f Marine Engineers, Jaipur (September 2009) accessed at 
http://www.ieindia.org/pdf/90/90MR2Q3.pdf on 4 May 2012.
83 See Navy Matters Website, ‘Future Aircraft Carrier -  CVF: part 2 ’ (2012) accessed at http://navy- 
matters.beedall.com/cvO-2.htm on 6 May 2012.
84 Qinetiq Website, ‘QinetiQ's Zephyr solar-powered unmanned aerial system is flown by US Naval Air Warfare 
Center personnel’ (23 November 2009) accessed at http://www.qinetiq.com/news/pressreleases/Pages/us- 
zephyr.aspx on 6 May 2012 and Richard Gray, ‘Solar powered spy plane breaks flight record’, The Daily 
Telegraph (23 August 2008). The Zephyr stayed in the air for three and a half days.
85 See an outline o f the proposed Taranis Unmanned Combat Air Vehicle (UCAV) at airforcetechnology.com, 
‘Taranis, United Kingdom’ (2012) accessed at
http://www.airforce-technology.com/proiects/tanaris/ on 4 May 2012. For information on the Watchkeeper 
UAV see Thales Group Website, ‘Watchkeeper UAV undertakes maiden flight’ (15 April 2010) accessed at
http://www.thalesgroup.com/Pages/Event.aspx?id=6918 on 7 May 2012.
the operational benefits of this platform seem to have been the paramount factor in its 
development.
Given the above evidence, we can see that the MOD did begin to invest money into 
developing alternatives to traditionally powered equipment during the examined period. 
Through reduction in greenhouse gas emissions and improvement in energy efficiency, these 
were likely to aid in providing sustainable security solutions to the potential conflict drivers 
of energy resource competition and climate change, even if this was not one of the main 
intentions shaping their development. As such, there was some movement towards the 
adoption of technology amenable to sustainable security principles, although without the 
attendant sustainable security intentions being evident in the justification for their 
development.
Arms Exports; Evidence of a Control Paradigm Approach
In terms of the impact of energy security considerations on British arms exports we can see 
that there was a clear control paradigm approach apparent in the Labour government’s desire 
to facilitate sales of defence equipment to the Middle East in the examined period. Certainly, 
the British defence industry used defence exports to bolster links between the UK and Saudi 
Arabia in particular, acting as a proxy for the Labour government. In this manner, the 
government hoped to ensure continued influence in a strategically important region, as well 
as close relations with a regime that controlled the world’s largest proven oil reserves and 
whose oil production was a key determinant of world oil prices. Indeed, the SDR implied the
o /
importance of defence exports to Labour’s defence vision. Similarly, the Defence Select 
Committee certainly believed that British defence exports enhanced UK political influence in
87those countries that received British arms. In addition, Mark Phythian commented that arms
exports were ‘an expression of Britain’s desire to play a world role and a way of facilitating 
88it’. Thus, the evidence in succeeding paragraphs will demonstrate this argument.
86 ‘The Government’s manifesto contained a commitment to maintain a strong British defence industry. The 
MOD will continue to support and promote defence exports within the strict criteria laid down in July 1997 to 
avoid their misuse for aggression or internal oppression’. SDR, paragraph 163.
87 ‘There are also other significant but often unquantifiable benefits from defence exports. They may be decisive 
in supporting strategic defence manufacturing capabilities within the UK, and it is argued that they help open up 
overseas markets for civil exporters. They are also seen to help in cementing military alliances and in bringing 
political influence where it might not otherwise exist’. House o f Commons Defence Committee, Second Report 
-  The Appointment o f  the New Head o f  Defence Exports Services, HC. 147, session 1998-1999 (London: TSO. 
1999) paragraph 10.
88 The Politics o f  British Arms Sales Since 1964, p.33.
When we examine the evidence we can see there has been a history of arms exports 
between Great Britain and countries in the Middle East stretching back to the 1950s.89 
However, the most significant transactions in this region were the so-called Al-Yamamah 
arms deals of the 1980s and 1990s, which saw Saudi Arabia purchasing Tornado and Hawk 
jets from Britain for approximately £43 billion over a twenty year period.90 This willingness 
to sell arms to the Middle East continued between 1997 and 2010 despite Labour’s supposed 
‘ethical’ foreign policy. For example, by monetary value, Saudi Arabia was the top 
destination for British arms exports in 1998 and 2003, as well as being the second largest 
export market for each of the years from 1999 to 2001.91 Similarly, Oman was the fourth and 
third most valuable destination for British arms exports in 2004 and 2005 respectively and the 
United Arab Emirates (UAE) was the fourth most valuable market in monetary terms in 
1998.92
Following on from this, a further accord between the UK and Saudi Arabia (termed 
‘Al-Salam’) confirmed in 2007, resulted in the agreement to sell 72 Eurofighter Typhoons to 
Saudi Arabia for a fee of £4.4 billion, from which BAE Systems would benefit greatly. It 
would appear that the desire to keep this agreement for security reasons (which was mooted 
in meetings between Tony Blair and the Saudi regime in 2005) was behind the termination in 
December 2006 of a Serious Fraud Office (SFO) investigation into alleged corrupt practices 
used to secure the previous Al-Yamamah arms deals. This termination was in response to 
threats from the Saudi royal family that they would cut diplomatic links, intelligence co­
operation and end the Al-Salam arms deal, following SFO efforts to gain information on 
Swiss bank accounts used by the Saudi regime and allegedly connected to bribes provided by 
BAE Systems.94 The grounds given for the closure of the investigation by the SFO were the 
‘need to safeguard national and international security’.95 In relation to this, it was emphasised 
by the SFO and the Attorney General that the motive for termination was not related in any
89 See The Politics o f  British Arms Sales Since 1964, chapter 5 and chapter 6.
90 The Sunday Times, ‘BAE cashes in on £40 billion Arab jet deal’ (20 August 2006) and Tim Webb , ‘Bribing 
for Britain: Government Collusion in Arms Sales Corruption’, Goodwin Paper Number 5 (CAAT, 2007) p. 13
91 Access Strategic Export Controls Annual Reports at http://w w w.fco.gov.uk/en/publications-and- 
docum ents/publ ications 1 /annual-reports/export-controls 1 accessed on 2 October 2011.
92 Ibid.
93 See CAAT Website, ‘Arms Trade Issues - Saudi Arabia’ (2012) accessed at 
http://www.caat.org.uk/issues/saudi-arabia.php on 4 May 2012.
94 ‘BAE: Company out o f control’, CAAT Paper (2008) p.3, accessed at 
http://w ww.caat.org.uk/resources/publications/ on 4 May 2012.
95 CAAT, ‘Submission to High Court o f Justice : Eurofighter’, CAAT Document (2007) Paragraph 27, accessed
at http://www.controlbae.org.uk/background/CAAT witness statem ent.pdf on 4 May 2012.
way to economic interests.96 This seems to be belied by the fact that Tony Blair emphasised 
the number of jobs that could be lost in the UK if the Al-Salam arms deal did not go through, 
as well as the importance of maintaining good relations with a country that had a wider
Q*7‘strategic interest’ for the United Kingdom. Thus, we can see that good relations with such 
an important oil producer were more important to the British government than the need to 
conduct a justifiable criminal investigation.98
Another reason for the continued arms exports to the Middle East was the significant 
political influence that defence companies (particularly BAE Systems) had on the 
government at this time. In this instance, we can therefore see Allison’s GPM in play, with 
senior figures in the DIB able to influence declaratory policy to a significant degree. For 
example a defence industry insider commented that BAE Systems Chairman Sir Richard 
Evans was one of the few businessmen who could see Prime Minister Tony Blair on 
request.99 This was certainly not a new development, as Michael Portillo had noted that when 
he was Defence Secretary in the preceding Conservative administration senior figures in the 
defence industry would often bypass him and speak directly to the Prime Minister about their 
particular concerns.100 Indeed, there was a clear manifestation of what has been termed the 
‘revolving door’ in this period. In essence, the ‘revolving door’ sees Ministers, government 
officials and ex-members of the armed forces taking up jobs in the defence industry upon 
vacating their original occupations, and figures within the defence industry taking up 
seconded roles within government.101 The implication here is that this allows the defence 
industry to maintain close personal relationships with members of the government, 
potentially skewing procurement decisions in favour of vested interests rather than more
i ry>
objective considerations. Previous senior figures at the declaratory and operational levels
of policy who now work for companies involved in defence include Geoff Hoon, Adam
Ingram, Dr John Reid, ACM Sir Glenn Torpy, Admiral Sir Alan West and Lieutenant
10^General Richard Applegate.
96 Ibid. paragraph 28.
97 BBC News Online, ‘Blair defends Saudi probe ruling’ (15 December 2006) accessed at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk71/hi/uk politics/6182125.stm on 7 May 2012.
98 ‘BAE: Company out o f control’, CAAT Paper (2008) p.4.
99 Mick Lambert, Judith Rattenbury and Ian Prichard, ‘The Political Influence o f Arms Companies’, Campaign 
Against the Arms Trade Paper (April 2003) p.3.
100 ‘How the MoD Wastes Our Billions’, Dispatches- Channel 4, first broadcast on 20 September 2010.
101 Mick Lambert, Judith Rattenbury and Ian Prichard, ‘The Political Influence o f Arms Companies’, Campaign 
Against the Arms Trade Paper (April 2003) p.3.
1 Ibid.
103See CAAT Website, ‘Political Influence: Revolving D o o r-L o g ’ (2012) accessed at
http://www.caat.org.uk7issues/influence/revolving-door.php on 4 May 2012.
Thus, the political influence of figures within the British DIB was another reason for 
the facilitation of British arms sales to the Middle East by the declaratory sphere of policy, 
either through the allowance of military exports to countries in the region or via direct 
meetings with those countries’ rulers. Indeed, from 1997 until 2010 successive Defence 
Secretaries conducted bilateral meetings with Middle Eastern countries such as Oman, 
Kuwait, Qatar, Iraq, the UAE and Saudi Arabia every year, indicating the importance that 
was attached to maintaining good relations with these countries.104 This intervention was 
important for many British defence companies as the Middle East was either a profitable 
region at this time or considered to be a region in which companies could potentially enhance 
their future profitability.105
Finally, arms exports to regions such as the Middle East were encouraged as a key 
means of ensuring the survival of an independent British defence industry that could act as a 
symbol of continued British independence on the international stage (as well as ensuring 
security of supply in the event of war).106 For example , the SDR stated ‘The British defence 
industry is outstandingly successful and a vital national asset. It provides jobs for over 
400,000 people and earns the country around £5Bn [sic] from exports each year. From a 
defence point of view a healthy and competitive industrial base is crucial to ensuring that we 
will be able to continue to procure the right equipment for our forces at competitive
1 0 7prices’. The same arguments in support of the British defence industry were used by 
Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon in 2002 and Defence Minister Lord Drayson in 2007.108
I04Defence Minister Adam Ingram: ‘The Ministry o f Defence provides a high standard o f support to legitimate 
defence exports. The Defence ministerial team plays a full part in this work and Ministers have continued to 
promote UK defence exports vigorously. In recent years we have helped the UK defence industry to win orders 
worth on average around £5 billion annually ...’. Hansard, HC Deb Volume 429, Column 19(10 January 2005). 
For a list o f overseas visits made by Cabinet Ministers costing in excess o f £500 from 1997 onwards see 
National Archives Website, ‘Travel and Gifts’ (17 July 2009) accessed at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/proprietv and ethics/m in isters/tra 
vel gifts.aspx on 6 May 2012.
105 Outside the UK, EU and the US, Saudi Arabia was the largest defence market in monetary terms for BAE 
Systems in 2007 and 2008, accounting for £1.9 billion and £1.6 billion respectively. See ‘Leveraging Global 
Capability’, BAE Systems Annual Report 2008 (BAE, 2009) p .l 18; ‘Cobham is developing its activities in 
regions and countries which are forecast to experience higher growth rates, such as India, South Korea, Saudi 
Arabia and other Middle East states’. Cobham, Cobham Annual Report and Accounts 2009 (Cobham, 2010) p.9; 
‘There was also strong growth in Chemring’s munitions division, where sales leapt by 35 per cent thanks to 
orders from the Middle East’, John O’Doherty, ‘Bomb detectors lift Chemring sales’, The Financial Times (18 
January 2011).
106Ministry o f  Defence Policy Paper -  Paper No. 5: Defence Industrial Policy, p. 10.
107 SDR, paragraph 162.
108‘We all benefit from the quality o f our defence industry. And we can be proud o f its success. It provides some 
3% o f the UK's manufacturing output and employs some 345,000 people directly and indirectly. The defence 
industry makes a major contribution to the UK economy and to this country's science and technology base. Over 
the past 5 years it has achieved a global market share o f some 21%, which is second only to the US defence 
industry - which is o f considerably greater size’. Geoff Hoon, Speech at the Defence Industry Conference
Indeed, Jean Seaton has argued that, such is the desire to retain an independent British 
defence industry, that British defence policy can ultimately be seen as a defence industrial 
policy.109 Certainly, Antonia Feuchtwanger believed this to be a key reason for the continued 
overspending on British military equipment in her book The Best Kit; Why Britain ’s Defence 
Doesn ’t Need an All- British Defence Industry.110 Also, we can see Allison’s GPM at play in 
the desire for the Labour government to be seen to be protecting British industrial jobs, as 
any loss could affect key parliamentary constituencies. For example, Gordon Brown’s 
decision when Prime Minister to build the mooted aircraft carriers on the River Clyde and 
Portsmouth was seen by some as a way of upholding the Labour vote in key Labour seats.111
In sum, there was essentially a continuity of approach between the Labour 
government and their Conservative predecessors in the desire to promote arms exports to
119Middle Eastern countries. Energy security considerations and the desire to maintain 
influence in. a key global region certainly played a significant part in this attitude, although 
the lobbying power of the British DIB and the desire to protect and maintain an independent 
British defence industry were also key determinants of this approach.
Conclusion
In conclusion, we can see that energy security considerations had a variable degree of impact 
on the defence-industrial level of policy in this period. Firstly, we saw that defence industry 
representatives were interested in defending the position of the British defence industry by 
emphasising the importance of security of supply of military equipment to British forces, as 
well as the jobs that the industry sustained within the UK. The importance of the equipment 
produced by the DIB in ensuring the maintenance of overseas interests was not greatly used 
as this would have been a tenuous argument at best. As such, we can see that the GPM
(October 14 2002) accessed at http://articles.janes.com/articles/Janes-Defence-Weekly-2002/CQNFERENCE- 
Geoff-Hoon-s-speech-at-the-EXHIBlT10NS.html on 30 April 2012 and Lord Dray son, Speech at the Defence 
Manufacturers Reception (16 May 2007) accessed at
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20081120170436/http://www. mod.uk/Defencelnternet/AboutDefence 
/People/Speeches/MinDES/20070516DefenceManufacturersAssociationReception 16May2007.htm on 30 April 
2012 .
109 Jean Seaton, ‘The Defence and Security Review We Need’, The Political Quarterly, Vol. 81, No. 3 (2010) 
p.363.
110 Antonia Feucthwanger, The Best Kit; Why Britain’s Defence D oesn’t Need an All- British Defence Industry 
(London: Policy Exchange, 2004).
111 Angus Macleod, David Robertson and Roland Watson, ‘Revealed; the truth about the aircraft carrier deal’, 
The Times (22 October 2010).
112 Neil Cooper, ‘Arms exports, new labour and the pariah agenda’, Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 23, No. 
3 (2000) p.62.
explains the lack of alignment between the declaratory and defence-industrial spheres of 
policy in this respect, with the British DIB keen to protect its position within the British 
defence establishment through arguments regarding British independence, industrial expertise 
and employment. However, the articulation of sustainable security notions by the DIB from 
2006 onwards demonstrated the increasing importance of the issues of climate change and 
energy competition in defence and reflected the saliency of these issues as the 2010 General 
Election drew nearer. As we saw in Chapter Three, this could therefore be attributed to 
Dorman’s time cycle model and the attendant contraction of the time cycle at the declaratory 
sphere leading to pressure from the government for the British DIB to demonstrate their 
environmental credentials. Similarly, in political terms, adopting sustainable energy targets 
boosted defence companies’ corporate credentials. Thus, despite continued arms sales to 
Middle Eastern countries, there was an adoption of certain sustainable security tenets in this 
period that represented a positive move towards an ultimate ideal of sustainable energy 
security across the British defence establishment.
In terms of defence procurement, we saw that the development of the Astute class 
submarines, Type 45 destroyers and Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers was motivated to 
a degree by a governmental desire to maintain British influence in areas such as the Middle 
East. As such, their development could be ascribed to a control paradigm approach to energy 
security. There was also a lack of significant investment in energy technology research due to 
the cost of major procurement budgets and the assumption that the UK would be able to 
accrue the benefits of any technological research conducted by the United States or the 
civilian sector. Yet, there was research into alternative energy technologies for military use as 
regards the Army’s FIST programme, the Royal Navy’s IEPS and the development of the 
Zephyr solar-powered UAV, although their development could not be accredited to the 
impact of any energy security considerations.
Finally, we saw that arms exports to the Middle East were used in this period to 
bolster British influence in a region that was key to supplying British (and global) energy 
needs. In this manner, the Labour government continued the control paradigm approach of 
their Conservative predecessors. Nonetheless, there were other noteworthy explanations for 
the promotion of arms exports to the Middle East. The DIB had significant lobbying power 
and was able to use the ‘revolving door’ to try and sway Ministers to aid arms exports to the 
profitable Middle Eastern market. Also, the government was keen to promote arms exports 
as these ensured the profitability of the defence industry and helped safeguard jobs in key 
constituencies. Thus, we can again see the effect of the GPM, with the need for the
government to maintain political support and the interaction between different levels of 
defence policy leading to particular decisions being made at the defence-industrial level 
defence policy.
Conclusion
This thesis has examined the impact of concepts of energy security and sustainable security 
on defence policy during the tenure of the previous Labour government. In order to do this 
effectively, it utilised Ian Bellany’s framework for analysis that was initially outlined in his 
1994 book Reviewing Britain’s Defence. This divided British defence policy into three 
‘spheres’ of policy: the declaratory level, the operational level and the defence-industrial 
level. Hence, this structure created a sound methodological scaffolding that allowed effective 
analysis of the separate strands of defence policy, as well as enlightening the reader as to any 
synergies or differences between the three levels.
In addition to Bellany’s analytical model, the ORG’s concepts of a control paradigm 
and a sustainable security paradigm were used as twin prisms so as to analyse the effect of 
energy security considerations on defence policy in the examined period. The former 
paradigm allowed us to view the impact of energy security issues on defence policy through 
the justification of the need to develop or maintain the capability to deploy military force to 
secure important energy resources. In contrast, the latter paradigm emphasised a preventative 
approach, and its effect would therefore be seen in the espousal of the need to adopt better 
energy efficiency standards and develop alternative energy technologies for military use in 
order to address the conflict drivers of climate change and energy resource competition and, 
in the process, also enhance the United Kingdom’s energy security. Also, Andrew Dorman’s 
time cycle model of defence policy and Graham Allison’s three models of government were 
used as effective explanatory tools to clarify the reasons for the specific nature of the impacts 
of energy security considerations at each level of defence policy. Finally, Chapter Two 
outlined the energy needs of the United Kingdom in the examined period, so as to provide a 
solid understanding of the context in which decisions on energy security would be made.
Ultimately, the main body of the thesis established that energy security considerations 
did have an impact at each level of British defence policy between 1997 and 2010. However, 
this impact was variable and depended upon the differing aims of the actors at each of the 
policy levels. As such, there was no consistency in approach to the question of energy 
security considerations throughout defence policy. Still, where energy security issues were 
referenced, there tended to be a clear manifestation of the ORG’s control paradigm approach, 
with an emphasis on the securing of fossil fuels resources through military action. For 
example, the declaratory level of defence policy considered energy security to be a key issue
during this period, as the United Kingdom continued to rely heavily on fossil fuel-derived 
energy for its transportation and electricity generation needs. The need to ensure a continued 
supply of overseas energy resources in the face of diminishing North Sea oil and gas reserves, 
as well as rises in global energy prices, saw declaratory policy (in documents such as the SDR 
and The Future Strategic Context for Defence) emphasising the importance of maintaining 
the ability to intervene in energy-rich areas such as the Middle East. In essence, until 2008 
there was a purely control paradigm approach to the issue of energy security, with the British 
armed forces’ expeditionary capability being seen as an important means of ensuring 
continued energy supplies to the UK. However, as Chapter Three demonstrated, this was a 
rational governmental appraisal of a very real security concern. Certainly, there was a distinct 
lack of viable energy alternatives on offer for immediate use in the early part of the period 
under examination. This fact was evidenced by the concurrence with the government’s 
approach from the House of Commons Defence Committee, the Chief Scientific Adviser to 
the MOD, as well as the failure of opposition parties to criticise the government for failure to 
develop alternative energy technologies for use by the military. Thus, in the final analysis, 
until 2008 the approach of the Labour government to the issue of energy security was 
ultimately a decision based upon rational considerations, rather than any political pressure 
from other actors within defence policy or the wider British political establishment. In view 
of this, Allison’s RAM provided the best explanation as to the impact of energy security 
considerations at the declaratory level of policy in the first eleven years of the Labour 
government.
The RAM explanation for the energy security approach displayed at the declaratory 
level of policy was in stark contrast to the lack of interest shown in energy security matters 
by the Army and RAF at the operational level. Instead, both these services were initially 
more concerned with retaining their high-end warfighting capability in the face of uncertainty 
over their future roles following the recent end of the Cold War and the newly elected Labour 
government’s desire for the armed forces to be a ‘force for good in the world’. As such, 
energy security considerations were not considered to provide sufficient justification for the 
two services’ organisational and procurement proclivities. Additionally, there was the 
assumption in the Army that whatever mission they were tasked with they would have the 
capability and ingenuity to adapt to the exigencies of the specific environment in which they 
were deployed. This was due to the experiences garnered from the many differing combat 
environments the armed forces had been involved in since 1945. Similarly, the increased use 
of UORs in military operations during this time meant any past requirement for the need to
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develop equipment for use in specific regions or to fulfil a definite capability gap gradually 
receded.
Still, as Labour’s time in power looked to be drawing to a close and funding cuts 
became a distinct possibility, senior RAF officers used energy security justifications as a 
means of proposing continued investment in the RAF. This displayed a pertinent recognition 
of the increased saliency of energy issues within political discourse at this time (although not 
the sustainable security tenets that were being espoused within the declaratory circle of policy 
at this time; the RAF continued to emphasise how its conventionally powered equipment 
could ensure access to energy resources through the use of military force). However, the 
Army continued to ignore energy issues (except for occasional reference in doctrinal papers 
produced by the DCDC). Instead, its continued embroilment in operations in Afghanistan saw 
it emphasising the need to adapt the Army’s outlook and organisational structure so it was 
better suited to similar operations in the future. In light of this, Allison’s GPM provided an 
effective explanation as to the varying degrees of appreciation of energy security matters 
amongst the two services, with energy issues only impacting on the views of senior officers if 
they were seen as providing a strong argument for the continued funding of their service.
Ironically, the GPM also provided an effective explanation for the noticeable impact 
of energy security considerations in the statements and doctrine of the Royal Navy 
throughout the period in question. This was due to the fact that the Royal Navy could use the 
issue of energy security as a means to emphasise its economic importance to the British 
government and, in this manner, secure continued investment for its mooted procurement 
programmes. Indeed, the increasing political saliency of energy issues from 2003 onwards 
(with the publication of 2003’s Our Energy Future -  Creating a Low-Carbon Economy, the 
Stem Review of 2006 and the Climate Change Act of 2008) saw a continued stress by the 
Royal Navy on its ability to ensure access to energy resources through military action. As 
such, the ORG’s control paradigm approach to energy security was manifested by the Royal 
Navy from 1997 until 2010.
The work of the DCDC also demonstrated another difference in approach to energy 
security at the operational level of defence policy. As a department of the MOD, this body 
consisted of military and civilian personnel whose stated aim was to ‘produce concepts and 
doctrine ... to help inform decisions in Defence strategy, capability development and
operations ...L1 Essentially, the DCDC’s Strategic Trends programme saw climate change 
and energy resource competition as being key global conflict drivers from 2003 until 2040. 
This recognition of the importance of energy security considerations to defence policy could 
be attributed to the relative independence of the DCDC from the contemporary concerns of 
the government and the armed forces. It was allowed the scope to look forward twenty to 
thirty years in the future and to consult with independent strategic thinkers working outside 
the MOD. However, its stated reaction to these conflict drivers remained essentially a control 
paradigm response, with the application of military force still seen as the most effective 
means of ensuring the United Kingdom’s continued energy security. Again, this viewpoint 
could be ascribed to the peculiar makeup and role of the DCDC within the MOD. The 
freedom it had to predict the likely future security threats in the approaching two to three 
decades, combined with the civilian component to create an appreciation of the likely long 
term impacts of the energy security conflict drivers. Nevertheless, the military members of 
the DCDC put an emphasis on a military response to these drivers that was consistent with 
their backgrounds and training.
At the defence-industrial level of policy, energy security considerations had little 
effect on the perceptions of senior figures in the defence industry until 2008. There was no 
mention of the ability of the UK defence industry to protect British energy interests by 
producing equipment and weapons platforms that enhanced the UK’s expeditionary 
capability. Instead, statements from defence industry representatives demonstrated that their 
main focus was on the desire for the Labour government to continue to invest in the British 
DIB and also protect it from foreign takeover. The GPM provided an explanation for this 
approach as the DIB (in a similar vein to that demonstrated at the operational level of policy) 
remained understandably eager to defend its position within the British defence establishment 
in the face of cuts in research and development funding, in addition to delays in equipment 
programmes as the government sought to make short-term cost savings in the defence budget.
Still, despite the lack of impact of energy security concerns on the consciousness of 
actors within the defence industry, a control paradigm approach was discernible in the 
development of weapons platforms such as the Type 45 destroyers, the Astute class nuclear- 
powered submarines and the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers. These could all be used 
for power projection purposes and, given the statements made at the declaratory level about 
the importance of maintaining access to the Persian Gulf and its energy resources, were
1 DCDC Website, ‘What We Do’ (2012) accessed at
http://www.mod.uk/Defencelntemet/MicroSite/DCDC/WhatWeDo on 4 May 2012.
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therefore developed by the government to ensure the United Kingdom could continue to 
secure its interests abroad, with these interests including energy concerns. Of course, there 
were other factors in their development, including the Royal Navy’s desire for the 
procurement of such large weapons platforms as a demonstration of the Royal Navy’s 
continued independence as a service, as well as an organisational inclination towards these 
types of platforms.
Similarly, the continued facilitation of significant arms sales to Middle Eastern 
regimes illustrated the British government’s desire to maintain and demonstrate its influence 
in such a key strategic area. Thus, a control paradigm approach to energy security was again 
demonstrated with the desire to maintain the ‘military advantages enjoyed by key regional 
allies’, as well as the continued fostering of close links with the Saudi Arabian and Omani 
regimes. Nonetheless, as with the development of the Royal Navy’s new weapons platforms, 
there were other reasons for the assistance the government gave to British arms exporters. 
These included the lobbying power of the British defence industry, as well as the belief that 
the profits that overseas arms sales garnered for British defence companies would allow the 
continued existence of an independent British DIB. Of course, what this (and the 
procurement of military equipment such as the Type 45 destroyer) demonstrated, was that the 
DIB was to a certain extent beholden to the procurement decisions taken by the government 
and, to a large extent, the operational level of policy. Hence, any development of alternative 
energy technology (and consequent movement towards sustainable security tenets) wouldI
ultimately have had to come from direction given by the declaratory and operational spheres 
of defence policy.
Accordingly, we saw that the aforementioned differences and differing approaches to 
energy security at the three policy levels justified the use of the ORG’s control paradigm 
idea, as well as Allison’s three models of government. Both of these concepts were able to 
provide suitable explanations for the effect (or lack thereof) of energy security considerations 
at each level of defence policy. They also aided in illuminating the wider concerns at play at 
each level of defence policy and demonstrated the difficulty of transmitting the importance of 
particular security threats through all levels of defence policy, in the face of differing aims 
and concerns at each particular level.
2 Lewis Page, Lions, Donkeys and Dinosaurs: Waste and Blundering in the Military (London: Arrow, 2007)
p.216.
The ORG’s sustainable security paradigm and Dorman’s time cycle model were also 
of great use in identifying and explaining the changes in the appreciation of energy security 
concerns at the declaratory and defence-industrial levels of policy from 2008 onwards. For 
instance, the election of David Cameron as Leader of the Conservative Party in December 
2005 and the subsequent appointment of Gordon Brown as Prime Minister in 2007 saw 
environmental issues rising up the political agenda in Britain, as both of the main political 
parties attempted to emphasise their ‘green’ credentials (not least the Conservatives, who 
were keen to use environmental issues to portray themselves as a more ‘friendly’ party). 
Certainly, the passing of the Climate Change Act of 2008 saw the creation of legally-binding 
emissions targets for all government departments. Thus, the impending general election of 
2010 created an imperative for the government to display its willingness to address 
greenhouse gas emissions at all levels of government. This had the effect of compelling the 
MOD to publish its own Climate Change Strategy in December of that year. As it would have 
appeared politically remiss to ignore the substantial contribution of the MOD to Britain’s 
‘carbon footprint’, the declaratory level of policy increasingly moved towards the espousal of 
sustainable security notions with the further publication of papers such as the MOD Climate 
Change Strategy 2010, Defence In a Changing Climate and the Sustainable Procurement 
Strategy. These papers outlined the requirement for the MOD and the armed forces to cut 
their greenhouse gas emissions and move towards greater development of alternative energy 
technologies so as to address the issue of climate change and, in the process, improve the 
UK’s energy security situation. However, statements from Defence Secretaries in 2009 and 
2010 showed that the government was still eager to retain influence in the Middle East due to 
the continued reliance on oil reserves from this region.
In light of this evidence, we saw that Dorman’s time cycle model provided an 
effective explanation as to the reasons for the adoption of sustainable energy security 
principles at the declaratory level of defence policy from 2008 onwards. The forthcoming 
general election and the increased saliency of climate change and energy security (following 
the Stem Review and the UN IPCC report of 2007) meant the Labour administration was 
keen to avoid any opprobrium on these issues in all areas of government policy. Indeed, the 
government’s increased focus on the need to institute sustainable energy principles was 
transmitted to the defence-industrial level of policy with the establishment of the Sustainable 
Procurement Charter in 2008. Accordingly, the DIB became more willing to demonstrate its 
environmental credentials in journal articles, reports and specific papers such as Qinetiq’s 
Aviation CO2 Emissions Abatement Potential From Technology Innovation and Thales
Group’s annual Environment Report. Of course, as well as receiving a stimulus from the 
government on this issue, British defence companies understood the beneficial public 
relations effects that followed from the institution of such measures.
As well as helping to explain the particular impact of energy security issues on 
defence policy from 2008, Dorman’s time cycle model also aided in the explanation of other 
aspects of defence policy that were addressed in the main analysis. For example, we saw that 
the impact of the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States drastically changed the focus of 
British defence policy towards the combating of international terrorism and WMD 
proliferation. This left little chance of sustainable security principles being adopted as the UK 
became involved in long-running conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Similarly, the increased 
use of UORs when the armed forces were deployed overseas indicated a disjuncture between 
policy formulation and policy implementation in defence policy. Thus, the short-term 
political judgements of the government to intervene in certain regions did not always match 
up to the equipment capabilities of the armed forces. Finally, the DCDC’s contention in its 
2010 Strategic Trends papers that the development of alternative energy technologies in the 
near future would not be sufficient to replace fossil fuels appeared to be in contrast to the 
positive statements regarding renewable energy made in government papers such as the MOD 
Climate Change Delivery Plan, as well as the government’s own targets set out in the 
Climate Change Act of 2008. Given this evidence, we could see that the government and 
DCDC were operating in different time cycles, with the DCDC able to look ahead several 
decades, whilst the government had to operate in its own short-term political cycle (which 
emphasised its ‘green’ credentials) as the 2010 General Election drew ever closer.
This study also revealed that there was evidence of sustainable security ideas and 
technologies being adopted within the British defence establishment during this period 
without any attendant conception of the need to address the sustainable energy security 
drivers of climate change and energy resource competition. These changes were primarily 
caused by the operational experiences and imperatives of the time. Firstly, the Army’s 
experiences of stabilisation missions in Iraq and Afghanistan in this period saw a gradual 
appreciation of the need to adopt a ‘Comprehensive Approach’ to security. This meant 
greater inter-governmental and inter-departmental cooperation in the course of military 
operations and an Effects-Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) that focussed on the likely 
result of any military or political actions rather than emphasising the use of force as an end in
3 This aimed at a legally binding target o f an 80% reduction in emissions within the UK by 2050.
itself. Thus, the sustainable security paradigm’s notion of greater integration between 
government departments was embraced by the Army. Indeed, this idea was the prime 
conceptual focus of the Army from 2003 onwards, with senior Army officers and DCDC 
doctrinal papers outlining the importance of this approach in contemporary and future 
operations. There was a similar recognition of the importance of a ‘Comprehensive 
Approach’ to security in RAF doctrine at this time and, to a lesser extent, Royal Navy 
doctrine. However, the recognition of energy security issues in doctrine produced for the 
RAF and Army came from the DCDC and reflected their greater appreciation of these issues 
in comparison to the Army and RAF alone.
The experience of operations in such places as Afghanistan also affected the 
declaratory level of policy and saw the ‘Comprehensive Approach’ to security propounded 
with the publication of the NSS in 2008, which also noted the importance of an integrated 
approach to the United Kingdom’s security challenges. In contrast to the Army and RAF, 
there was an appreciation of energy security issues and the NSS did recommend the 
diversification of energy supplies and the development of renewable energy technologies as 
appropriate responses to future energy security challenges. The articulation of these measures 
would have been in response to the findings of the Stem Review of 2006 and the UN IPCC 
Report of 2007. However, despite the positive intent of the document, there was little in the 
way of precise content on how an integrated response to security threats would be instituted 
within government. As such, it bore the hallmarks of inter-departmental compromise which 
was redolent of Allison’s GPM.
Sustainable energy technologies for military usage were also researched at this time 
but without any energy security justifications. Instead, operational requirements were the 
paramount rationale for their development. For instance, the FIST programme looked to 
develop portable power devices to power dismounted infantry’s individual equipment. This 
was part of the wider drive to develop NEC within the armed forces and was stimulated by 
future operational requirements. Similarly, there was also continued development of the more 
energy efficient IEPS for many of the Royal Navy’s new ships, but, again, the main rationale 
for its use was the operational benefits that this motive system provided. Indeed, the British 
defence establishment’s technological focus on NEC in this period was certainly a factor in 
the lack of investment and lack of interest in renewable and alternative energy technologies. 
This was combined with an expectation that the British armed forces would be able to reap 
the benefits of any civilian or US military technological developments.
Looking to the future, the new Conservative government’s Defence Review (entitled 
Securing Britain in an Age o f Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review) saw 
energy security as a key issue in the face of the rising need for oil and gas imports to fuel 
Britain’s economy.4 Interestingly, there was little mention of the need for the military to 
adopt renewable and alternative energy technologies, perhaps highlighting again the 
importance of the electoral cycle in the publication of such documents as Defence in a 
Changing Climate. However, the sustainable security notion of greater inter-departmental 
cooperation on this issue was certainly highlighted, indicating that the lessons of the Labour 
era were understood to some degree.5 Ultimately, it appeared that the dominant control 
paradigm approach that was evident during the Labour government’s time in power was 
likely to persist as long as fossil fuels remained the predominant energy source, although the 
development of alternative energy sources may provoke a gradual evolution away from these 
in the future.
4 MOD, Securing Britain in an Age o f  Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, Cm. 7948
(London: TSO, 2010) p.50.
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